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This thesis is an account of international efforts to assess and control the 
possible human health and environmental effects of nanotechnologies. I 
show how the desire to reap the benefits of nanotechnologies has led 
decision-makers in America and Europe to adopt very similar policy 
strategies. While political reactions thus are largely comparable, industry 
responses however differ remarkably. The diverging industry reactions to 
comparable state policies invite a closer inspection of the institutional 
drivers of business behavior in regulatory politics. I trace the roots of the 
varied business responses through two case studies that explore how the 
institutions and processes of national chemical control regimes link to 
the strategic risk-benefit calculations of companies. I examine the 
policies developed to regulate the risks of nanomaterials in Britain, 
Denmark, Germany and the United States and compare the role of 
industry in the four countries’ regulatory processes.  
I argue that the capacity of state bureaucrats to credibly commit to 
regulatory outcomes shapes the political behavior of business. In areas of 
high scientific and technical uncertainty, such as nanotechnologies, new 
information can exercise significant influence on regulatory agendas, 
priorities and policies. This can work in industry’s favor, if disclosing 
information succeeds in convincing state bureaucrats to make decisions 
that benefits industry. Companies will however only volunteer 
information about their operations if they are confident that it will not 
be used to the detriment of their interests. I demonstrate how 
concentration of regulatory powers in executive bureaucracies and 
deliberative institutions structure business expectations about the 
probable behavior of state authorities, and how such institutions can 
convince companies to entrust state bureaucrats with sensitive 
information. The thesis in short speaks to the significant business 
influence over the outcome of regulatory politics that flows from the 
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This thesis began with a familiar question: why do industries self-regulate? I was led to this 
question in part from a curiosity of international efforts to regulate nanotechnologies and the 
observation that reactions of industries in America and Europe differed: whereas companies in 
Britain and Germany have embraced self-governance in the form of codes of responsible 
conduct, comparable initiatives are conspicuously absent in the United States and Denmark. A 
commonly held view among political scientists understands self-regulation as a strategy crafted to 
starve off a threat of state intervention in the affairs of an industry. The pervasive risk 
uncertainties associated with nanotechnologies are indeed widely recognized as demanding a 
regulatory response to guarantee that possible hazards are effectively controlled. Nanobusinesses 
obviously have much riding on the nature of this response. Statutory regulations could increase 
business costs, erect barriers to market entry, result in lower or changing patterns of innovation 
and so on. And, as could be expected, corporate representatives and industry insiders have 
undeniably been quick to warn of the dire, if not catastrophic consequences of ‘premature’ 
regulations. The fervor of the nanotech debate in short suggests that British and German 
companies self-regulated to thwart a legislative response. 
In the course of researching the evolving regulatory process, it however became abundantly 
clear that governments in America and Europe wanted much the same things. In hindsight, this 
is not surprising. Having staked enormous financial and political resources on nanoscience and 
technology, decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic share an obvious ambition of ‘getting it 
right’. The desire to reap the benefits of nanotechnologies, while avoiding the pitfalls, has in turn 
led governments to adopt very similar policy strategies. Schematically summarized, these include 
formal strategies or policy statements, combined with attempts to expand the knowledge base on 
potential risks, ultimately leading not to new legislation, but indirect regulation of 
nanotechnologies through existing legal frameworks. This created a puzzle: if not born of a desire 
to preempt new legislative controls – which were never seriously considered in either America or 
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Europe – how can we account for the codes of responsible conduct launched by companies in 
Britain and Germany? Why were no similar initiatives undertaken in the United States and 
Denmark? 
My initial interest in self-regulation in turn led to a closer inspection of the regulatory process. 
Nanotechnologies have created intricate difficulties for regulatory authorities to not only gauge 
the need for immediate action, but also to develop appropriate risk assessment and management 
instruments. Governments have consequently devoted considerable resources to shore up the 
knowledge base, combined with appeals for cooperation among all relevant stakeholders and an 
emphasis on the strategic value of partnerships with industry. The regulatory process has in other 
words presented industry with other opportunities and predicaments than a mere desire to 
forestall statutory regulations. With state authorities scrambling at the complexities of scientific 
uncertainty, new information can exercise a significant influence on regulatory agendas, priorities 
and policies. We might thus have expected industries to jump on the opportunity to mold 
regulatory outcomes to suit their needs and interests. Yet, while governmental preferences and 
strategies in the four countries were largely similar, industries have responded remarkably 
different: disengagement from regulators in the United States, acquiescence and adaptation in 
Denmark, and active participation and cooperation with governmental officials in Britain and 
Germany. The thesis therefore ultimately became an inquiry into the drivers of business behavior 
in regulatory politics. What follows then is an account of international efforts to assess and 
control the human health and environmental risks of nanotechnologies and the significant, yet 
often surreptitious business influence that flows from the power to disclose, bias and withhold 
information from state authorities. 
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We are in this awkward middle territory where we have just enough information to think there is an issue, but not enough 
information to really inform policymakers about what to do about it. 
Kristen Kulinowski, Director of the International Council on Nanotechnology  
(Quoted in Morrissey 2007) 
 
Anyone interested in the influence of business on the policy process must therefore examine the information needed to make 
specific policy decisions and consider how the struggle over that information ultimately shapes the decisions that government 
makes.  
Cary Coglianese (2007: 205) 
 




Nanotechnologies and the purposeful manipulation of matter at the atomic level are expected to 
be among the defining technologies of the 21st century. At the nanoscale – the size range from 
one to one hundred billionth of a meter – materials and particles can have markedly different 
properties than their larger chemical equivalents. This is both the promise of the technology and 
the cause of major concern over different behaviors, fates and toxicity. Debate on how to address 
the suspected, yet unknown risks of nanotechnologies began around the turn of the millennium 
and has yet to conclude. This thesis is an account of international efforts to assess and control 
the uncertain risks of nanomaterials over the decade from 2003 to 2013. I track the evolution of 
state control policies in Britain, Denmark, Germany and the United States and recount how 




1  Interview, Berlin, June 22, 2012. 
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heart of this account then, is the nature of relations among state authorities responsible for 
overseeing human health and environmental safety and representatives of the chemical industry. 
This opening chapter is devoted to presenting the questions motivating my investigation of 
nanotech regulation and how I intend to answer them as well as the empirical subject of my 
inquiry and its theoretical ambitions. To illustrate the range of questions, concepts and quandaries 
with which this account wrestles, let us however first consider an example that can help ground 
and thus demystify what follows. 
The Industrial Age left a toxic legacy. The advance of industrial civilization created a vast and 
ever-increasing stream of wastes, toxins and noxious substances. By the time Rachel Carson’s 
pathbreaking bestseller Silent Spring hit bookstores in 1962, the chemical industry had already 
produced some 100 trillion pounds of toxic wastes – enough to create a highway to the moon, 
100 feet wide and 10 feet deep (Montague 1992). For much of the 20th century, hazardous 
industrial, household and military wastes were indiscriminately flushed into the environment – 
unsupervised and often through illicit and clandestine methods – simply buried, abandoned and 
forgotten (Collins 2010: 84ff.). Festering beneath the surface, this insidious legacy slowly invaded 
its surroundings, seeping into aquifers, contaminating food supplies, poisoning fragile ecosystems 
and percolating through residential areas – and in short order a host of human tragedies and toxic 
calamities ensued. The scale of soil and groundwater contamination is daunting and the 
complexities and costs of remediation are just as staggering. In the United States alone, some 
150,000 contaminated sites have been identified and an additional 200,000 sites are expected to 
require cleanup over the next 30 years (EPA 2004). Available remediation techniques are 
unfortunately slow, costly, inefficient, and resource-consuming – and many result in highly 
contaminated wastes that then themselves have to be disposed. At US$ 100 per ton of 
contaminated soil excavated, reclaimed and treated – a common benchmark – the aggregated 
financial burden for site cleanup is truly colossal (Zhang 2003: 323).  
Advances in chemistry and material science now promises novel solutions to old problems. 
Nanoscale iron particles represent a new generation of remedial techniques that could provide 
cost-effective and extremely versatile tools for some of the most vexing cleanup problems. 
Owing to their diminutive size, nanoparticles can increase chemical catalysis and reaction rates, 
pervade very small spaces in the subsurface and remain suspended in groundwater, allowing them 
to achieve wider distribution than their macro-scale equivalents. Nano-remedial methods are 
expected to offer efficient and flexible solutions to contaminants that are known to be persistent 
in the environment, recalcitrant to many treatments and highly toxic to human health (EPA 2007; 
Karn, Kuiken and Otto 2009). Beyond its significant environmental promise, nano-remediation is 
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also attractive from an economic perspective: developing cost-effective treatment technologies 
could save billions of dollars in cleanup costs. The market potential for remedial techniques 
based on nanoparticles has been estimated to be US$ 2.4 billion in 2010 (Rickerby 2007: 25). 
Given the vast scale of contamination, it is thus little wonder that these techniques attract the 
attention of authorities, practitioners and industries liable for the cost of remediation. 
Nano-remediation is no panacea for the problem of contamination, however. Beyond the 
technical and engineering glitches that still needs to be worked out, more fundamental questions 
relate to the behavior and fate of nanoscale particles once they have been released to the 
environment. One concern is for example that unreacted iron particles can migrate from 
treatment zones and cause harm to the surrounding environment. Other concerns arise over the 
unknown effects of nanoparticles on plants, animals or ecosystem processes; to what extent they 
are toxic and what organisms are affected; how they behave and move over time in the air, water 
or soil; whether they persist and accumulate in the environment and so on. Until more is known 
about their possible impacts on human health and the environment, caution is in short merited 
before nanoscale materials are realized on a broad commercial scale (RS and RAEng 2004: 45f.).  
Reactions from governments in America and Europe to the promises and uncertainties of 
nano-remedial techniques can best be characterized as cautiously optimistic. In 2004, the British 
government for example requested that industry avoid the deliberate release of nanoparticles into 
the environment – including for remedial purposes – until their effects and possible risks have 
been assessed. Similar calls for further risk research have been voiced by other governments. 
While political reactions thus are largely comparable, the responses of practitioners and 
businesses differ internationally. In the United States, nano-remediation is rapidly emerging as a 
lucrative new market for commercial operators. In Britain, by contrast, industry has in effect 
observed a voluntary moratorium on nano-remediation since 2004. A recent survey among UK 
practitioners found little evidence to suggest that this situation is about to change: responses 
from a mix of UK-based and international operators revealed no imminent plans for the use of 
nano-remedial tools; nor did respondents anticipate that such techniques would be used in 
Britain in the foreseeable future (Bardos et al. 2011). Respondents however also reported that 
their company had undertaken remedial projects using nanoscale iron particles in other countries 
or that such projects were in progress. And that research to develop and assess the technique, 
including field trials, were under way in the United States, Australia and various European 
countries – but not in the United Kingdom. How might we account for these responses? Why do 
companies observe a voluntary moratorium on nano-remediation in Britain, but not in other 
countries?  
An Uncertain Business 
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A number of factors might reasonably explain the discrepancies between the UK plans of 
practitioners and their international business strategies. The scale and nature of environmental 
contamination in Britain might for example render nano-remedial tools inappropriate for 
practical applications or irrelevant from a commercial perspective. Or perhaps HM Government 
has neglected to provide the financial incentives and funding opportunities that could make 
nano-remedial research and development appear attractive to operators. Or perhaps 
administrative barriers in Britain inhibit the use of novel techniques for environmental 
remediation. Upon closer inspection, however, none of these factors seems to account for why 
companies abide by a voluntary moratorium. Once known as the ‘Dirty Man of Europe’, Britain 
has more than its fair share of toxic wastes and contaminated sites just waiting for cleanup to 
commence. For the entrepreneurial company, the business opportunities for nano-remedial tools 
in short abound. Funding for nanoscience – including research into environmental applications – 
is similarly no less generous in UK than in other countries (Palmberg, Dernis and Miguet 2009). 
While the use of new substances for environmental remediation finally requires administrative 
approval, the licensing procedure is not excruciatingly bureaucratic or burdensome by 
international standards. Nor has HM Government established new administrative measures that 
might deter commercial applications or otherwise dissuade companies from using nano-remedial 
tools in Britain – at least none that sets the UK apart internationally. Official policy in fact 
consists merely of a request that industry refrain from the deliberate release of nanoparticles into 
the environment. Nonetheless, no project applications have been received to date. If not 
motivated by technical, financial or administrative obstacles, how can we account for the 
voluntary moratorium observed by industry in Britain? Caution on part of governments we might 
expect. But businesses exist to generate value for their shareholders. Given the market potential 
of nano-remediation, why do UK and international companies avoid these tools in Britain? Why 
do these same companies not observe a moratorium in other countries? What role did the official 
recommendation play in convincing companies to refrain from the deliberate release of 
nanoparticles into the environment – and why?  
Let me hasten to assure the reader that this thesis is not an account of the techniques of 
environmental remediation or the science behind the manufacture of nanoscale iron particles. 
Nano-remediation instead serves as a readily accessible illustration of the uncertain promise and 
unknown risks of nanomaterials – and the intricate dilemmas confronting policy-makers and 
governmental risk managers. At the same time, the example also highlights the engine that drives 
my inquiry: i.e. the observation that comparable state policies have met with widely varied 
business responses. In this thesis, I ask how governments have sought to regulate the possible 
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human health and environmental risks of nanoscale materials and I examine the policies they 
develop to assess and control chemical hazards. But above all, this is a study of the role of 
business in regulatory politics. I ask what businesses want from the regulatory process and 
investigate the strategies and tactics they adopt to advance their interests. I further ask why 
industries in some countries embrace self-governing responsibilities, while others do not. This 
thesis thus constitutes an inquiry into the drivers of business behavior in regulatory politics. To 
answer these questions, I look to the institutions that underpin relations among state bureaucrats 
and national industries. I argue that the capacity of state bureaucrats to credibly commit to 
regulatory outcomes shapes the political behavior and strategies of business.  
In a wider theoretical perspective, I make two claims with respect to the regulatory behavior 
and interests of business. First, fear of state intervention need not be the dominant concern or 
driver of business behavior. State regulations can of course increase business costs and punish 
wrongdoing – but they also serve as guidance to expected behavior. In areas of high scientific, 
technical and legal uncertainty, industries therefore usually have reasons to welcome regulatory 
decisions and outcomes that can help them navigate an uncertain business environment. Second, 
and for this reason, industries are willing to share information about their operations – even in 
the absence of structural constraints on state capacities to intervene – if disclosing such 
information succeeds in convincing state bureaucrats to make decisions that either reduce 
anticipated costs or increase private benefits. Companies will however only volunteer information 
to state bureaucrats if they are confident that the information will not be used to the detriment of 
their interests. Whether companies will decide to disclose, bias or conceal information depends in 
short on the expected behavior of their regulatory adversaries. The nature of bureaucratic 
commitments will thus figure prominently in corporate risk-benefit calculations.  
The empirical backdrop against which I pursue these claims is the regulation of 
nanotechnologies. Nanotechnology refers to particles and products at the nanoscale2 as well as 
the techniques used to manipulate, visualize, and characterize materials at this scale. 
Nanotechnology – or nanotechnologies – is thus not a single technology, but consist instead of a 
heterogeneous group of engineered particles that have little more in common than their tiny size. 
Compared to materials in their bulk form (macro and micro), the same materials at the nanoscale 
can exhibit completely different chemical reactivity, electrical conductivity, strength, mobility, 




2  To illustrate the dimensions involved, a single human hair is about 80,000 nanometers wide, a red blood cell 
is approximately 7,000 nanometers wide and a water molecule is almost 0.3 nanometeres across. 
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example appear red, blue or gold in color. The purposeful and precise manipulation of atoms and 
molecules promises numerous applications that can provide superior price-performance ratios, 
manufacturing cost advantages, product differentiation – or enable altogether new products and 
processes (NSTC 2000; Bowman and Hodge 2007).  
A first generation of nanomaterials and products began to enter commerce around the 
millennium and the global market for nanotechnologies has since grown at staggering 20 percent 
per year.3 Despite insistent buzz of a trillion dollar nanotech market by 2015 (NSF 2001; Lux 
Research 2004; Cientifica 2008), the current market value, while unknown, nonetheless falls far 
below this optimistic mark. Recent market research thus pegs 2010 global sales of nanomaterials 
at roughly US$ 25 billion (European Commission 2012: 10). The surge of new startups and the 
diversification of established businesses into nanotech applications are meanwhile expected to 
create an estimated 2 to 10 million new manufacturing jobs. Little wonder then that 
nanotechnologies attract large and rapidly increasing public and corporate investments,4 with 
global R&D funding reaching 11.8 billion dollars in 2006 (Palmberg, Dernis and Miguet 2009). 
These are big figures indeed for such small particles.  
Many of the same traits responsible for the political and commercial appeal of nanomaterials 
however – their small size and dynamic properties – also raise unfortunate and uncomfortable 
questions about their human and environmental effects given their capacity to penetrate and react 
with biological systems. A number of studies have for example noted similarities in the size and 
shape of carbon nanotubes (CNT) – one of the most commercially promising and widely 
researched nanomaterials – and asbestos fibers, an infamous carcinogen. Despite a decade of 
safety research, answers to important questions remain elusive. Little is in fact known about the 
toxicological and epidemiological effects of nanomaterials, their fate and transport in the 
environment, their exposure pathways, whether they persist and accumulate in food chains or 
how they might interact with other chemicals. The promise of the technology itself – that 
materials at the nanoscale can exhibit novel and unpredictable properties – thus raises serious 
concerns over the capacity of existing risk management systems to guarantee human health and 




3  As an illustration of the rapid rate at which nanotech is being brought to market, by March 2011 the 
Consumer Product Inventory, which tracks nanotechnology-based consumer products, had grown by nearly 
521 percent (from 212 to 1317 products) since it was first released in March 2006. Source: 
www.nanotechproject.org/inventories/consumer/analysis_draft/ [Accessed August 31, 2013] 
4  In the United States, for example, the accumulated investment under the Federal National Nanotechnology 
Initiative represents the biggest single investment in science and technology since the Space program. 
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Nanomaterials are not of course in any sense unregulated. States intervene heavily to control 
chemical hazards. State control regimes were however enacted long before the prospect of 
nanotechnologies was yet on the horizon. Given the state of knowledge at the time, statutory 
controls were designed to assess the toxicity of bulk not nanoscale materials: the risk assessment 
criteria, regulatory oversight triggers, toxicity parameters, and threshold minimums outlined in 
extant regulations may therefore well be unsuited or inadequate to assess and control the risks of 
nanomaterials (Maynard 2006; Pelley and Saner 2009). Current standards for example have as an 
unstated premise that the larger the dose, the greater the risk. But quite the opposite could in fact 
be true for nanomaterials: under certain conditions, nanoparticles cluster to form larger particles. 
The more they cluster, the lower their potential to penetrate skin or cause other kinds of 
exposure. In contrast to the premise of current standards then smaller doses might imply greater 
risks (Davies 2007: 14).  
The pervasive uncertainties about risks, benefits, properties and future directions of 
nanotechnologies are widely recognized as demanding a regulatory response to ensure that any 
potential hazards are effectively controlled. With the advent of nanotechnologies on the 
regulatory agenda, the question facing regulators, industries and other stakeholders was in other 
words not whether the state should intervene to guarantee public health and safety, but how. 
Although quick to embrace the economic potential of nanotechnologies, governmental control 
strategies have from the onset been frustrated by information deficiencies in at least three key 
areas: the paucity of scientific data on the properties of nanomaterials, the speed of development 
within the field and its heterogeneous nature (Davies 2006; Bowman and Hodge 2008). Most of 
the information required for a comprehensive risk analysis of nanotechnologies is inaccessible to 
governments, either because the requisite technical and scientific knowledge simply does not exist 
or because relevant product and process details are widely dispersed among nanomaterial 
producers and users. In fact, most  
“regulatory hurdles are currently insurmountable because we still do not know exactly what 
‘nanotechnology’ means or encompasses, much less what concrete risks it may pose. ‘Nanotechnology’ is 
a poorly defined, insufficiently understood set of diverse products, processes, and technologies that is not 
easily captured by any existing regulatory definition, model or system.” (Marchant, Sylvester and 
Abbott 2010: 124f.) 
Governments across the world have consequently devoted substantial resources to shore up 
the knowledge base. Beyond considerable increases in public funding and support for safety 
research, a core element of American and European nanotech policies has consisted of 
encouraging dialogues, cooperation and knowledge exchange among government, industry and 
other stakeholder groups to inform the development of policies and regulatory controls. The 
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policy process has in other words created ample opportunities for private interests to mobilize 
and influence regulatory decisions and outcomes.  
Conventional wisdom would lead us to expect that industries in liberal market economies 
should react alike to similar state policies; and that this response in turn should differ from the 
strategies adopted by their competitors in coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 
2001). We might in other words expect American companies to react like their UK competitors; 
and that German and Danish companies adopt similar strategies to influence the direction of 
national nanotech policies. Confronted with comparable governmental preferences and strategies, 
industries in these four countries have nonetheless responded remarkably different: dissociation 
from regulators in the United States, acquiescence and adaptation in Denmark, and close, 
informal cooperation with government officials – combined with the launch of codes of 
responsible conduct – in Britain and Germany. The varied business responses to similar state 
policies are in short puzzling and invite a closer inspection of the institutional drivers of 
corporate strategies to influence regulatory decisions and policies. Why did the responses of 
American and British companies differ? Why did German and Danish companies not react alike? 
Students of comparable politics usually portray Britain and Germany as contrasting cases; so how 
can we explain the coincidence of business responses observed in these two countries? How can 
we account for the codes of responsible conduct launched by the British and German industries? 
Why were no similar initiatives undertaken in the United States and Denmark?  
These questions are the concern of this chapter and its six companions. Combined they 
provide an account of the role of industry in the regulation of nanotech, the determinants of 
business strategies in regulatory politics and the ability of governments to assess and control 
chemical hazards. This chapter proceeds to introduce the economic stakes of chemical 
companies in nanotechnologies. Section two considers the role of information and business 
interests in regulatory politics. Sections three and four briefly sketch my theoretical arguments, 
followed by section five which explains the empirical strategy. Section six presents an overview of 
the findings, while section seven outlines the road ahead.  
NANOTECHNOLOGIES AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY  
Hailed as the basis for the next industrial revolution, nanotechnologies already find applications 
in almost every economic sector from energy, electronics and semiconductors over cosmetics, 
pharmaceuticals and health care to textiles, automotive, construction, food and agriculture. 
Looking across industries and market segments, however, it is striking how R&D spending in 
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particular targets application areas within the chemicals and allied industries. This is to be 
expected: in business terms, nanomaterials, from nanoparticles to nanotubes, are no different 
from other types of specialty chemicals. Chemical companies are the major manufacturers – and 
users – of nanomaterials, currently in the form of bulk nanoparticles, such as titanium dioxide, 
iron or silver, but eventually, as the technology matures, also more advanced functional materials 
(National Research Council 2006; Renn and Roco 2006). Applications of nanotechnologies in 
downstream industries meanwhile depend on the raw materials and intermediate products 
supplied by the chemical industry. Although nanomaterials account for only a tiny fraction of the 
total volume of chemicals manufactured, production is expected to increase significantly over 
coming years (RS and RAEng 2004: 71). Chemical companies are now heralding nanotech as the 
industry’s potential savior (Lux Research 2004: 191). With both direct and indirect links to almost 
all industrial sectors, the industrial chemicals sector is one of the most central and diversified 
industries of the modern economy. So why are nanomaterials so important to chemical 
companies?  
Industrial chemicals have long ceased to be a growth business. For the past two decades, share 
prices of major U.S. chemical corporations have underperformed the S&P 500 average (Lux 
Research 2004: 191). In the 1960s and 1970s, new synthetic materials, such as nylon and 
polyester, helped fuel the growth of chemical companies, making them Wall Street darlings. But 
the industry has since stalled. By 1980, chemistry science was no longer producing the 
breakthroughs, which had marked chemicals as a growth industry, since its origin in the late 
1800s (Chandler 2005). While R&D intensity in the chemical industry remains well above the 
industrial average, technological maturity translated into fewer innovations and diminishing 
returns to research and development. It is estimated that there has been a 90 percent decline in 
product innovations for bulk or commodity chemicals since 1965, with focus instead turning to 
cost control through process innovation (Albach et al. 1996). Since the 1970s, the cost of 
introducing new substances has risen sharply, and innovation has progressively become the 
domain of large companies: in 1983, four companies accounted for over 60 percent of R&D 
spending for industrial chemicals, with DuPont alone responsible for one fourth (Davies 1983). 
While these general trends disguise significant variations across subsectors, growth at 
disproportionately high rates, rapid innovation and technological change – characteristics of the 
postwar period – has undeniable come to an end. Nanotech and the development of new 
materials now for the first time in decades promise new product lines and business opportunities.  
Nanotechnologies are expected to usher in a profound ‘paradigm shift’ in the chemical 
industry. Success in the chemical industry used to be limited by size and scale of operations. High 
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barriers of entry meant that small companies rarely had a chance of competing, rendering the 
industry traditionally one of the most inhospitable environments for small startups. Akin to the 
invention of recombinant DNA, which created the modern biotech industry and profoundly 
altered the business model of the pharmaceutical industry, nanotechnologies are set to change 
this by transferring the success function from ‘scale of operations’ to the ‘creativity of the 
scientist’ (Lux Research 2004). Making nanomaterials is in fact not altogether that difficult: 50 
dollars worth of raw materials and equipment will suffice to produce a few thousandths of a gram 
of nanoparticles. In principle, a few people working out of a garage or a professor and some grad 
students is all that is require to establish a highly innovative startup (Cientifica 2008); and indeed 
startups and university spin-outs experimenting with various applications of nanomaterials 
abound.  
While startups now serve as important catalysts of innovation, large chemical manufacturers 
are meanwhile well-positioned to reap the benefits of nanotechnologies. Many nanomaterials and 
applications have been developed by specialist companies that have only the ability to produce 
small quantities required for research. No sane company however would base a major product on 
a nanomaterial made by a financially precarious startup. Scaling up production without scaling up 
cost is not a trivial exercise, and it is not something that can be achieved with the resources and 
expertise of a small university spin-off. As Big Pharma before them, large chemical corporations 
are therefore expected to drive demands for in-licensing of novel, innovative products and 
development-stage acquisitions (Lux Research 2004: 194). Following relative industrial decline 
and technological maturity, it is thus no surprise that chemical manufacturers have much riding 
on the success of nanotechnologies. As the to date most radical illustration of the industry’s 
commitment to nanotechnologies, DuPont – the pioneering company of the revolution in 
synthetic fibers – announced the sale of its nylon, polyester and lycra businesses to Koch 
Industries in November 2003. As other chemical leaders, DuPont instead wagers hopes for 
future innovations and higher profits on the ability of nanotech breakthroughs to rejuvenate the 
industry (Zhao, Boxman and Chowdhry 2003). Regrettably, for DuPont and its competitors, 
storm clouds are gathering as increasing consumer skepticism and calls for governmental 
regulation threatens to bring the nanotech innovation boost to an abrupt end.  
REGULATORY POLITICS AND BUSINESS INTERESTS 
For all their novel properties, nanomaterials are from a regulatory perspective familiar in at least 
one respect: the paucity of reliable information on which to base protective standards. To assess 
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and control the uncertain risks of nanotechnologies, state authorities require vast amounts of 
scientific, technical and economic information. Information which regulators do not have – and 
which can only be acquired with difficulty, if at all. But this is not a predicament unique to 
nanomaterials. From environmental policy over worker protection to the regulation of 
competition, state authorities in almost all contexts need more information than they have – and 
much of the needed information is held only by the very businesses they seek to control.  
Government regulation of economic behavior usually finds its justification in three main types 
of market failures: a lack of competition, externalities, or a lack of full information about 
products and services (Coglianese 2007).5 When markets fail, state authorities must collect and 
process information about the activities of individuals, organizations and industries: to identify 
whether businesses are acting as monopolists, regulators need information about their marginal 
costs of production. For regulation that addresses externalities or seeks to ensure adequate 
product disclosure or safety, regulators need information about the risks created by products and 
production processes. Information is as Cary Coglianese and colleagues observe (2004: 277) thus 
the lifeblood of regulatory politics: “The effective use of governmental power depends on 
information about conditions in the world, strategies for improving those conditions, and the 
consequences associated with deploying different strategies.” State authorities must in short 
gather, develop and analyze relevant information about the activities they wish to regulate as well 
as about available control techniques.  
More often than not however the information state authorities require to make regulatory 
decisions can be supplied only by the very companies and industries they regulate. Companies 
almost always know much more than governments about the risks associated with their products, 
technologies and processes (Grant, Paterson and Whitston 1988: 60f.; Wagner 2004: 1642). For 
many issues and problems, governments can of course learn as much as, if not more than, 
industry. When state intervention is needed to protect the public from harms arising largely 
independent of economic activity – such as infectious diseases or natural disasters – the relevant 
information can be acquired by governments or independent researchers as easily as by industry 
(Coglianese 2007: 187). General scientific expertise is however rarely sufficient when state 
agencies look to control particular industry practices or harmful products. And it is often 
impossible for governments to conduct independent research to replicate the information held by 




5  Although nanotechnologies might conceivably implicate any and all of these market failures, the most salient 
concerns arise over externalities and information asymmetries (Coglianese 2010). 
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complaints by customers or workers, or simply based on their superior understanding of the 
properties of their products and the occasions for exposure to them (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and 
Parson 2004: 286; Applegate 1991). The best source of information about the risks of particular 
products and processes, the activities of companies, the costs of remediation or mitigation, or the 
feasibility of different control technologies is in other words the regulated industry.  
State authorities cannot count on self-interested holders of information to reveal it fully and 
without bias. Neither can governments always count on their powers to compel disclosure of 
information. But while manufacturers may have an interest in sharing favorable, self-serving 
information,6 they have little incentive to produce, disclose or otherwise assist in the acquisition 
of data that would help governments regulate (Lyndon 1989). When information is sorely 
incomplete, controverted, or effectively unobtainable, states face intractable difficulties in 
deciding how to intervene against suspect products and activities. Industries bend on reducing 
state interference are therefore best advised to minimize available information about their 
operations. That industries have reasons to resist cumbersome regulations hardly needs 
elaboration. Although their rationales may differ, companies of all sizes and colors share 
undeniable interests in rejecting statutory obligations that could result in increased operating cost, 
delays on market entry and so on. Fear of state intervention in other words cautions against 
supplying truthful information that would make it easier for state authorities to impose costly 
new regulations.  
But business also has preferences for and stakes in the outcomes of regulatory politics that 
extends beyond a mere desire to minimize state intervention. A classic tenet of the Economic 
Theory of Regulation is thus that an industry might actively seek regulation – just as it may be 
thrust upon it. In this view, the state is both a potential threat and resource to industry. As 
succinctly expressed by George Stigler (1971: 3): “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” We need not subscribe to this view 
however to appreciate that businesses can value certain regulatory outcomes. More recently, the 
varieties of capitalism literature has for example emphasized how national industries look to state 
policies to maintain, enable and reinforce the institutional competitive advantage upon which 
they rely. Since many of the institutions that allow companies to coordinate their behavior 
depend on the regulations governments promulgate, businesses in liberal and coordinated market 




6  Such as information showing that the likely costs of a new regulation would be higher than government 
anticipates or that the likely benefits would be lower (Coglianese 2007: 187). 
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with – that is, complementary to the existing modes of coordination (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall 
and Thelen 2009: 16f.). A similar conclusion applies with respect to risk regulation: industries 
clearly have reasons to resist draconian environmental, health and safety regulations; but 
important benefits can also accrue from state intervention.  
When there is a clear legal framework associated with a given range of economic activities, 
businesses are better able to identify and quantify commercial risks. A predictable regulatory 
environment can for example help companies avoid undertaking expensive and long-term R&D 
for applications, which may later be banned. In a stable business environment, investors and 
lenders are more forthcoming in offering financial support and insurers are more willing to offer 
coverage for potential liabilities. A mix of scientific and regulatory uncertainty can in contrast 
combine to significantly impair the economic prospects of an industry. Absent official guidance, 
companies are uncertainty about their obligations, leaving them potentially liable should 
manufacturing processes or products later be discovered to cause harm to humans or the 
environment. Consumers and business partners similarly prefer to buy tested and safe product; 
but will tend to shy away from products with unknown effects or uncertain risks. Without 
statutory guidelines, however, companies cannot effectively demonstrate the safety of their 
production processes and products. To survive and prosper, industries in short require a stable 
and predictable environment in which to orient their operations; and they therefore have reasons 
to welcome regulatory outcomes that can help them navigate an uncertain environment. The 
inconclusive status of nanomaterials under existing statutes and regulations in other words 
presents opportunities and predicaments beyond a mere desire to reduce state interference.  
BUREAUCRATIC COMMITMENTS AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 
In this thesis, I argue that the varied responses of industries in America and Europe result not 
from variations in governmental control strategies for nanotechnologies or from different 
stakeholder perceptions of nanotech, but from differences in the capacity of state bureaucrats to 
credibly commit to cooperation with industry. In areas of high scientific and technical 
uncertainty, such as nanotechnologies, new information can exercise significant influence on 
agency agendas, priorities and policies. This can work in industry’s favor, if disclosing 
information succeeds in convincing state bureaucrats to make decisions that benefits industry. 
With the promise of influence, companies may therefore readily volunteer information, share 
their expertise and actively assist regulators in the acquisition of new knowledge. Cooperation can 
in other words serve industry’s interests as well as regulators’ needs.  
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But cooperation is also a dangerous course for industry: while regulators certainly appreciate 
information volunteered by industry, they may value the information differently than originally 
anticipated. Regulatory problems often have several plausible causes, and they almost always have 
several potential solutions. Companies with a hazy picture of the regulator’s overall puzzle may 
fail to accurately assess the value and impact of any particular piece of information. Seemingly 
unimportant data could in fact be just the information regulators were searching for to justify 
stringent restrictions of industry practices, processes or products (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and 
Parson 2004: 303). Unless industry can trust regulators with information, disclosure is a risky 
gambit. When deciding among a course of disclosure or nondisclosure, companies must in other 
words attempt first to anticipate how regulators evaluate the available body of knowledge; second 
how they can be expected to act on that knowledge; and finally what impact new information will 
have on agency decision-making. Companies will only volunteer information to state bureaucrats 
if they are confident that the information will not be used to the detriment of their interests; and 
cooperation therefore hinges on the capacity of state bureaucrats to credibly commit to respect 
corporate interests. Whether companies will decide to disclose, bias or conceal information 
depends in short on the expected behavior of their regulatory adversaries and the nature of their 
commitments.  
The framework I elaborate to dissect the determinants of business strategies draws in 
important ways on the varieties of capitalism literature. The varieties literature is premised on the 
existence of distinctive institutions that permit business – and governmental – actors in different 
types of political economies to make credible commitments to one another (Hall and Soskice 
2001; Wood 2001). I begin from a similar premise to explore the institutional arrangements that 
allow bureaucratic actors to convince companies that they can be trusted with sensitive 
information. While formal procedures exist to routinize the handling of trade secrets, by and 
large, the means of protecting confidential information depend on the relationships between 
regulators and the regulated (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985: 224). Different industry 
strategies will in other words reflect variations in the institutions, which underpin relationships 
among industry and state bureaucrats. Countries differ in their regulatory institutions and 
processes. And they therefore transmit different kinds and amounts of information about the 
probable future behavior of state bureaucrats to industry. Two features in particular of national 
regulatory regimes, I argue, are responsible for the capacity of state authorities to commit to 
cooperation with industry: the regulatory powers of state bureaucrats and their reliance on 
deliberative institutions in the formulation and implementation of chemical safety policy. 
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First, political systems differ in how they concentrate or diffuse regulatory powers, and they 
therefore structure the opportunities to influence regulatory outcomes differently. Concentration 
of regulatory authority in the hands of administrative agencies dictates a strategic orientation 
towards the state bureaucrats with the power to decide regulatory outcomes. Independent and 
insulated state authorities are not easily swayed by changing political and economic conditions, 
but focus instead on achieving their statutory obligations and objectives. Limits on political 
interference or judicial scrutiny may thus on the one hand convince manufacturers that a 
commitment to pursue a set of stable and predictable policies is credible. Absent recourse to the 
courts or parliaments, representatives of organized interests can on the other hand tread few 
alternatives paths to influence the direction of regulatory policy. Companies consequently have to 
win what they can during administrative deliberations. Since information and expertise is the 
most relevant currency in convincing state bureaucrats (Culpepper 2011), concentration of 
regulatory powers can create potent incentives for companies to divulge information, if this can 
be exchanged for influence on administrative decisions and policies.  
Second, advisory bodies, which put industrial expertise in permanent and close contact with 
their academic and governmental peers, create opportunities for participants to improve 
confidence in the strategies of each other. Policy discussions funneled through such deliberative 
institutions afford industry representatives opportunities to learn how officials understand 
scientific evidence and evaluate the need for new controls. Because they increase the amount of 
information obtained and disseminated among participants, advisory bodies improve the ability 
of companies to gauge the intentions of state bureaucrats and predict their probable reactions to 
new information. Confidence in the designs of state bureaucrats can in turn persuade companies 
to volunteer sensitive information and hence shape regulators’ diagnosis of regulatory problems 
and their possible solutions.  
Where companies have reasons to doubt the credibility of bureaucratic commitments, they 
must in contrast remain vigilant to possible concealed agendas or the prospect of political or 
judicial interference in regulatory proceedings. Nondisclosure is in short a rational business 
response, when state bureaucrats cannot credibly commit to respect the interests of industry. In 
chapters three through six, I demonstrate how businesses in all four countries responded to the 
incentives and opportunities embedded in their respective regulatory systems; and how industry 
self-regulation in Germany and Britain is a response to the policy process that grows organically 
from a strategy of cooperation with state authorities. To appreciate the motivations for 
companies to embrace self-governing responsibilities, it is however necessary to briefly consider 
the reactions to and fate of the technology – biotech – which preceded nanotechnologies.  
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TECHNOLOGY LOST AND THE SELF-GOVERNANCE OF NANOTECH 
In 2003, the European Union adopted a new set of regulations governing the approval and sale 
of genetically modified organisms. Preceding the enactment of Council Regulation 1829/2003 
was a decade fraught with intense policy disputes, unilateral restrictions or bans by individual 
Member States on GM products that had been approved by the EU, vocal opposition from the 
NGO community, consumer boycotts, and highly negative media coverage, resulting in 
deteriorating public acceptance of GMOs in food, suspicion of industry and declining trust in the 
regulatory authorities charged with overseeing food safety. Since 2003, the EU’s stringent labeling 
requirements, combined with widespread consumer rejection, have prompted virtually all food 
producers and retailers to refrain from using or selling GM foods that would be required to be 
labeled as such. Few GM foods have been approved for commercialization, the number of field 
trials has remained low and practically no GM crops are commercially grown in the EU 
(Bernauer and Meins 2003: 652f.; Vogel 2012: 81). Prior to the GM Controversy, policy-makers, 
scientists and biotech firms saw in the technology the basis for a second Green Revolution. 
Dashed by a perfect storm of anti-GM sentiments, abandonment by business partners, and 
onerous regulations, culminating in public backlash and technology stigma, these hopes never 
came to fruition. The scene and timing for nanotechnology’s arrival on the regulatory agenda in 
2003 could thus hardly have been more inauspicious. 
Nano is not GM. But as another technology with revolutionary promise – ultimate human 
control of the very forces of nature – nanotech entails all the ingredients for visceral public 
reactions and market rejection. Much writing on nanotech governance thus emphasizes the need 
to heed the lessons of GM. Foremost among these is the need to ensure public acceptance of 
nanotechnologies and market confidence in industry. If nanotech is to avoid the fate of GMOs, 
stakeholders – business partners, investors, insurers, employees, the media, and especially 
customers and the public – need to be reassured that companies commercializing 
nanotechnologies are proactively and effectively mitigating any risks related to them. I suggest 
that self-regulation in this contexts should be understood as business strategy intended to garner 
stakeholder confidence and acceptance of nanotechnologies.  
Recognition of the signs of deteriorating acceptance of GMOs in food and growing suspicion 
of industry came late for the biotech industry; and industry leaders never embraced self-
governing responsibilities as a response to mounting public skepticism. Proponents instead – 
mistakenly – assumed that rational arguments could influence the response to the technology. 
While markets and consumers certainly did come to appreciate the revolutionary new drugs 
associated with advances in genetic engineering, those very same scientific principles applied to 
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crops and food unleashed a barrage of anti-GM sentiments. Public hostility, backlash and 
technology stigma in turn compelled politicians to entrench these sentiments in official policy 
(Sylvester, Abbott and Marchant 2009). The misfortunes of the European agri-biotech industry 
thus constitute a cautionary tale for the nanobusiness community – a looming fate that industry 
leaders on neither side of the Atlantic have a desire to share. 
Confronted with ostensibly similar challenges, industries in America and Europe have 
nonetheless drawn different conclusions from the GM Controversy: whereas the British and 
German industries have responded to the dangers of ‘nanophobia’ by endorsing codes of 
responsible conduct, comparable initiatives are conspicuously absent in Denmark and the United 
States. I argue that the roots of these diverging self-governing strategies lie with the different 
roles companies have assumed in the regulation of nanotech. Regulatory policies decided through 
mutual agreement and joint collaborations imply that state bureaucrats and companies both have 
a stake in the final outcome; and inevitably that they must share the political risks of such 
decisions. This is however treacherous terrain for industry: because consumers and other 
stakeholders do not or cannot distinguish among members of the ‘nano’ industry, companies will 
tend to assume a collective identity in the public’s eye. Adverse information about the products 
or activities of one company will consequently color perceptions about the entire industry and 
the technology as a whole. If left undisputed however regulatory and scientific developments 
could trigger visceral market reactions as happened for the agri-biotech industry. The 
predicament facing industry is therefore one of managing stakeholder perceptions of 
nanotechnology risks and benefits; and codes of responsible conduct can be understood as 
instruments to reassure stakeholders that regulatory decisions do not reflect the inherent harmful 
properties of nanotechnologies. Industry self-regulation in Britain and Germany thus does not 
intend to preempt, but complement state intervention.  
THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This thesis recounts the roots of the varied responses of industries in Britain, Denmark, 
Germany and the United States to the regulation of nanotechnologies; and its research strategy 
thus grows from the broad question: what determines business behavior in regulatory politics? 
Business behavior and strategy result from multiple, often interwoven conditions and 
circumstances, the most obvious of which are to be found within the corporation itself (Getz 
1997; Coen, Grant and Wilson 2010). To account for the diverging responses of companies in 
America and Europe, I however look to the institutions that underpin relations among state 
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bureaucrats and industry. Accordingly, I investigate how governments in the advanced industrial 
economies have sought to regulate nanoscale materials and their possible risks to consumers, 
workers and the environment; and review how industries in different regulatory contexts have 
responded to the policy process. To understand the impact of regulatory institutions on business 
behavior, we need to examine their links to the strategic risk-benefit calculations of companies. In 
consequence, I undertake a controlled comparison of the institutional drivers of business 
responses through two case studies contained in chapters four and five: chapter four contrasts 
the dynamics of regulatory policy-making in Britain with the United States, while chapter five 
compares the nature of regulatory politics in Germany to Denmark. And, the question I ask of 
each case is thus: how have the institutions of national regulatory systems shaped the response of 
industry to the policy process? 
The arguments I elaborate and test in the empirical chapters draw on extant theories of 
business behavior in regulatory politics. As I observed above, the varied industry responses to 
comparable state policies nonetheless elude predictions based on conventional political science 
wisdom. And the case studies therefore at the same time serve a heuristic purpose: hence, while 
the four cases primarily serve as vehicles to assess my theoretical arguments, the empirical 
analyses also raise new questions about the drivers of business behavior in these four countries. I 
take these questions as opportunities to further probe the roots of the diverging industry 
responses; and the cases studies as a result also serve to clarify and refine my initial arguments. 
The methodological approach I use is thus one of theory-driven, inductive inquiry (George and 
Bennett 2005: 20ff.). 
The manufacture and use of nanomaterials are potentially subject to multifaceted programs of 
intervention under both general pollution control laws and legislation directed at specific product 
categories. While efforts are gradually under way to control specific applications of nanomaterials 
in legislation governing food safety, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and pesticides, I focus on 
chemical management frameworks; that is, the policies regulating industrial chemicals and their 
risks in the workplace and the environment. The main source of exposure to manufactured 
nanomaterials is in laboratories and other workplace settings. Governments, businesses and other 
stakeholders have therefore on the one hand displayed particular interest in controlling sources of 
occupational exposure. Notification and premarket testing requirements will on the other hand 
dictate how nanomaterials are regulated further downstream. Whereas nanomaterials in their role 
as food additives or drug delivery systems are subject to frameworks controlling end products, 
chemical safety laws are largely ‘front-loaded’ statutes that provide state agencies with the 
authority to review chemicals before and during their use. Chemical management frameworks 
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form the initial basis for obtaining the safety-related information that is passed along the supply 
chain. Absent such information, employers and downstream users cannot undertake proper 
hazard assessments in accordance with health and safety legislation. The extent and nature of 
regulatory controls upon the introduction of nanomaterials will consequently prove influential in 
determining whether and how they will fall under the scope of other consumer and 
environmental protection statutes (Frater et al. 2006).  
In order to control for sector, market and industry specific characteristics, I devote particular 
theoretical and empirical attention to the chemical industry. Other industries that use 
nanomaterials are to some extent subject to national chemical management frameworks. Any 
developments relating to the control of nanomaterials will however primarily impact on chemical 
companies. Given the level of R&D intensity, any occupational safety measures will weigh 
prominently on chemical manufacturers. Similarly, new testing or notification provisions will 
disproportionately affect the interests of chemical companies. As the primary targets of 
regulation, it therefore no surprise that representatives from the chemical industry have 
dominated efforts by business groups to influence the direction of the evolving regulatory 
framework for nanotechnologies. Yet, despite this common, overarching goal, industry leaders 
and corporate representatives have nonetheless set about achieving it through remarkably 
different strategies. Internationally, business responses thus range from close cooperation with 
state authorities over dissociation from regulatory officials to acquiescence and adaptation to 
state policies. 
To understand the unlike responses of industries in America and Europe, the thesis relies on a 
comparative research design. Chapter three tracks the evolution of state control policies in 
Britain, Denmark, Germany and the United States over the decade from 2003 to 2013 and 
compares the role of industry in the policy process. The four cases were selected in order to 
ensure a rigorous assessment of my arguments across similar and different cases. The four 
countries have, firstly, emerged as prominent voices in the international nanotech debate; and as 
such their nanotech policies encompass the broad catalogue of strategic initiatives, research 
investments and risk management instruments OECD countries have fielded to assess and 
control the risks of nanomaterials (OECD 2006; 2008; 2012; 2013). The four countries thus on 
one hand provide a representative sample of how governments in the advanced industrial 
economies have responded to the uncertain promise of nanotechnologies (Seawright and Gerring 
2008: 299f.). As their control strategies moreover are largely comparable, we are on the other 
hand also afforded a measure of control for the effect of state policies on corporate risk-benefit 
calculations.  
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Equally important, the cases secondly capture a wide and varied spectrum of business 
behaviors, tactics and strategies. Efforts to design appropriate control policies are beset with 
uncertainties, and the high stakes riding on such decisions easily engender political controversy. 
While the regulatory process in most countries admits the views of nongovernmental 
participants, the opportunities and incentives to share information with regulators differ. Active 
cooperation with state authorities may allow companies to mold regulatory policies to their 
strategic advantage. But companies must also be cautious of sharing information that risks the 
impositions of adverse regulations. Differences in the extent, format and timing of participation 
in the policy process thus hints at variations in the strategic risk-benefit calculations of 
companies. As I document in chapter three, the four cases offer ample instances of collaboration 
with or dissociation from governmental officials, disclosure as well as nondisclosure, business 
self-governance and its absence; and the cases studies allow us to explore the various paths 
through which these outcomes came about (Mahoney and Goertz 2004).  
The logic of my argument should finally lead us to find an empirical relationship between the 
institutions of domestic regulatory systems and the strategies of national industries. The four 
countries were therefore sampled to assess how different institutions impact on business 
behavior and at the same time control for alternative explanations of the observed outcomes. The 
empirical chapters match the four countries in pairs on major political and economic dimensions 
to control for their possible confounding effects on business behavior (King, Keohane and 
Verba: 202-206) and consider how variations in the regulatory environment for nanotech have 
influenced the responses of national industries. Chapter four on Britain and the United States 
thus varies the regulatory powers of state bureaucrats, while chapter five investigates the effects 
of deliberative institutions in Germany and Denmark. Given their distinct approaches to 
chemical control policy, the country pairs allow us to explore the links between different 
institutions and their effects on corporate decisions to disclose, distort or withhold information 
from state bureaucrats.  
Interactions among regulatory authorities and companies of course do not occur in a vacuum: 
the political strategies of business grow from deeply rooted traditions of state-society relations 
and the distinct organizing logic of political economies. We therefore need to untangle the impact 
of general business-government relations from the specific effects of regulatory institutions. To 
make inferences about the institutions and processes of chemical control, we must in short be 
confident that they exercise an effect on the behavior of companies, independent of distinct 
state-society traditions or the particular history, organization, and economic strength of national 
industries. Beyond variations in their institutions and processes of chemical control policy, the 
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country studies juxtapose broadly similar cases. And the case studies thus approach the question 
of control for confounding variables according to the logic of most similar systems (Lijphart 1971; 
1975).  
Classifying patterns of interactions among business and government in advanced industrial 
economies has long been of particular interests to students of comparative political economy. 
Whatever classification scheme is employed, however, Britain and the United States are invariably 
placed in the same category. And, while perhaps relatively unfamiliar to the comparativist, 
Denmark is usually grouped together with Germany. Since the country studies contrast parallel 
processes of nanotech regulation in the liberal Anglo-Saxon countries and the continental 
Rechtsstaats of Germany and Denmark, we can thus firstly feel confident that variations in industry 
strategies do not merely represent calculated attempts to counter different bureaucratic or legal 
traditions. Second, the legacy of ‘corporatist-style’ negotiations between major interest groups 
and the state in Germany and Denmark would rule out different modes of interest intermediation 
as the source of variation; as should the prevalence of pluralist modes of interaction in the United 
States and (to some extent) Britain.  
Neither should, thirdly, variations in the organizing logic of the four countries’ political 
economies present serious problems for drawing valid inferences. Although neither Britain nor 
Denmark may represent ‘pure’ types (Howell 2007; Campbell and Pedersen 2007), they do 
nonetheless fall squarely within the group of liberal and coordinated market economies, 
respectively (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2009). Variations in regulatory strategies 
– whether governmental policy proposals are incentive compatible or not – should thus not 
reflect the gravitation of national industries towards the modes of coordination for which there is 
institutional support. The case studies would in short appear to provide a good comparative fit 
(Lijphart 1971): since the organization of their political economies and their traditions of state-
society relations are comparable, any difference in industry strategies is likely to reflect differences 
in the organization of their national chemical control regimes.  
The gentle reader might reasonably object that the case studies also contrast countries with 
very different political systems. Might not the federal American system, for example, create 
different opportunities for businesses than the unitary British system; opportunities which could 
have a different bearing on the political strategies of companies in the United States than in 
Britain? Relationships among regulatory authorities and business actors constitute one dimension, 
albeit an important one, of a nation’s public policy process. The influence of business 
organizations inside political parties, political and constitutional constraints on the autonomy of 
national governments or policy-making procedures decentralized enough to allow business 
An Uncertain Business 
22 
groups many points of access and some veto points all weigh on the strategic risk-benefit 
calculations of companies. Precautions must in other words be taken to ensure that conclusions 
drawn from the country studies are indeed valid and not a spurious effect of some omitted 
feature of these cases (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).  
This is an endemic problem in comparative research. My approach to the problem is to 
explicitly consider the most important alternative explanations that might be relevant to the 
observed patterns of interactions in the four countries (in particular legislative developments, 
public opinion, the political and economic strength of national chemical industries, and the 
impact of EU competences on regulatory decision-making). As Peter Hall (2008: 310) 
emphasizes: “One secures a more stringent assessment of the validity of a theory by comparing 
how well it explains the facts one observes with how well another theory explains such facts.” To 
anticipate the results of chapters four, five and six, neither of these rival accounts offers a 
satisfactory explanation of the varied business responses in Britain, Denmark, Germany and the 
United States. In each country, industry strategies, including the decision to self-regulate or not, 
flow from the specific configuration of institutions that underpin relations among state 
bureaucrats and industry. The possibility of comparisons across the case studies and the existence 
of within country variations in industry strategies further bolster our confidence in this 
interpretation and our ability to draw causal inferences about the determinants of business 
behavior in regulatory politics (Hall 2003; George and Bennett 2005). 
Effective causal inference requires bringing to bear as many kinds of evidence as possible 
(Collier, Brady and Seawright 2004); and the case studies labor to systematically consider 
information about actors and their interactions, the unfolding of events leading to the observed 
outcomes as well as about alternative mechanisms, which might have produced these outcomes. 
The case studies bring together some 25 expert interviews with official documents and secondary 
literature. The analyses seek to triangulate these different sources to arrive at more valid and 
reliable interpretations of each case. The empirical backbone of the analysis is the burgeoning 
body of written evidence produced as a direct result of the evolving nanotech debate. Scientific 
reports, technical policy documents and other official publications provide a generous source of 
information about the design and progress of strategic initiatives, research programs and risk 
management policies as well as the extent, format and timing of industry participation in the 
policy process. The case studies further draw on a broad array of internal working documents, 
meeting minutes, position papers, written comments, testimony and transcripts to recreate policy 
deliberations, priorities and decisions. Information about national chemical control regimes was 
gleaned from official documents outlining policy mandates, statutory obligations, regulatory 
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competencies and processes. Documents were in the main accessed through official websites; 
and the case studies make extensive use of this ‘paper trail’ to reconstruct policy rationales as well 
as to trace interactions among regulators and business representatives.  
The case studies are further enriched by information drawn from country surveys and policy 
reviews, statistical data, press coverage and similar secondary sources. Summary reports and 
country profiles were likewise consulted to garner information about the history, organization 
and operations of national chemical industries. Nanotechnology meanwhile attracts considerable 
scholarly attention; and academic publications proved a valuable source of additional insights 
about the unfolding of the four countries’ regulatory processes. I moreover reviewed a diverse 
range of extant academic literatures to obtain information on business-government relations in 
the four countries, the nature of regulatory politics and the role of the chemical industry in their 
respective political economies.  
While voluminous, official documents and secondary sources however provide only a partial 
picture of the regulatory process and corporate risk-benefit calculations (George and Bennett 
2005: 99-105). Additional data was therefore collected through 27 semi-structured interviews with 
representatives from business groups, regulatory authorities and other stakeholders. Respondents 
were identified among former participants in the regulatory processes and an attempt was in each 
country made to interview representatives from industry and government as well as third parties 
to cover multiple views of the policy process.7 The interviews were designed to obtain evidence 
about the stakes and motivations of actors as well as the underlying context of the empirical 
cases; and the interviews thus supplied invaluable information, when official documentation or 
secondary literature was patchy. The interviews were however above all intended to help root out 
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the official sources. Interviews with former participants were 
in consequence used both to facilitate a better grasp of the empirical cases and to systematically 
test, elaborate and correct conclusions drawn from the written materials. To counter potential 
distortions of the empirical record, opinions and interpretations expressed during interviews were 
sought qualified in subsequent interviews and cross-checked against written evidence, where 
necessary by gathering additional data or consulting new literature. Assertions made in the case 




7  Interviews were carried out between February 2011 and July 2013. As a condition of participation, all 
respondents were promised anonymity and in-text quotations from interviews are therefore presented in a 
non-attributable form. Refer to Appendix A for a list of respondents in each country and their affiliations. 
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the ambivalent cases, the written record was allowed to prevail, with interview statements instead 
offered to illustrate the positions of various stakeholder representatives.  
Throughout I use the available information to assess the congruence of my explanatory 
framework as well as rival explanations with the observed patterns of interactions. Evidence from 
the written sources is thus compared with what is known about the nature of regulatory politics 
in each country and information gleaned from the interviews. The case studies draw on these 
diverse sources to piece together an account of the policy process in the four countries, the role 
of industry in the regulation of nanotechnologies and the institutional roots of the varied business 
responses.  
PREVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
The uncertain promise and unknown risks of nanomaterials have led governments in America 
and Europe to pursue a range of largely comparable strategic measures and policy initiatives. 
Guided by what can best be described by an ambition of ‘getting it right’, authorities in Britain, 
Denmark, Germany and the United States embarked on a regulatory path focused on closing 
existing knowledge gaps, combined with active participation in international efforts to enable a 
targeted response to nanotechnologies. To inform their regulatory policies, decision-makers have 
moreover prioritized initiatives to canvass the views of stakeholders. From an early stage, 
collaboration with industry was thus in each country recognized as an important strategic 
measure to advance the regulatory agenda. At face value, then, governmental decision-makers 
have arrived at much the same diagnosis of the challenges created by nanotechnologies – and 
their possible solutions.  
British and German companies have not hesitated in their response to the opportunities for 
influence entailed by the invitation for dialogue and cooperation. Companies and their 
representatives have taken every opportunity to consult and cooperate with state authorities, 
pressing on decision-makers their concerns about scientific developments, technical feasibility 
and economic impacts. Regular contacts and dialogue have in turn created the impetus for a 
range of government-industry collaborations covering joint safety research, exposure assessment 
and the development of risk management methodologies. Collaboration has allowed decision-
makers to access information crucial to gauge the need for immediate action and the formulation 
of strategic priorities. Industry representatives for their part have sought to nurture and reinforce 
cooperative relations with regulators, resulting in extensive policy discussions, accommodation of 
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corporate interests and broad, if not universal agreement on the direction of national nanotech 
policy.  
Although presented with ostensibly similar prospects of guiding regulatory decisions and 
policies, American and Danish companies have nonetheless been reluctant to embrace the 
strategies of their German and British competitors. Relations among state authorities and 
industry have in both countries remained detached and arms’ length. In the United States, 
companies have displayed manifest discomfort in cooperating with the federal regulators. 
Skepticism regarding the intentions of federal agencies has strongly spoken against a course of 
volunteering information to regulators. Federal safety research has remained largely detached 
from parallel efforts in industry, while risk management initiatives have taken shape through 
internal agency processes. In Denmark, companies have voiced few demands and offered only 
minor input to the policy process. With little discernible industry mobilization, the Danish policy 
process has been dominated by state authorities – and the prevalence of irregular and ad hoc 
engagements among officials and industry representatives. Even as a political agreement was 
concluded in 2012 to introduce new mandatory obligations on industry, business representatives 
voiced few loud objections or protests. Acquiescence and acceptance of governmental policies 
are in short words that best describe the response of Danish companies.  
ROADMAP 
Chapter two elaborates my framework for dissecting the drivers of business behavior in 
regulatory politics. I first discuss the dynamics of chemical control policy and consider the 
interests of businesses in the regulation of nanotech. I next explore the political problem of 
commitments and how variations in the institutions and processes of national chemical control 
regimes can explain the varied business responses to nanotechnologies. Chapter three examines 
state policies to assess and control the risks of nanomaterials and documents how companies in 
Britain, the United States, Germany and Denmark have responded to the regulatory process. I 
show how decision-makers in America and Europe have adopted similar policy strategies; and 
how the responses of companies vary across the four countries. Chapters four and five are tasked 
with explaining this variation. 
Chapter four demonstrates how the autonomy of administrative authorities to determine 
regulatory outcomes, insulated from pressures originating from other branches of government, 
explains the different responses of industries in the United States and Britain. Disengagement 
from regulators in the United States and cooperation in Britain are in turn business responses 
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that grow from the distinct opportunities for influencing regulatory outcomes on either side of 
the Atlantic. Chapter five recounts the reasons for the diverging responses of German and 
Danish companies. I show how the responses of companies in the two countries are rooted in 
the institutions that structure communications among state actors and industry representatives. I 
further demonstrate how the strategic environment for chemical control policies in Britain and 
Germany are comparable; and how the coincidence of business responses in these two countries 
is explained by the capacity of state bureaucrats to commit to cooperation with industry.  
Chapter six asks why companies in Britain and Germany self-regulated, while their U.S. and 
Danish competitors did not. I show how neither the organization of business interests, market 
developments nor the prospect of new legislation can account for the cross-national variation in 
industry self-regulation. The chapter instead demonstrates how UK and German companies 
embraced self-regulation as an instrument to reassure their stakeholders that regulatory decisions 
and outcomes do not reflect the inherent harmful properties of nanotechnologies. Chapter seven 
returns to the UK moratorium on nano-remediation. Drawing on chapters four and five, I argue 
that a voluntary moratorium on the use of nano-remedial techniques is an industry response that 
grows from the demands placed on corporate decision-makers by the realities of the British 
regulatory system. The chapter further revisits my theoretical arguments in light of the empirical 
cases as well as how they might apply to other countries, industries and technologies. I consider 
possible implications for our understanding of the regulatory behavior and interests of business, 









The uncertain promise of nanotechnologies has shaped regulatory debates for the better part of a 
decade. The, as of yet, unknown risks of nanomaterials are widely recognized to demand a 
regulatory response. Given the vast financial and political resources invested in nanosciences and 
technologies, politicians and regulators share obvious interests in ensuring the safe and 
responsible development of nanotechnologies. The desire to reap the economic, environmental 
and societal benefits of nanotechnologies has thus led governments to embrace broadly similar 
policy strategies. Rather than recount the origins of governmental control strategies, the purpose 
of this chapter is instead to develop a framework that will allow us to dissect the roots of the 
varied industry responses to comparable state policies. For this reason, the chapter seeks to 
elaborate the regulatory interests of ‘nanobusinesses’ and the drivers of their behavior. To 
understand why industries in America and Europe reacted differently, we must look to the 
institutions that underpin relations among regulatory authorities and industry; and how the 
capacity of state bureaucrats to commit to a set of predictable control policies links to corporate 
risk-benefit calculations. 
I develop this argument in two steps. Sections two through five discuss the dynamics of 
chemical control policy and consider the interests of businesses in the regulation of nanotech. 
The control of chemical hazards demands vast amounts of scientific, technological and economic 
information. Information which regulators do not have – and in many instances can only acquire 
from industry. Companies for their part will only volunteer information to state bureaucrats if 
they are confident that it will not be used to the detriment of their interests. Cooperation among 
regulators and industry is thus a desirable, but not inevitable feature of chemical control policy. 
In sections five to seven, I explore the political problem of commitments and how variations in 
the nature of bureaucratic commitments shapes the behavior of business in regulatory politics. I 
explain how concentration of regulatory powers in state bureaucracies and the reliance on 
deliberative institutions in the formulation and implementation of chemical safety policy can 
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convince companies to trust state bureaucrats with sensitive information. First a few words on 
the problems of regulating nanotechnologies are required, however.  
NANOTECHNOLOGIES: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWN UNKNOWNS  
Although quick to embrace the economic potential of nanotechnologies, governmental control 
strategies confronts a number of intractable difficulties. An amalgam of scientific, technical, 
commercial and regulatory complexities conspires to render regulation of the science and the 
technology an intricate task. Nanotechnologies enable the manufacture of entirely new synthetic 
substances that are markedly different in atomic structure from naturally occurring substances – 
and whose effects on humans and the environment are therefore completely unknown. Most 
nanomaterials meanwhile represent nanoscale versions of well-known substances like iron or 
silver. The behavior of a substance can however change radically when it falls below certain size 
thresholds: a particle of 10 nanometers can behave completely different from the exact same 
substance at 100 nanometers. Unlike traditional bulk chemicals, whose effects varies as a result of 
molecular structure, mass and concentration levels, size dependent properties render attempts to 
evaluate, model and predict the toxicity and behavior of nanoscale materials far more 
complicated. Familiar substances like iron that are known to be harmless can become toxic solely 
on the basis of their small size. Regulators usually rely on their knowledge of familiar chemicals 
to extrapolate and predict the properties of new and unfamiliar substances. Because even very 
small differences, such as a coating, can critically alter a nanomaterial’s effects in biological 
systems (SRU 2011: 5f.), extrapolations from known materials, which could assist regulators 
determine and prioritize the need for safety testing, remain as a consequence highly unreliable. 
Although the body of knowledge is growing, an understanding of how the properties of 
nanomaterials determine their biological effects remains elusive; and, the perplexing bottom line 
is that there is currently no method to predict which nanomaterials will produce a toxic response 
and which will not (Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott 2008: 44; 2010). 
A further complication stems from a lack of appropriate instruments to monitor and study the 
behavior of nanomaterials. Most of the tools designed for the nanoscale were driven by the needs 
of the semiconductor industry – an industry whose products are created in a very dry, ultra clean 
and high vacuum environment. 57 percent of all industrial R&D is however spent on applications 
that work in a liquid medium from gasoline over lubricants to blood. In a vacuum, liquids boil off 
at room temperature and most detection tools are consequently useless for studying how these 
materials behave in other media like soil, water and air. Without the tools to describe, specify, 
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characterize and measure nanomaterials, state authorities are unable to define and enforce 
protective standards. Consider exposure limits for carbon nanotubes as an illustration: the U.S. 
National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety recommends an exposure threshold of 
seven micro grams per cubic meter. Is exposure below this level safe? Frankly, we do not know. 
But current detection techniques cannot measure CNTs below this level.1 Technical impairments 
and engineering problems then obstruct attempts to discover, study, and manage the potential 
adverse effects of nanomaterials.  
The risk management challenges arising from the paucity of scientific data and the lack of 
appropriate instrumentation are at the same time exacerbated by the speed of development 
within the field and its heterogeneous nature. Nanomaterials are manufactured and used by 
businesses in a wide variety of market segments and product sectors from cosmetics to 
construction. Many nanomaterials are developed in a decentralized fashion, with a significant 
percentage of production coming from small, dispersed university spin-offs and startups. The 
processes used in the production of nanomaterials as well as their uses in the manufacture of 
other products are further tremendously diverse. As a result, collecting data on which materials 
are being produced, ascertaining how and for what applications these materials are used, and 
developing an efficient enforcement strategy, is hampered by the sheer number and diversity of 
facilities involved (Florini et al. 2006: 45).  
Framing nanotechnologies for regulatory purposes has finally created its own set of problems. 
Statutory regulations require – among other things – clear definitions of what is to be regulated 
and understandable compliance requirements (Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott 2010: 124f.). But 
finding adequate language has proven difficult: there is for example no internationally agreed 
definition of the term ‘nanomaterial’ with standardization bodies, scientific institutions, 
authorities and private organization each advancing their own definitions. Efforts to establish 
common terminology, nomenclature, protocols for toxicity testing and reference materials are 
likewise in their infancy. State authorities are in consequence unsure of how to specify the 
obligations of manufacturers to test and obtain safety-related information for their materials. 
Should regulators for example distinguish among nanoparticles that are engineered and 
incidental, soluble and insoluble, free and embedded, and so on? Do nanomaterials have one, two 
or three dimensions at a scale below 100, 200 or 300 nanometers? How relevant are structure, 




1  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 23, 2012. 
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have yet to be answered conclusively (Jaspers 2010: 271f.). Given the sheer number of 
nanomaterials that are being researched, developed and manufactured as well as the range of 
parameters – size, shape, composition, coating, reactivity, surface area and chemistry – that might 
influence their behavior and properties, governmental control strategies are in short confronted 
with a task of daunting proportions.  
CONTROLLING (NANO) CHEMICAL HAZARDS 
Most of the complexities frustrating the design of effective control policies are rooted in the 
same problem: information – or rather a lack thereof. Whether looking to formulate a generic 
policy for nanomaterials, decide on an appropriate safety standard, or assess the risk of a specific 
nanomaterial, state authorities require vast amounts of information. Consider, for example, a 
regulator seeking to estimate the risks of a given nanomaterial: to do so, the regulator must 
proceed in three steps – hazard identification, dose-response assessment, and exposure 
quantification – each demanding separate data inputs. Our regulator must first identify the 
possible hazards of the nanomaterial in question by evaluating the qualitative evidence of harm. 
Based on this assessment, she must secondly determine the relationship between dosage and the 
probability and severity of an effect. Finally, our regulator must estimate the amounts or 
concentrations to which individuals or the environment is or may be exposed. Information about 
the nanomaterial’s intended use and fate is therefore as important as knowledge about its intrinsic 
properties, since exposure is a precondition for any harm to occur. If there is no exposure, there 
is no risk.  
But our regulator’s information needs do not end here: to control the risks of the material, she 
must further consider questions of technology and cost. The regulator must ask which responses 
are likely to be effective, what degree of improvement each is likely to accomplish, which control 
technologies are available, and what the improvement will cost (Applegate 1991; Esty 2004). To 
regulate nanomaterials, state authorities must in other words consider four basic kinds of 
information: they need to know about the nature and magnitude of any harmful activities or 
products, including the probability of such harm (risk assessment); they need information to 
decide how to allocate limited resources among identified hazards (priority setting); and identify 
and evaluate possible responses (standard setting). Finally, regulators need information to enforce 
their chosen response (Applegate 1991; Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 2004). But for most 
nanomaterials, this information is not readily available. And, at present, regulators have neither 
the resources nor the technical tools and regulatory instruments to effectively acquire the 
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information they need. Consider the problems of data generation through government-sponsored 
safety studies.  
Our regulator from above may well decide that the available evidence for the risks of say 
nano-silver (or the lack thereof) warrants further research. Bracketing budget restraints and the 
significant costs of safety testing,2 she might decide to draw on existing in-house expertise to 
conduct this research. Or she might commandeer the expertise of academic researchers, 
independent consultants, or even nongovernmental organizations. If the information she seeks is 
of a general nature – for example the effects of nano-silver on health – this might be worthwhile. 
But studying the properties and behaviors of nano-silver would not tell her much about levels of 
exposure to – and therefore risks of – nano-silver. Unless our regulator can acquire information 
about use patterns, production processes, exposure pathways and endpoints, she will be unable to 
define a tolerable risk threshold for nano-silver (Meili and Widmer 2010: 447); and she will 
consequently struggle to decide on the best course of action. Internal agency experts or outside 
consultants will be of little help. Characterizing the risks of nano-silver and other nanomaterials 
will instead to a wide extent depend on accessing information held by industry. 
Nor can our regulator rely on traditional regulatory instruments to gather the information she 
requires. Take something as apparently simple as tracking the use of nano-silver in industry: most 
chemical management frameworks define standards and exemptions from them based on 
molecular identity and mass – not particle size. Only changes in quantity, concentration or 
chemical structure, not in size or shape, will trigger identification, notification and classification 
requirements (Ludlow 2008). Unless the nanoscale form of a substance constitutes a change in 
chemical identity, nanomaterials will in most cases be classified as the same substance in bulk 
form. Until specific provisions are put in place, nano-silver will be regulated as silver; nano-iron 
as iron and so forth. Manufacturers and users are not required to register and label their 
nanoscale materials as such and much less undertake additional safety testing – and nanomaterials 
can in consequence enter the market relatively unrestrained and unnoticed. State agencies can 
only demand disclosure and production of information, when they are so authorized by their 
political masters, and for nanotechnologies they lack this authority. Our regulator is in other 
words unable to mandate disclosure of which materials are being produced, how and for what 




2  Jae-Young Choi and colleagues (2009) for example estimate that the costs of testing existing nanomaterials on 
the U.S. market will range from US$ 249 million to US$ 1.18 billion. 
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Most of the information needed to regulate the risks of nanomaterials is thus unavailable or 
inaccessible to state authorities – either because the scientific knowledge to support hazard 
identification and dose-response assessment simply does not exists or because the scientific, 
technical and professional expertise needed to decide among alternative control measures is 
beyond the grasp of agency officials and experts. Or because information on use patterns and 
product details relevant to exposure assessment is widely dispersed among manufacturers and 
users. Compiling data and gathering knowledge sufficient to develop a systematic risk 
management approach to the nanomaterials currently on the market is likely to overwhelm 
available risk management resources for most state authorities – and by the time it is done, new 
generations of nanomaterials will already have entered the market, creating new risk uncertainties 
(Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott 2008: 44).  
While the amalgam of scientific, technical, commercial and regulatory uncertainty certainly 
complicates attempts to gather information, a lack of reliable information is not a problem 
unique to nanomaterials: a common theme of much writing on toxic substance regulation is thus 
“the dearth of scientific [and basic] information available to assess the impact of industrial 
activities on public health and the environment.” (Wagner 2004: 1619) Toxic substance control 
demands that state authorities produce, collect and process relevant information as evidence of 
toxicity and exposure continues to surface and accumulate. As new hazards are revealed, agencies 
must update and reevaluate their safety assessments or control policies. But in many cases the 
evidence of harm is sketchy, based on studies of variable design and quality, and subject to 
interpretation according to changing assumptions and analytic judgments that are beyond the 
grasp of the untutored. The effectiveness and cost of alternative control measures are difficult to 
estimate, and their appropriate design and application often depend on the knowledge of 
specialists (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985: 157f). Chemicals regulation is thus a continuous, 
resource-intensive and time-consuming process – one which requires state authorities to rely on 
industry to provide the bulk of the information they need. 
State bureaucrats are usually poorly positioned to gather information about business 
operations, or at least to gather it cheaply. Even where they try, it is almost always more 
expensive and time consuming, since chemicals manufacturers and users have significant 
advantages in cumulative experience, technical skills, access to data, and research capacity, not to 
mention the fact that they own the production process (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 
2004: 287). Bureaucracies are created to organize expertise and manage information needed to 
implement state policies. But their expertise tends to be general, say on the material properties of 
nano-silver and its impacts on health; and, while state bureaucrats can collect an impressive array 
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of data about the policies they govern, it tends to be of a standardized and easily observable 
nature (Scott 1998; Culpepper 2003: 194). Yet general scientific expertise and statistical data is 
insufficient, when state agencies must decide how to regulate suspect chemicals or particular 
industry practices. State authorities instead need detailed and accurate information about business 
operations to understand the scope of the regulatory problems they cause – and how to craft 
effective solutions to them. But this information cannot be supplied without the assistance of 
chemicals manufacturers and users, or at least only with difficulty and at great cost. Quoting two 
German officials, Volker Schneider (1985: 180) writes:  
“Chemicals control policy […] depends to a large degree on the cooperation between government, 
industry […] and science. Thus, the environmental assessment of chemicals … requires a good deal of 
scientific, technological and economic information, which the administration does not have, and can only 
get from those concerned. Since the provision of appropriate reliable information from industry and 
science can be secured only to a limited extent through compulsion, cooperative relations between 
government, industry and science are necessary conditions for the guarantee of a sufficient supply of 
information.”  
The best sources of information about nanoscale and macroscale chemicals, industry practices 
and processes, the costs of mitigation, or the feasibility of different control technologies are in 
short the very companies, authorities are looking to regulate (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 
2004: 278). Governmental appeals for collaboration, voluntary disclosure and the emphasis on 
the strategic value of partnerships with industry should be seen in this light.  
THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY AND THE MANUFACTURE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Manufacturers and users of chemicals ordinarily are in the best position to cheaply and accurately 
provide or obtain toxicity and exposure data, since they have the greatest familiarity with their 
products’ characteristics and the occasions for exposure to them. Companies learn through their 
own testing and analysis, from reports of complaints by customers or workers, or simply based 
on their superior understanding of their products and processes (Applegate 1991: 299). Product 
liability laws and the prospect of consumer rejection of dangerous chemicals likewise create 
strong incentives for industry to learn as much as possible about their products. Companies in 
fact almost always know much more than regulators about the risks associated with their 
substances, production technologies and manufacturing processes (Grant, Paterson and Whitston 
1988: 60f.; Wagner 2004: 1642). Although they may have an interest in sharing favorable, self-
serving information, chemicals manufacturers and industrial users have few incentives to 
produce, disclose or otherwise assist in the acquisition of data about possible adverse effects. 
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Concerns for intellectual property, confidentiality issues, regulatory liabilities and a desire to avoid 
negative publicity should hazards be discovered at a later stage result in overwhelming incentives 
to minimize transparency about harmful substances or activities (Lyndon 1989; McGarity and 
Wagner 2008: 28f.).  
Virtually no market benefits accrue to companies, which publish data on the safety of their 
chemicals. Safety research cannot easily be validated or compared, and consumers and investors 
are unlikely to make purchasing or investment decisions based on a manufacturer’s self-serving 
statements about safety. Yet, while disclosure of test data seldom provides a clear market signal, a 
negative result is almost always definitive: when a substance does cause cancer in laboratory 
animals, ambiguities concerning how those results should be extrapolated to humans does not 
substantially diminish the adverse publicity associated with the discovery of its harmful effects 
(Wagner 2004: 1634ff.). Toxicity and exposure are negative features of chemicals and a 
nanomaterial’s latent toxic effects are hardly a point in its favor in the market. But even 
disclosure of test data acquitting a chemical of suspicion could cause significant economic harm, 
since it might provide important assistance to knowledgeable competitors. An inability to protect 
confidential information rapidly diminishes the returns from innovation, and alerting competitors 
to market strategies, trade secrets and plans for long-term profitability could prove disastrous.  
Legal safeguards allow manufacturers to impede public access to a large body of information 
regarding their manufacturing processes, test data and products. But companies also have 
incentives to withhold or discredit information that could help governments regulate. Regulation 
and enforcement tend to increase in lockstep with the availability of information on harmful 
effects: whereas no information usually means no regulation, a solid body of uncontested, 
adverse information will almost certainly lead to intrusive regulation or perhaps a ban on the 
activity or substance in question. Industry in consequence has strong incentives to keep 
incriminating information tightly under wraps – or to release such information only slowly 
(Coglianese 2007). Since much of the information needed to design, enforce and justify 
regulatory action lies within the particular knowledge of industry, manufacturers and users of 
chemicals are however also superbly well-positioned to influence the decisions and outcomes of 
toxic substance control.  
When information is sorely incomplete, controverted, or effectively unobtainable, state 
authorities are often unable to decide how to intervene against suspect substance or industry 
practices. Even under a precautionary standard, uncertainty and a lack of knowledge will act to 
delay or impede a regulatory response. Since uncertainty can mitigate or avoid the costs of 
regulation altogether, industry faces compelling reasons to manufacture uncertainty about 
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substances and their adverse effects (Lyndon 1989: 1820). Simply withholding damaging 
information and publicizing only favorable information can allow companies to present a 
misleadingly positive account of their products and processes – and hence offset incriminating 
information produced by others. Or companies can use their control of key information to 
produce inflated estimates to suggest that the costs of a new regulation will be higher than 
anticipated or that its benefits will be lower. Unless outsiders can gain access to ‘inside 
information’, biased cost estimates will effectively stand unchallenged. Submitting volumes of 
highly specific and very detailed technical data can likewise permit companies to bury damaging 
information in a mountain of ‘irrelevant’ material with the effect of slowing down the control 
process to a virtual standstill (Wagner 2010). Overloading an agency with more information than 
it can absorb is thus but an extension of a conscious strategy to keep regulators in the dark.  
If independent research does find evidence of harm, challenges to its methodology, data 
interpretation, sampling or review processes can be used to question the results in the eyes of 
officials. The simple fact that a study has been subjected to lengthy and credibly-sounding attack 
is often sufficient to impair its perceived reliability. And portraying research as ‘fatally flawed’ or 
‘tentative’ can serve to generate pressure on decision-makers to discount it (McGarity and 
Wagner 2008: 38ff.). More elaborate efforts to manufacture uncertainty entail investments in 
‘counter-research’ carefully tweaked to produce results more favorable to the manufacturer’s 
interests: keeping doses low, shortening the duration of an experiment, using animals that are 
resistant to cancer and many other clever tricks have in the past been employed to produce 
results that make chemicals seem less dangerous than they are (Collins 2010: 116; Fagin, Lavelle 
and the Center for Public Integrity 1996). From industry’s superior information, knowledge and 
expertise therefore flows a significant influence over the course of chemical control policy. While 
nanotechnologies are recognized to demand a regulatory response, companies might nonetheless 
diminish its adverse effects, simply by minimizing the amount or credibility of information that 
could indicate cause for concern or justify more intrusive regulations. The pervasive information 
deficiencies confronting state agencies in other words present unique opportunities to influence 
how governments will decide to govern the technology. 
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND NANOTECH REGULATION  
Debate on the nature of an appropriate response to nanotechnologies has waged for the better 
part of a decade. Manufactures and users of nanomaterials obviously have much riding on the 
outcome of this debate. Statutory regulations might increase business costs, erect barriers to 
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market entry or result in lower or changing patterns of innovation – the lifeblood of the industry. 
‘Business’ is however not a homogenous group, but represent rather a number of competing and 
often conflicting interests (Hart 2004). Although industry leaders thus have struck a harmonious 
cord in rejecting ‘premature’ regulation, they do not necessarily see eye-to-eye on how the state 
should govern the technology. The nanotech industry is not monolithic, and questions of 
oversight and regulation are viewed distinctly by corporate decision-makers according to factors 
ranging from business resources over market location and orientation to research and 
development strategies. Given the fragmented and complex industry structure, state intervention 
will impact very differently on members of the industry – and their regulatory stakes 
consequently differ.  
Despite the heterogeneous nature of the industry, two distinct types of ‘nanobusinesses’ are 
emerging: the large and the small. With their different resources and dispositions, large and small 
companies have distinct and often diverging interests (Traxler 2007). While statutory controls on 
nanomaterials and their risks will infringe on the interests of all companies, compliance costs will 
not be equally distributed across large and small manufacturers. Consider for example the 
implications of mandatory testing requirements: safety testing raises the costs of bringing new 
products to market and may discourage companies from sinking funds into risky new ventures. 
Because they lack the economic resources and experience to mount sophisticated screening 
programs, testing will however be disproportionately burdensome for small companies. Testing 
obligations may in contrast work to the advantage of large corporations: small companies are 
frequently unable to understand and cope with statutory requirements (Ashford and Heaton 
1983), and large corporations might therefore wish to promote mandatory testing as an 
instrument to undermine the profitability of startups, allowing incumbents to buy up their patents 
and intellectual property as they crash.  
Large manufacturers nonetheless have little reason to welcome extended testing requirements: 
first, expected returns in small-volume chemicals are rarely sufficient to offset the cost of testing 
(Schulze 1985). Because most nanomaterials still – at best – are produced in kilos not tones, new 
testing obligations will encroach on the profit margins of large and small manufacturers alike. 
Second, since rival products made without nanoscale materials would not be subject to similar 
requirements, even where they present comparable or perhaps greater risks, testing obligations 
would place nanomaterials at a distinct commercial disadvantage (Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott 
2010: 131); and an obligation to test all novel nanomaterials and products might therefore serve 
to thwart the industry’s long-term economic prospects. Although their rationales may differ, 
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companies of all sizes thus face compelling reasons to resist statutory obligations that could result 
in increased cost, delays on market entry, and so on.  
While overly zealous environmental, health and safety regulations might indeed bring the 
nanotech innovation boost to an abrupt end (Lin 2007: 112), the current mix of scientific and 
regulatory uncertainty also acts as important barriers to successful commercialization 
(OECD 2010). When there is a clear legal framework associated with a given range of economic 
activities, businesses are better able to identify and quantify commercial risk. Statutory regulations 
can of course increase business costs. But they also serve as guidance to expected behavior and 
so help build confidence in an industry – especially an industry that may involve significant, but 
uncertain risks (Paddock 2010: 183). In a stable and hence more predictable regulatory 
environment, investors and lenders are more willing to offer financial support, and insurers are 
more inclined to cover potential liabilities. The inconclusive status of nanomaterials under extant 
statutes and regulations therefore presents industry with other opportunities and predicaments 
than a mere desire to minimize state interference.  
Whether the issue is patenting or testing of novel nanomaterials, a predictable regulatory 
response will facilitate access to venture capital as well as reduce insurance and other operating 
costs; and, a stable regulatory environment will thus be vital to the success and survival of 
startups and other small companies. Reflecting on the issue of testing, an industry observer 
noted: “[Small companies] really did want testing. What they don’t want is uncertainty. They 
don’t want a regulatory wasteland. And they don’t want testing that doesn’t work. So, they don’t 
want unfair and burdensome testing. […] Early in the game, they want to know what the testing 
[requirements will be].”3 But large manufacturers likewise face high stakes in a clear set of 
regulations governing their products and activities. Although their political resources and strong 
legal teams allow large corporations to navigate the control process, they also need regulatory 
clarity to minimize risks of patent litigation or avoid undertaking expensive and long-term R&D 
for applications, which may later be banned (Davies 1983; OECD 2010: 89).  
The uncertain legal status of nanomaterials further leaves industry liable for damages in the 
event that manufacturing processes or products are later discovered to present dangers to 
humans or the environment. Because the science is continuously evolving there is as Amy Fink 
(2007: 23) notes a possibility that “issues arising out of nanotechnology will not become apparent 




3  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 17, 2012. 
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flood of ‘long tail’ claims.” For small startups, prospects of long-term health effects need perhaps 
not figure prominently among their day-to-day concerns: by the time hazards can be established 
for their applications, they may long have ceased operations or been acquired by other 
companies.4 As the market consolidates, then, incumbents – and their financial stakeholders – 
could be forced to foot the bill of toxic legacies emerging from their own products or from their 
acquisitions. Uncertain of how to quantify or cost liability, insurers have for example been among 
the first stakeholders to urge caution (See e.g. Swiss Re 2004; Gen Re 2004; Allianz 2005; Lloyds 
2007). Sparse exposure and toxicology research, a lack of nano-related accident history, and the 
breadth of nanotech applications have insurers concerned that “[t]he examples of accidents and 
individual claims frequently mentioned in connection with nanotechnology are only the tip of the 
iceberg.” (Swiss Re 2004: 39) Unless and until measures are undertaken to address such 
uncertainties, the insurance industry might decide to price premiums conservatively, and be 
selective in the types of risks they insure against (Guy Carpenter 2006) – an approach illustrated 
by Continental Western Group’s 2008 decision to refuse coverage for clients involved with 
carbon nanotubes. While this policy was later retracted, limits on insurance coverage would create 
major impediments for companies engaged in nanotechnology research, with new ventures either 
being put off or decided against completely. Without clear statutory guidelines, companies 
however remain uncertain about their obligations, leaving them – as well as their investors and 
insurers – guessing about their eventual degree of liability exposure (Dana 2010; DeVries, 
Gotting and Liebfarth. 2010).  
Consumers and business partners meanwhile prefer to buy tested and safe product, but will 
tend to shy away from products with uncertain effects or unknown risks. Yet, until effective risk 
management methods, guidelines and instrumentation are developed, companies cannot 
effectively demonstrate the safety of their products. This lack of agreed standards to facilitate 
communications among manufacturers and their customers on quality and safety issues is 
consequently viewed as one of the major barriers to successful commercialization (OECD 2010). 
The market however will produce neither instruments nor guidance, and companies must instead 
look to the state to provide the necessary risk management infrastructure. The slowly evolving 
regulatory environment and the absence of an unequivocal statutory response at the same time 
readily feeds into public perceptions of government inaction in the face of unknown hazards; and 




4  Nonetheless, startups that ignore possible health and safety implications will discover that interest in their 
novel materials and processes – no matter how promising – is not as keen as they had hoped. 
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to consumer boycotts and visceral market reactions. Reservations on part of financial 
stakeholders, combined with the potential for public backlash, could eventually frighten off 
business partners and downstream users, severely reducing the industry’s economic prospects. 
Several global food companies, including once market leaders such as American Kraft Foods, 
have for instance already taken measures to disassociate their products and brands from 
nanotechnology. Mounting public hostility to nanotech could ultimately compel politicians to 
entrench ‘irrational’ or ‘uninformed’ sentiment into official policy, cut public funding, erect costly 
test barriers or even introduce a moratorium on further development (Sylvester, Abbott and 
Marchant 2009: 169). How states decide to govern the uncertain promise and unknown risks of 
nanomaterials will in large measure determine the long-term commercial viability of 
nanotechnologies and hence shape the fortunes of nanobusinesses – be they large or small. While 
regulations might come at a price to flexibility, a clear legal environment also promises significant 
benefits in terms of regulatory certainty, stakeholder confidence and business predictability, 
which cannot simply be ignored.  
THE RISKY LURE OF DISCLOSURE 
Although the regulatory process has remained mired in a search for appropriate control 
mechanisms, the question facing policy-makers, regulators and industry was never whether the 
state should intervene to guarantee public health and safety, but how. If reducing the scope of 
state interference was their only or even primary concern, manufactures and users of 
nanomaterials might be best advised to limit available information about their operations. In the 
current situation, however, regulatory uncertainty complicates the commercial environment for 
companies and impedes the market performance of nanotechnologies (OECD 2010). While 
over-regulation thus indeed may be the fear of some, industry at large nonetheless has an interest 
in promoting outcomes that could translate into a long-term stable and favorable business 
environment. And given their superior information, knowledge and expertise, companies will be 
well-positioned to influence how the state decides to intervene to ensure human health and 
environmental integrity.  
With regulators scrambling at the complexities of scientific uncertainty, new information can 
exercise a significant impact on regulatory agendas, priorities and policies (Haas 1992). This can 
work in industry favor, if disclosing information succeeds in convincing state bureaucrats to 
make decisions that either reduce anticipated costs or increase private benefits. Disclosure and  
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cooperation might for instance convince governments to provide financial subsidies for testing of 
existing nanomaterials or for coordinated research efforts for a particular group of products. 
Inputs on market conditions or the state of applied science could likewise expedite the drafting of 
guidance documents, common standards and nomenclature. Or disclosure might simply afford 
companies opportunities to negotiate control measures that accommodate their views on 
mitigation techniques and costs. Once enshrined in regulation, a negotiated standard might 
promote inertia and regulatory ‘lock-in’, hence reducing the likelihood of future more rigorous 
regulations. Information and expertise are key resources for influencing the design of regulatory 
policies and research investments intended to develop new risk management methods. 
Cooperation with state authorities could therefore allow companies to mold the very scientific 
basis, technical tools, test protocols, procedures and nomenclature regulators must employ to 
craft and justify future decisions and actions. Disclosure might in other words allow companies 
to capture private benefits or reduce compliance costs under the current rules of the game; and 
over the longer term to bend those rules to serve their interests.  
Whether the lure of influence will indeed be sufficient to induce companies to disclose 
information depends of course on the expected consequences of cooperation. Schematically, 
when evaluating their choice of disclosure or nondisclosure, companies must anticipate one of 
four possible ‘outcomes’ (See figure 2.1). Viewed from industry’s perspective, we may refer to 
these as: joint decisions (OUTCOME 1); punitive controls (OUTCOME 2); governmental inaction 
(OUTCOME 3); and, unilateral regulations (OUTCOME 4). We can assume that industry will rank these 
Disclosure 
Nondisclosure 
Figure 2.1 The Risky Lure of Disclosure 
 
OUTCOME 1 Joint Decisions [Rank: 1] 
OUTCOME 2 Punitive Controls [Rank: 4] 
OUTCOME 3 Governmental Inaction [Rank: 2] 
OUTCOME 4 Unilateral Regulations [Rank: 3] 
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outcomes as follows. With a regulatory response looming on the horizon, companies will prefer 
to shape that response to their strategic advantage (OUTCOME 1). Companies may in consequence 
be inclined to accept some degree of constraint on their operations in exchange for state policies 
that could help stabilize the business environment, limit liability exposure, prevent market failures 
and promote regulatory lock-in on outcomes favorable to their interests (Shaffer 2010: 65). With 
the promise of influence, companies may therefore readily volunteer information, share their 
expertise and actively assist regulators in the acquisition of new data. Cooperation in short serves 
industry’s interests as well as regulators’ needs. But disclosure is also a dangerous course for 
industry: while regulators certainly appreciate information volunteered by industry, they may 
value the information differently than originally anticipated. Seemingly unimportant data could in 
fact be just the information needed to impose stringent new restrictions on industry products or 
practices. Unless companies can trust regulators to respect their interests, cooperation is a risky 
strategy (OUTCOME 2). 
Maintaining silence, i.e. nondisclosure, on the other hand represents the conservative gambit. 
Manufacturers and users of nanomaterials are of course not the only source of information, and 
they certainly do not have a monopoly on expertise. State bureaucrats have their own sources of 
information; and while information might currently be either under-supplied or inaccessible, the 
knowledge about and understandings of potential risks is steadily accumulating. Regulators may 
therefore eventually feel convinced that specific restrictions, control policies or legislative 
amendments are required and justified – regardless of the degree of industry disclosure 
(OUTCOME 4). While nondisclosure does not preclude or prevent state intervention, uncertainty 
and a lack of knowledge usually act to delay a regulatory response. Regulators may moreover find 
it difficult to justify comprehensive regulatory action, especially if industry can find ways to 
discredit or question the credibility of existing information (Lyndon 1989: 1819f.). Ultimately, 
industry resistance could prove sufficient to reverse the tide of regulatory action – but it could 
also fail. Between unilateral regulations and punitive controls industry is thus caught between a 
rock and a hard place. Because nondisclosure might force state authorities to settle on less 
intrusive controls, unilateral regulations should nonetheless be preferable to companies intend on 
minimizing regulation’s adverse effect.5  
Better still would of course be governmental inaction (OUTCOME 3). Given the pervasive 




5  Not to mention that nondisclosure will shelter companies from breaches of confidentiality, competitive 
disadvantages, increases in liability exposure, and so. 
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action; and they may therefore wish to limit state intervention to minor, cosmetic adjustments to 
extant regulations or broad statements on their relevance to nanotechnologies. With the 
associated degree of business predictability, the benefits to companies cannot be dismissed. But 
governmental inaction also fails to address the roots of some of the persistent challenges in the 
current commercial environment. Governmental inaction offers limited guidance to companies 
looking to demonstrate the properties, quality and safety of their novel products and applications; 
nor will inaction help establish procedures needed to credibly communicate such information to 
consumers and business partners in the value-chain. Since moreover minor, cosmetic changes to 
extant regulations can be implemented with relative ease, they can just as easily be undone. 
Failure to lock-in a favorable outcome consequently robs companies of a solid safeguard against 
future adverse regulations should new incriminating evidence come to surface. While 
governmental inaction thus promises companies freedom to operate in the short term, it may 
well fail to translate into a long term, favorable business environment. 
We can in short assume that companies will prefer regulations decided through mutual 
agreement to governmental inaction, which in turn is preferred to unilateral regulations. Avoiding 
the debilitating impacts of punitive controls should nonetheless dominate corporate risk-benefit 
calculations. Whether industry decides on a strategy of disclosure or nondisclosure will however 
ultimately depend on what companies can expect their regulatory adversaries to do.  
Regulators for their part will prefer that industry discloses, rather than withholds or distorts, 
needed information. And they may therefore be willing to pursue policies that accommodate the 
interests of industry. Establishing upfront how regulators will react should industry decide to 
disclose or withhold information is nonetheless somewhat tricky. Nanotech confronts policy-
makers and risk managers with all the characteristics of a classic policy dilemma: while on the one 
hand seeking to encourage the technology’s economic and societal benefits, governments must 
balance this desire against the need to ensure human health, public safety and environmental 
integrity on the other (Hodge, Bowman and Ludlow 2007: 6). Governments would undoubtedly 
prefer to land the regulatory process on an outcome that both eliminates, or at least minimizes 
possible risks and ensures a favorable business environment. An outcome that accomplishes 
neither, in contrast, represents a scenario that governments understandably are determined to 
avoid. And, in some situations, crafting effective risk management policies that do not 
overburden industry with new obligations may indeed prove unproblematic. Often, however, 
state policy will be unable to reconcile these twin goals; and in such cases regulators must decide 
how best to mitigate risks to human health and the environment without compromising 
industry’s ability to innovate and compete. 
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Hence, whether disclosure will result in joint decisions or whether it will compel regulators to 
respond with punitive controls is a function of how state authorities trade off safety for 
competitiveness, when their policies can accomplish one, but not both objectives simultaneously. 
How state bureaucracies rank outcomes that achieve one goal at the expense of the other is 
contingent both upon organizational attributes, such as e.g. their statutory mandates, their 
resources, internal power structures and so on, as well as the political environment within which 
they operate. Agencies staffed predominantly by industrial hygienists, toxicologists or other 
specialists are likely to approach such trade-offs in a different manner than those dominated by 
lawyers, economists or other generalists. Statutory mandates insisting on elaborate cost-benefit 
balancing likewise conditions different trade-offs than statutes stipulating a strict application of 
the precautionary principle. Reactions by independent regulators will meanwhile differ from state 
agencies that must anticipate frequent interference from elected politicians, while variations in the 
capacity of organized interests to pressure an agency dictate yet again different trade-offs (Wilson 
1980; 1989). And so forth. Because the agencies charged with oversight of nanotech as well as the 
political circumstances they must navigate are so tremendously diverse, an unequivocal answer to 
when state actors will prefer outcomes that allow industry freedom to operate at the expense of 
human health and environmental integrity – and vice versa – is hard to come by. Given the 
variance of contexts and state actors, it is in other words unwise to impute to regulators rigid 
preferences for one goal over other (Frieden 1999: 61ff.); and we are instead better served by 
leaving this as a question to be answered by the empirical record. 
REGULATORY POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF COMMITMENTS 
To succeed in regulation of complex social and economic processes, states require accurate 
information about the possible and actual consequences of their policies. Left to their own 
devices, state authorities however frequently find it impedingly costly, if not impossible, to gather 
the information they need – and they may therefore wish to turn to business or other private 
actors as a cheaper and more reliable alternative source of information. State policies thus often 
depend on the behavior and cooperation of individuals, groups and industries to meet their 
objectives. But companies must be wary of sharing information about their operations with state 
actors, who under a range of unpredictable influences may decide to use the information against 
business (Hall and Soskice 2001: 47). Fear of state interference in other words cautions against 
supplying truthful information. Clearly, it is not always in the interests of state actors to defect 
from a cooperative agreement: by striking a bargain with business, states can craft and implement 
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more efficient policies. But efficiency alone is insufficient to guarantee that state actors will 
abstain from reneging on an agreement (North and Weingast 1989: 806; Morrow 1999: 96). State 
preferences change over time, and while state actors may wish to encourage cooperation with 
business, their incentives after the fact are not always compatible with maintaining an agreement 
(Schelling 1956: 299; Shepsle 1991: 247f.). Unless short-term incentives to alter agreed policies 
can be eliminated, business has reasons to doubt whether or not state actors intend to honor 
their promises. Business will in short only cooperate with state actors, if their commitment to 
abide by an agreement is credible. 
When states cannot rely on coercion to implement their policies, a lack of credibility becomes 
problematic: if future policy changes can be anticipated, social and economic actors may fail to 
react and adapt as intended, thus preventing the policy from attaining its objectives. Since the 
information needed to design and enforce effective chemical control policies only to a limited 
degree can be secured through compulsion (Schneider 1985: 180), the capacity of state 
bureaucrats to make credible commitments will influence whether companies will decide to 
disclose, bias or conceal information. Companies will only volunteer information to state 
bureaucrats if they are confident that the information will not be used to the detriment of their 
interests. Where such expectations are not well-founded, companies must in contrast remain 
vigilant to possible ulterior motives: nondisclosure is rational, if companies have reasons to 
suspect concealed agendas. When deciding between a course of disclosure or nondisclosure, 
companies must in other words attempt first to anticipate how regulators will evaluate the 
available body of knowledge; second how they can be expected to act on that knowledge; and 
finally what impact new information will have on their decision-making. We must therefore look 
to the institutional mechanisms that allow state bureaucrats to convince companies that they can 
be trusted with sensitive information. 
To understand the impact of institutions on business responses, we need to examine their 
links to the risk-benefit calculations of companies. Institutions enter strategic calculations by 
providing information about the choices of others. Because they define the range of available 
actions, institutions provide a rational basis for formulating expectations about how other are 
likely to act (Knight 1992: 55ff.; Lake and Powell 1999: 8f.). Institutions can therefore mitigate 
commitment problems by reducing uncertainty about future behavior (North 1990). The 
institutional configuration of national chemical control regimes thus structure business 
expectations about the likely behavior and responses of state bureaucrats: formal and informal 
institutions transmit information on the possible intentions, priorities and designs of regulators. 
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And this information assists companies formulate strategies to anticipate regulatory 
developments, given the probable actions of their regulatory adversaries.  
Companies draw on two kinds of information to predict the behavior of state bureaucrats: on 
the one hand, companies use their understanding of how formal institutions and their operating 
procedures structure the regulatory process and its possible outcomes – and importantly how the 
control process can be influenced through different strategies. Because they define what 
regulators can and must do, overarching legal and institutional relationships inform expectations 
about likely response to new information, and how withholding or disclosing information might 
influence that response. On the other hand, repeated historical experience builds up a set of 
common expectations that allow companies to anticipate how regulators might react to new 
information. Knowledge about past behavior serves as a guide to predict how regulators will 
respond in the future (Knight 1992: 77-80). Companies rely on both kinds of information to 
gauge the credibility of bureaucratic commitment. Countries however differ in their institutions 
and processes of chemical control; and companies are thus presented with different kinds and 
amounts of information about the probable behavior of state bureaucrats. I argue that two 
features in particular of national chemical control regimes are responsible for the capacity to 
commit to cooperation with industry: the regulatory powers of state bureaucrats and their 
reliance on advisory bodies in the formulation and implementation of chemical safety policies.  
COMMITMENTS AND BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY  
The varieties of capitalism literature suggests that the credibility of governmental commitments is 
systematically linked to their policy-making powers. Governments operate within distinct 
constitutional and political environments that dictate when and how they can intervene in the 
affairs of social and economic actors. Institutional constraints on their policy-making powers thus 
determine the capacity of governments to commit to a set of stable and predictable policies 
(Wood 2001; Gourevitch and Shinn 2005). Fragmentation of political authority decreases the 
capacity to initiate policy change at whim, without first consulting and placating multiple veto 
players. In separation of powers systems, for example, precisely because the legal status quo is so 
difficult to change, any political agreement that is embedded in legislation will be durable, and 
everybody knows it. Once a law is passed, the capacity to renege on an agreement – by passing a 
new law that reverses it – is drastically diminished (Moe 1990: 242). Dispersion of political 
authority therefore promotes the stability and predictability of state policies. Commitment 
problems will in contrast be especially pronounced in political regimes that vests authority firmly 
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in the hands of the executive. Concentration of state powers brings uncertainty to the political 
economy: because governments have the capacity to introduce dramatic reforms at will, social 
and economic actors must doubt their commitments to pursue a set of stable policies (Wood 
2001: 258ff.). Cooperation between state actors and business should in short, as Peter Hall and 
David Soskice (2001: 48) argue, be more feasible in political systems  
“in which producer groups enjoy substantial structural influence. This structural influence may rest on a 
number of bases: the authority of producer organizations inside political parties, the entrenchment of 
neo-corporatist practices in enough spheres of policy-making that defection in one can be punished in 
another, or policy-making procedures decentralized enough to allow producer groups many points of 
access and some veto points.”  
In regulatory politics, however, neither ‘structural influence’ nor institutional controls on the 
exercise of authority guarantee the credibility of bureaucratic commitments. Constitutional and 
political variables do of course impinge on regulatory politics and business strategies; but not 
necessarily as envisioned by the varieties literature. Comprehensive checks on the decision-
making authority of state bureaucrats in fact render cooperation less, not more likely. Political 
systems differ in how they concentrate or diffuse regulatory powers and authority; and they 
consequently structure the opportunities for companies to influence regulatory outcomes 
differently. I argue that the autonomy of state authorities to decide regulatory policies and 
outcomes, insulated from pressures originating from other branches of government, determines 
their capacity to commit to cooperation with industry. In what follows, then, I take bureaucratic 
autonomy to mean an agency’s discretionary authority to enact policies that will not be limited or 
overruled by other political actors.6 For actors engaged in strategic interactions, the prospect of 
external intervention alters both their own assessments of the possible outcomes and provides 
additional information about the probable future behavior of others (Knight 1992: 59f.). We 
must therefore overtly account for how the powers of other state actors to intervene in regulatory 
proceedings enter corporate risk-benefit calculations; and how this may discourage or dispose 
companies to cooperation with state bureaucrats (Ostrom 1990: 190f.).  
Establishing generic standards of public safety and environmental integrity is the purview of 
elected politicians. Toxic substance laws, no matter how specific or detailed however, rarely 
stipulate what controls should be imposed on particular chemicals. Administrative law-making 




6  This definition thus draws on the principal-agent formulation of bureaucratic autonomy as the extent to 
which agencies are able to implement outcomes that diverge from the preferred policies of their principals, 
without being prevented ex ante or punished ex post (See e.g. Miller 2005). 
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classes of chemicals, such as nanomaterials, or to specific cases, such as nano-silver, is a 
quintessentially administrative task: since legislatures do not and cannot anticipate the full range 
of regulatory issues at the stage of policy formulation, state authorities usually enjoy considerable 
discretion to make decisions that are essentially legislative in nature (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 
1985: 74f.; Croley 1998). The constraints placed on bureaucratic decision-making procedures 
however vary across countries, and there are consequently striking variations in how authorities 
carry out their regulatory responsibilities. What state bureaucrats can and must do is in large 
measure determined by the overarching legal and institutional distribution of regulatory authority. 
While legislatures in general confer wide discretionary powers on state bureaucracies, they are 
not equally zealous in their oversight of how those powers are exercised: whereas some 
parliaments are content to limit scrutiny to the broadest issues of chemical safety policy, others 
assume an active role in reining in administrative discretion by subjecting agency decisions and 
policies to intense and protracted investigation. Rigorous oversight and frequent interference 
from legislators reduce the autonomy of state bureaucrats and shifts the locus of regulatory 
decision-making towards the legislature. Active review of agency decisions by the courts, special 
administrative courts or appeal boards likewise decreases bureaucratic autonomy. If 
administrative decisions can be altered or invalidated by judicial review, state bureaucrats are 
denied control over the outcome of the regulatory process and the fate of their policies. Since 
finally chemical safety policy touch upon the responsibilities of several ministries and agencies, 
oversight by the chief executive and interdepartmental negotiations is necessary to ensure a 
coordinated governmental response. The tighter the coordination structure, the less able state 
bureaucrats are to decide regulatory issues, without first consulting and clearing those decisions 
with other executive actors. Overlapping jurisdictions thus undercut the authority of state 
bureaucracies. Administrative decisions and policies must in consequence attempt to anticipate 
the preferences and strategies of other state actors (Kim 2008: 35). And this has implications for 
industry’s choice of disclosure or nondisclosure.  
Fragmentation of regulatory powers casts doubts on the credibility of bureaucratic 
commitments. If administrative decisions and policies can be challenged, revised or overturned at 
other stages of the regulatory process, companies must question whether regulators will be able 
to uphold their end of a collaborative bargain. Litigation or political interference motivated by 
appeals from competing interest can compel state bureaucrats to sudden reversals in policy. But 
without the autonomy to decide regulatory outcomes, regulators cannot credibly commit to a 
future course of action. Any cooperative settlement between an agency and the industry it 
regulates may be vulnerable to political or judicial intervention; and uncertainty regarding the 
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future behavior of state bureaucrats reduces the value companies attribute to cooperation as 
benefits are either doubtful or unknown. Concentration of regulatory powers in state 
bureaucracies can in contrast create the critical impetus for cooperation. As the literature on 
policy delegation suggests, elected politicians can enhance the stability and predictability of state 
policies by entrusting regulatory powers to independent authorities. By renouncing their own 
capacity to influence regulatory decisions, or limiting the scope of judicial review, politicians can 
reduce uncertainties about the future direction of state policy (Majone 1996; 2001; Miller 2000). 
Insulated from the political process, state bureaucrats face different incentives – either given their 
preferences or their statutory mandates, or both – than elected politicians. As they are not subject 
to the short time horizons imposed by the electoral process, state bureaucrats can pursue their 
statutory objectives, even when those objectives no longer enjoy popular support (McCubbins, 
Noll and Weingast 1987; 1989). Limits on political interference or judicial scrutiny may thus 
convince manufacturers that a commitment to cooperation is credible.  
This view of the regulatory process admittedly neglects the many nimble ploys enterprising 
bureaucrats use to shelter their routines and policies from criticism and external interference. 
State bureaucrats are not hapless victims of the whims of their political masters, but can and do 
forge the circumstances under which they operate. Autonomy, Daniel Carpenter (2001: 353) 
writes, arises “when bureaucrats successfully […] build reputations for their organizations – 
reputations for efficacy, for uniqueness of service, for moral protection, and for expertise. It 
occurs, further, when they ground this reputation in a diverse coalition wrought from the 
multiple networks in which they are engaged.” Agencies with a reputation for capacity embedded 
in an independent power base can compel elected politicians and organized interests to defer to 
their decisions, change regulatory agendas and preferences, and perhaps even alter the terms of 
legislative delegation (Carpenter 2001: 15). In the realm of toxic substance control, however, 
neither organizational reputations nor coalitional politics offer much promise for state 
bureaucrats looking to buttress their autonomy and expand their regulatory authority.  
First, in complex and uncertain policy domains, administrative autonomy depend in large 
measure on the degree to which bureaucrats can lay claim to valuable expertise as well as their 
capacity to collect, process and deploy information required to implement their statutory 
mandates (Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 52). But in the area of chemicals control, bureaucratic 
claims of privileged knowledge or special expertise are unlikely to stand unchallenged. Gathering, 
developing and analyzing information remain at the core of control process – one which however 
requires state authorities to rely on industry to provide the bulk of data needed to regulate 
suspect chemicals. While state bureaucrats do have their own sources of information and 
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expertise, manufactures and users of chemicals nonetheless have significant advantages in 
cumulative experience, technical skills, access to data, and research capacity – advantages that in 
effect allow companies to cast doubt on the interpretations of law, science and economics 
advanced by state authorities. Elected politicians for their part are disinclined to defer to 
administrative decisions that have been subjected to lengthy, loud and compelling criticism; yet 
because state bureaucrats struggle to build reputations for unique or authoritative expertise, they 
cannot easily dismiss such criticisms. 
Second, the scope for state bureaucrats to assemble broad coalitions of intersecting interests 
behind their policies is equally limited. A manufacturer might indeed wish to support intervention 
targeted at its rivals and their products. Or segments of manufacturers and downstream users 
might have an interest in backing control policies that favor their production processes or 
mitigation technologies. But on the whole, companies have few incentives to ally with an agency, 
if this coalition expands its de facto autonomy and power to interfere in their affairs. Diffusion of 
regulatory powers not only leaves state bureaucrats in a tenuous political situation that undercuts 
the credibility of their commitments. At the same time, overlapping jurisdictions also creates 
alternative routes for companies and their representatives to influence regulatory outcomes. 
Taking an agency to court or lobbying Congress are strategies familiar from the American 
regulatory system. While these tactics may be less readily available to European companies, 
opportunities for both judicial review and political intervention do exists. More often, however, 
European companies can defend their interest by appealing for ministerial sponsors to place a 
break on meddling bureaucrats.  
Fragmentation of regulatory powers thus present amble opportunities for companies to 
deflect or delay regulatory action through indirect means. But as the possibilities to obstruct 
regulatory decisions proliferate, the incentives to divulge sensitive information to the agencies 
responsible for regulating their conduct decline. Although dispersion of political authority does 
promote the stability of governmental policies, institutional constraints on bureaucratic autonomy 
also detract from the value of maintaining relationships with regulators on congenial terms. 
Unless industry can hope to capture the agency, companies in short have few reasons to promote 
its autonomy; rather companies may wish to undermine that autonomy by convincing other state 
actors to intervene on their behalf against the agency and its decisions. Toxic substance control 
thus leaves little tactical leeway for state bureaucrats to expand their de facto autonomy and 
authority. 
State bureaucrats endowed with the power to decide the direction of regulatory policy in 
contrast confront companies with a distinct set of risk-benefit calculations: independent state 
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authorities are not easily swayed by changing political and economic conditions, but focus instead 
on achieving their statutory obligations and long-term objectives. Since insulation from the 
political process promotes the stability and predictability of state policies, companies may feel 
convinced that they can trust state bureaucrats with sensitive information. Absent recourse to the 
courts, parliaments or other executive actors, companies can on the other hand tread few 
alternatives paths to influence regulatory outcomes. And they consequently have to win what 
they can during administrative deliberations. Since information and expertise is the most relevant 
currency in convincing state bureaucrats, concentration of regulatory powers can therefore create 
potent incentives for companies to divulge information, if this can be exchanged for influence 
over administrative decisions and policies.  
DELIBERATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND COMMITMENTS 
Game theory predicts that actors engaged in repetitive, long-term relationships may develop 
strategies that reduce the risk of noncooperation in the future. In repeated games, the expected 
benefit of future cooperation can render commitments self-enforcing (Axelrod 1984). 
Relationships in a complicated world of unanticipated contingencies are however much more 
‘dense’ than a simple game theoretic analysis would suggest (Scharpf 1990; Sabel 1994). 
Regulatory problems often have several plausible causes, and they almost always have several 
potential solutions. Although institutional checks on administrative decision-making procedures 
do constrain the ability to decide outcomes, state bureaucrats almost always enjoy some scope to 
influence the direction of regulatory policy. Most toxic substance laws empower state bureaucrats 
to determine what chemicals to regulate, in what order, by what means, and how stringently. 
Depending on their specific agendas, priorities and preferences, regulators may thus react 
remarkably different to evidence of harm. But administrative discretion creates problems for 
companies attempting to predict how state bureaucrats will react to new information. 
For a regulator, the value of any particular piece of information depends on how effectively it 
fills a gap in the knowledge base and how important that gap is to the regulator’s decision-
making. Because companies with a hazy picture of the overall puzzle may fail to accurately assess 
the value and impact of any particular piece of information, the regulator may wish to downplay 
or obscure the significance of information she seeks from industry (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and 
Parson 2004: 303). Even a less cunning regulator could inflict real harm on industry, if disclosure 
compels the regulator to respond urgently to new information, without pause to consider 
industry inputs on control techniques or costs. Unless companies understand the designs and 
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intentions of their regulatory adversaries, they cannot predict how requested information might 
be put to use. And, companies must consequently harbor doubts about the credibility of their 
commitments. Viewed in game theoretic terms, this translates to problem of uncertain motives 
and hence a situation of strategic indeterminacy. Without some means of resolving this 
uncertainty, rational actors are unable to predict how others are likely to respond (Knight 
1992: 53; Morrow 1999). Deliberation I argue and the institutions which structure 
communications among state authorities and industry can overcome such ambiguities and thus 
bolster the credibility of bureaucratic commitments. 
Deliberation is usually meant to refer to a particular form of discussion – and is as such related 
to other forms of communication such as arguing or bargaining. Communication permits actors 
to establish the parameters of cooperative agreements, increase trust and hence thwart the 
expectations of noncooperative game theory. Deliberation however means different things to 
different people; and, they consequently construe its role and effects in widely different terms. 
Broadly, we can distinguish among those who understand deliberation as the careful balancing of 
reasons for or against some decision and those who view it as the act of communicating 
information through discussion. Here, I advance the latter view of deliberation as discussion. To 
avoid possible misconceptions, let us however briefly consider the former view and how its 
proponents understand the role of deliberative processes in regulatory politics.  
For proponents of this view, deliberation entails the exercise of practical reason as participants 
present and substantiate arguments, consider evidence, reflect on matters of mutual interest and 
attempt to persuade one another. The general claim is that public deliberation produces better 
decisions: pooling the ideas, views and information of participants and subjecting these ideas, 
views and information to collective, reasoned deliberation is assumed to yield more innovative, 
effective and ultimately legitimate decisions, as parties actively and sincerely debate the merits of 
alternatives in search of the decision that is most consistent with some notion of the common 
good (Cohen 1998; Rosenberg 2005). Deliberation can lead actors to revise opinions about both 
facts and values, alter premises, and discover common interests. Disagreements and 
inconsistencies encourage participants to balance their wants, and this can induce them to modify 
their choice of means for achieving their ends – and perhaps also to reconsider those ends 
altogether (Reich 1985: 1635; Croley 1998: 76-82). In the course of deliberative problem-solving, 
then, interests crystallize not simply because actors only fully recognize their own private interests 
through deliberation, but also because it is through this process that they come to understand the 
concerns, goals, and values of others, and how those concerns, goals, and values can be 
accommodated with their own. Deliberation allows participants to learn how their divergent 
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views can be reconciled and in the process develop converging definitions of common problems 
and agreed approaches for dealing with them. Regulatory outcomes are therefore not neatly 
reducible to the underlying interests of participants, but reflect instead collective judgments about 
priorities and policies that participants ultimately come to prefer. Through a process of mutual 
socialization and the consensus it generates, participants may gradually cease to understand 
themselves as representatives of disparate interests, but rather as representatives of a newly 
constituted community characterized by mutual learning and trust (Joerges and Neyer 1997: 620; 
Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). The emergence of collective identities, common values and mutual 
understandings can hence mitigate commitment problems as members come to share jointly 
constructed interests. 
Whereas deliberation in this tradition is cast as a group hunt for sound, consensus rationales, I 
instead understand it as a medium for strategic information transmission. In line with the 
varieties of capitalism literature, I construe deliberation in game theoretic terms as iterative 
information exchanges that can overcome problems of asymmetrically distributed information or 
bounded rationality (Hall and Soskice 2001: 11f.; Culpepper 2001). Discussion can have a 
number of effects on collective decision-making (Fearon 1998); yet, the most relevant in this 
context relates to the communication of private information. This could be information about 
how particular actions translate into particular outcomes, information about the consequences of 
those outcomes, or it could be information about how participants evaluate the consequences 
associated with those outcomes. Participants know that others might have some privileged 
information, but do not know what that information is, and discussion serves as the mechanism 
through which the parties reveal this information to one another. In revealing correct, fuller or 
simply better organized information, deliberation act as a vehicle for participants to arrive at 
more considered judgments themselves and to affect collective decisions through its influence on 
the judgments of others.  
For deliberation to influence individual or collective decision-making, it must bring about a 
change in how participants’ evaluate their options for achieving their goals (Morrow 1999: 86; 
Landa and Meirowitz 2009: 427f.). Debate creates opportunities for actors to persuade others of 
the relative value of particular alternatives and so influence their decisions. In the game 
theoretical literature, such ‘persuasion’ amounts to changing the beliefs of others about how 
particular actions yield particular outcomes. What can change in the course of deliberation is thus 
not how participants evaluate their ultimate goals, but instead their assessment of how best to 
achieve those goals, given their beliefs about the likely effects of various actions and the expected 
behavior of others (Austen-Smith 1990: 124f.; 1992: 45). Deliberation is therefore important not 
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because debating collective decisions compels actors to verbalize and justify their actions and in 
the process reconsider and revise their interests. It is rather important because it allows actors to 
exchange private information and thus fashion strategies to help overcome the uncertainties that 
prevent actors from cooperating with one another (Culpepper 2003: 21). Deliberation allows 
actors to assume common knowledge and hence facilitate the alignment of expectations: through 
discussion, participants can improve confidence in the intentions of others, exchange mutual 
commitments and learn to trust whether or not others will honor them (Ostrom 1990: 138f.; 
1998).  
The principal dilemma for discussion as a means of coordinating behavior is of course that 
participants can have strategic incentives to distort their special knowledge or hide their true 
intentions. Misrepresentation or deception can trick others to take actions that are not in their 
interest. Some of the thorniest problems in politics arise precisely, when participants are 
uncertain about the intentions of others and thus whom to trust. Unless information volunteered 
in the course of discussion can be verified, participants must rightly be suspicious of its accuracy, 
validity and reliability. Discussion will therefore only be efficacious insofar participants believe 
that others are telling the truth (Fearon 1998: 47; Austen-Smith 1992: 46). As a consequence, 
game theoretic models of deliberation are necessarily centered on the circumstances that 
encourage participants to truthfully reveal private information and induce their interlocutors to 
accept it as credible. Rather than look to the (ideal) deliberative behavior that will lead to better 
decisions, this view of deliberation then directs attention towards the institutions within which 
actors deliberate (Austen-Smith and Feddersen 2006; Landa and Meirowitz 2009: 429f.). 
In the varieties of capitalism tradition, a capacity to deliberate presupposes “institutions that 
encourage the relevant actors to engage in collective discussions and reach agreements with each 
other.” (Hall and Soskice 2001: 11). Actors rely on these institutions to break down barriers to 
effective communication, eliminate incentives to transmit deceitful information and thus buttress 
the credibility of their commitments. Deliberative institutions convert single exchanges into 
repeated discussions in which a reputation for trustworthiness can potentially mitigate short-term 
opportunism (Mackie 1998: 84f.; Schneider et al. 2003: 144). Because participants can reasonably 
expect to meet again in the future, joint membership of deliberative fora allows participants to 
cultivate reputations for providing accurate, reliable and valuable information. Ongoing 
discussion permits actors to periodically check and verify information volunteered by others and 
assess whether or not they can be trusted. Those, who are caught lying, can be rebuked and are 
thus reminded of the cost of deception. Systematic misrepresentation can earn participants a 
reputation for dishonesty and hence risks ostracism from the group or at the very least the 
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possibility of being ignored in future discussions. As Elinor Ostrom (1990) demonstrates 
graduated sanctions allow rule-breakers to observe that defections are uncovered and learn how 
others will respond to them: an incremental process of verification and graduated penalties 
affords participants opportunities to increase or decrease their trust in the reliability of others, 
circulate information about reputations, and over time learn how to cooperate with one another. 
If successful, discussion can lead actors to change their expectations about the probability that 
others are telling the truth about their intentions or special knowledge (Ostrom 1990: 138f.; 
1998: 13). Deliberative fora can thus facilitate collective discussion about joint problems, and 
allow participants to develop a common diagnosis of the situation, share information about the 
consequences of different actions, build mutual expectations and hence improve confidence in 
the strategies likely to be taken by others (Culpepper 2003: 17; Hall and Thelen 2009: 12f.). By 
encouraging participants to share information about their interests and beliefs, deliberative 
institutions can in short enhance the capacity for cooperative behavior and contribute to mutual 
expectations that others can be trusted to honor their commitments. 
In regulatory politics, deliberative institutions preeminently, but not exclusively,7 take the 
format of advisory bodies that allow state bureaucrats to consult outside expertise and garner the 
views of stakeholders. Advisory bodies at the same time provide venues through which officials 
can communicate their agendas, priorities and preferences to external stakeholders. State agencies 
usually, albeit to varying degree, funnel their agendas through expert committees, and – 
depending on the scope of involvement – such deliberative bodies can exercise considerable 
influence on regulatory decisions, programs and policies. Committee membership allows 
stakeholder representatives to participate in collective policy deliberation, decision-making and 
implementation (Ashford 1984: 73; Leifeld and Schneider 2012: 732). Advisory bodies, which put 
industry experts in permanent and close contact with their academic and governmental peers, can 
therefore promote candor in communication: ongoing dialogue on the scope and causes of 
regulatory problems creates opportunities for members to develop a common diagnosis of a 
given issue, gather, process and exchange information about the consequences of different 
decisions and craft agreed recommendations. 
Regular discussion among officials and industry representatives can thus strengthen mutual 
expectations that the views and interests of industry will be considered as new issues emerge. 




7  Other examples might include formal consultation requirements or informal norms insisting that affected 
parties should be heard. 
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without pause to consider industry inputs on control techniques or costs, they may find 
companies reluctant to volunteer needed information as new substances come up for future 
review. Companies might likewise wish to distort information transmitted in the course of 
advisory proceedings. Should a deception be uncovered, however, state authorities certainly have 
ways to make life more difficult for uncooperative regulatees. Ongoing discussion of regulatory 
priorities and policies allow participants to build trust and develop relations which encourage 
candid exchanges about potential sources of harm and their possible solutions. Institutionalized 
policy deliberations of course do not preclude disagreements or conflicts over the scope and 
direction of chemical control policies (Knight and Johnson 2007: 56). But they do accord 
regulators and industry representatives regular opportunities to settle their differences through 
debate and negotiation.  
Discussion channeled through standing committees and similar deliberative fora permits 
participants to improve confidence in the strategies of each other, and they can therefore be 
essential to address doubts about the credibility of commitments. Participation in advisory bodies 
afford companies and their representatives opportunities to learn how officials understand the 
scientific evidence and evaluate the need for and design of new controls. Companies are 
consequently in a better position to predict how they might react to new information; and how 
such a reaction might accommodate their interests. Where corporate decision-makers feel 
confident that officials can be trusted to consider their views and inputs, they may be more 
forthcoming and honest about sharing sensitive information. Since information is instrumental in 
shaping regulators’ interpretation of the evidence, their diagnosis of and solutions to regulatory 
problems, this confidence can create compelling incentives for companies to volunteer their 
expertise and experiences to officials.  
Absent secure channels to communicate agency agendas and designs, industry is in contrast 
placed in a more precarious position. Unstructured engagements do not give industry 
representatives the same opportunities for ‘a meeting of minds’, and they are consequently left 
guessing about possible ulterior motives. Insulated bureaucratic decision-making processes 
broken only by ad hoc consultations tend to obscure the bigger picture. With no permanent venue 
to organize and promote discussions of regulatory priorities or how evidence of harm should be 
interpreted, there is little basis for regulators and companies to develop common understandings 
of joint problems or establish mutual expectations about their possible solutions. Unable to gauge 
the intentions of state bureaucrats, companies are left without a reliable basis to predict how they 
might react to new information; and whether and how such a response might consider industry 
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Table 2.1  Institutions of Chemical Control and Their Expected Effects on Business Behavior  
 BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 
   
Regulatory  
Powers 
State bureaucrats endowed with 
 broad discretionary authority 
State bureaucrats enjoy limited 
discretionary authority 
   
  The limited prospect of political or 
judicial interference in regulatory 
proceedings reduces uncertainties 
about the direction of state policies 
 The prospect of political or judicial 
interference in regulatory proceedings 
creates uncertainty about the direction 
of state policies 
  Corporate strategies to influence 
state policies target state bureaucrats  
 Corporate strategies to influence state 
policies target multiple political actors  
  State authorities are able to 
accommodate industry views and 
concerns 
 State authorities are unable to 
accommodate industry views and 
concerns 
  Absent recourse to the courts, 
parliaments or other executive 
actors, companies face compelling 
incentives to divulge sensitive 
information as a strategy to 
influence administrative agendas, 
priorities and policies 
 The unpredictability of regulatory 
responses, coupled with opportunities 
to influence regulatory outcomes 
through access to other decision-
making venues, creates few incentives 





Business Response Disclosure Nondisclosure 
 DELIBERATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
   
Nature of Advisory 
Proceedings 
Comprehensive industry  
participation and representation 
Limited industry participation  
and representation 
   
  State authorities funnel their 
regulatory agendas through advisory 
committees and stakeholder fora 
 State authorities do not maintain an 
ongoing dialogue with industry on 
their regulatory agendas 
  Through regular discussion, 
participants develop common 
understandings of joint problems 
and mutual expectations about their 
possible solutions 
 Regulators and industry 
representatives do not develop 
common understandings of joint 
problems or mutual expectations 
about their possible solutions 
  Companies learn how state 
bureaucrats might react to new 
information and how such reactions 
might accommodate their interests 
 Companies are unable to predict how 
state bureaucrats might react to new 
information – and how such a 
response might consider their interests 
  Confidence in the designs of state 
bureaucrats creates strong incentives 
for companies to volunteer sensitive 
information  
 Uncertainty about the designs of state 
bureaucrats and the unpredictability of 
their responses hampers incentives to 




Business Response Disclosure Nondisclosure 
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views and interests. Uncertainty about the designs of state bureaucrats and the unpredictability of 
their responses consequently hampers incentives to volunteer information.  
CONCLUSION  
In closing this chapter, let me briefly summarize: in areas of high scientific and technical 
uncertainty, such as nanotechnologies, new information can exercise significant influence on 
regulatory agendas, priorities and policies. This can work in industry’s favor, if disclosing 
information succeeds in convincing state bureaucrats to make decisions that reduce anticipated 
costs or increase private benefits. But companies must also be cautious of sharing sensitive 
information with regulators: once revealed, information cannot be retracted and its release could 
severely infringe on corporate interests. Companies will therefore only volunteer information to 
state authorities if they are confident that it will not be used to the detriment of their interests. 
Whether companies will decide to disclose, bias or conceal information in other words depends 
on the expected behavior of their regulatory adversaries and the nature of their commitments.  
Countries differ in their organization and processes of chemicals control; and companies are 
thus presented with different kinds and amounts of information about the probable future 
behavior of state bureaucrats. Two features I submit of national chemical control regimes are 
responsible for the capacity of state authorities to commit to cooperation with industry: the 
regulatory powers of state bureaucrats and their reliance on deliberative institutions in the 
formulation and implementation of chemical safety policy. Table 2.1 outlines the expected effect 
of bureaucratic autonomy and deliberative institutions on corporate decisions to disclose or 
withhold information from state bureaucrats as well as the processes translating the institutional 
effects into the predicted business responses. Where companies in short believe that the 
decisions of chemicals policy will consider their views and interests, they may readily entrust state 
bureaucrats with sensitive information about their operations. Where companies in contrast have 
reasons to doubt the credibility of a commitment to pursue a set of predictable control policies, 
they must remain vigilant to possible concealed agendas or the prospect of political or judicial 
interference in regulatory proceedings. Nondisclosure is a rational business response, when 





A Decade of Uncertainty: 
American and European Nanotech Policies, 2003-2013 
 
 
Spurred by concerns over the relatively unrestrained market entry of an increasing number of 
nano-enabled products, awareness of nanotechnologies has risen dramatically among 
governments, investors, environmental activists, and companies alike. Given the uncertain risks 
of nanomaterials, the question facing regulators, industries and other stakeholders was thus from 
the onset not whether the state should intervene to guarantee public health and safety, but how. 
This chapter documents how that intervention has unfolded in Britain, the United States, 
Germany and Denmark over the decade since nanotech first emerged as an issue on the 
international regulatory agenda in 2003. In what follows, I examine the policies developed to 
assess and control the risks of nanomaterials and compare the role of industry in the four 
countries’ policy processes. I show how the desire to reap the benefits of nanotechnologies has 
led decision-makers in America and Europe to adopt very similar policy strategies; and I 
demonstrate how the reactions of companies differ across the four countries. 
To evaluate my argument, we need to know whether and to what extent companies are 
disclosing information to regulatory authorities. We may gain some initial traction on this 
question by analyzing public-private research ventures and industry responses to governmental 
appeals for voluntary data disclosure. Joint safety research and voluntary reporting initiatives raise 
delicate and complex issues of confidentiality, data access and ownership. By assessing whether 
and under which conditions companies have agreed to assist in the generation of new knowledge 
or participate in initiatives intended to facilitate access to existing industry information and 
experiences, we can establish a first baseline for evaluating the degree of disclosure. Safety 
research and voluntary reporting schemes constitute linchpins of governmental risk management 
strategies; yet, cooperation in these areas is not the only or indeed most important source of 
information for state bureaucrats. Direct communications with industry representatives in the 
course of consultative proceedings represents a richer source of information. What is being 
communicated in any given policy discussion is of course rarely readily observable. But we can 
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nonetheless approximate the degree of disclosure by evaluating patterns of interactions among 
regulators and industry representatives; in particular, the frequency of interactions and their conduct 
will indicate the extent of information communicated to regulators.  
First, information exchange is obviously contingent upon the opportunities for giving input as 
well as the range of issues on which regulators seek advice. Frequent and regular interactions 
increase occasions for companies to present their views and offer advice. Unstructured 
engagements and ad hoc consultations on a case-by-case basis in contrast limit the opportunities 
for companies to voice their positions and press their demands on governmental decision-
makers. If regulatory officials value the input of social actors by the utility of expertise they bring 
to the table, we can reasonably assume that the frequency of contacts capture elements of both 
the extent and quality of information transmitted to state authorities (Majone 1997; Reenock and 
Gerber 2008: 419). A second clue is provided by the conduct of interactions among regulators 
and industry representatives. Policy discussions conducted under the guise of formal proceedings, 
insisting on transparency, increases the number of parties privy to sensitive information and 
inhibits the ability to protect confidentiality. Procedural transparency in consequence acts as a 
barrier to candid discussions about potential sources of harm and their possible solutions (West 
2004). Less formal interactions, as Cary Coglianese and colleagues note (2004: 319), in contrast 
promotes information transmission to regulators, just as it facilitates gossip in everyday life. The 
opaque nature of informal interactions preserves discretion and protects the privacy of 
communications; and companies may therefore be more forthcoming and honest about sharing 
sensitive information.  
Differences in the extent, format and timing of industry participation in the policy process in 
short provide us with indications of the degree and nature of information volunteered to 
regulatory authorities. Accordingly, for each country, the analysis proceeds in two steps: I first 
consider the role of companies and their representatives in relation to the formulation and 
implementation of strategy measures, safety research and policy initiatives designed to provide 
the necessary basis for risk assessment and management of nanomaterials. Based on the observed 
frequency of interactions and their conduct, I conclude by assessing the degree of information 
disclosure and the character of relations among state authorities and industry. 
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES IN BRITAIN  
In Britain, the regulatory agenda for nanotechnologies was set with the publication of a 2005 
Government Action Plan (HM Government 2005); in the wake of its publication, several 
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initiatives were undertaken, which in a relatively short time span set Britain on a regulatory path 
of ongoing stakeholder engagement and public dialogue; promotion of nanotechnology research 
and development; and active participation in international efforts to assist in a more informed 
response to the potential human health and environmental risks of nanotechnologies. Guiding 
these activities was an ambition of ‘getting it right’ by ensuring that Britain “reap[s] the benefits 
and avoid[s] the pitfalls.” (HM Government 2005: 1). In response to the ubiquitous knowledge 
gaps collaboration with industry was from an early stage embraced as a strategic measure to 
advance the regulatory agenda. Governmental decision-makers have in turn come to favor a 
strategy designed to encourage dialogue among regulatory authorities and industry. By granting 
access for their representatives to key decision-making venues, HM Government in other words 
swung the door wide open for companies to seek influence over the direction of UK nanotech 
policy. Industry has not been oblivious to the opportunities inherent in this regulatory strategy; 
rather, industry representatives have grasped every opportunity to consult and press their views 
on state authorities. Ongoing dialogue among officials and corporate representatives has in turn 
provided the impetus for comprehensive government-industry cooperation intended to advance 
the regulatory agenda. British companies for their part have sought to cultivate close and 
collaborative relationships with regulatory officials, resulting in extensive policy discussions, 
accommodation and broad agreement on the course of British nanotechnology policy.  
Risk Management Strategies and Safety Research Policy  
Public support for nanosciences and technologies began in the late-1980s. Yet, the story of 
nanotech regulation in Britain only kicks off with the April 2003 publication of Prince Charles’ 
sharply expressed views on nanotech, including the fear of a future ‘grey goo’ scenario.1 A similar 
intervention by Charles in 1999 had precipitated and reinforced much of the subsequent hostility 
to GMOs in the British public; and concern that this new intervention and the resounding debate 
in its wake should likewise taint public confidence in nanotechnologies, prompted HM 
Government to respond urgently. In June 2003, the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering were commissioned to investigate the potential environmental, health and safety 
implications of nanotechnologies. The two Societies published their report, Nanoscience and 




1  ‘Grey goo’ describes a doomsday scenario in which nanoscale robots self-replicate out of control, producing 
unlimited copies of themselves, consuming all available material and ultimately laying waste to the planet (RS 
and RAEng 2004: 109). 
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on development, the report concluded that the virtual absence of data pertaining to 
nanomaterials represented clear challenges to effective risk management, and the two Societies in 
consequence urged a precautionary stance, combined with various recommendations intended to 
bridge existing knowledge gaps (RS and RAEng 2004:xii). Widely credited with having 
invigorated the regulatory debate in Britain and abroad, the report created the impetus for a spur 
of governmental initiatives to “ensure that the public and those who work with nanotechnologies 
feel confident that Government actions being taken are appropriate, proportionate and 
effective […].” (BIS 2010: 35). Welcoming the two Societies’ conclusions and recommendations, 
HM Government responded with an initial action plan in February 2005.  
Under the 2005 action plan, HM Government launched an immediate and multifaceted 
research program directed at addressing current uncertainties about the ecological behavior and 
toxicological properties of nanomaterials. An inter-ministerial Nanotechnology Research 
Coordination Group (NRCG), chaired by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Defra), was established to monitor progress and coordinate UK research initiatives. 
Under the auspice of the NRCG, 19 research objectives have been named and taken forward by 
five task forces. With the NRCG acting as steering body, the UK research program constitutes a 
cross-government effort, which draws upon expertise from governmental departments and 
agencies, the UK Research Councils, academia and industry. As part of its remit, the NRCG links 
to international partners, particularly the OECD and the International Standards Organization, 
with an aim to encourage knowledge exchange, avoid unnecessary duplication of research, and 
ensure the development of common standards for nanotechnology (Defra 2005; 2006a; 2007). 
HM Government’s research policy has thus served two, often complementary, objectives. With a 
priority to increase the understanding of manufactured nanomaterials and their potential risks, 
the NRCG has on the one hand supported the collection of scientific evidence and experience 
required to guide future decisions on appropriate control mechanisms. On the other hand, to 
ensure that knowledge and ideas generated by fundamental research can be transferred to 
industry for commercial applications, governmental agencies have focused on establishing 
mechanisms to support collaborative research between industry, academia and other relevant 
bodies (Defra 2007).  
The UK research program draws on the capabilities of domestic research institutions and 
international networks. From the program’s initiation, however, the persistent information 
deficiencies regarding use patterns, exposure pathways and endpoints created significant obstacles 
for attempts to prioritize research intended to underpin risk assessments and the development of 
regulatory controls. As one Defra official explained, this not only created a problem of directing 
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research efforts; it also urgently accentuated the need to gauge the level of immediate risks to 
human health and the environment.2 HM Government in consequence recognized the need for 
regulatory authorities “to develop links with industry to deliver the necessary research on the 
basis of need in the context of specific products and applications of nanotechnologies.”(HM 
Government 2005: 9). In an effort to promote knowledge exchange, representatives from 
industry were therefore encouraged to join the five NRCG task forces. Deliberations among 
governmental scientist, academic researchers and industry experts in the various task forces have 
in turn served to identify areas of concern, facilitate agreement on the major challenges facing 
reliable hazard identification, and ultimately inform research priorities (Defra 2007). In the words 
of a Defra official: “I think nanotechnology broadly is an area where we can be quite proud of 
our ability to collaborate with industry and with academia and the [NRCG] is a good example of 
that.”3  
As in other countries, ensuring a coordinated response to enable targeted safety research and 
avoid unnecessary duplication has been a key priority in the United Kingdom. For this purpose, a 
Ministerial Group on Nanotechnology was convened in 2007 to monitor and coordinate funding 
decisions, research initiatives and regulatory policies (HM Government 2008). Reporting directly 
to this overarching ministerial group, the NRCG – and similar inter-ministerial groups convened 
since 2005 – has thus provided a platform for consultation and information exchange among 
government officials as well as among officials and stakeholder experts. Despite 
recommendations by the Council for Science and Technology (2007) to assign overall funding 
responsibility to a single governmental body, the power to allocate funds and instigate actions has 
however remained with individual departments and agencies. Governmental entities have 
committed significant resources to enable safety assessment of nanomaterials – often 
implemented through initiatives discussed and agreed with industry. Both the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) and Defra have for example maintained ongoing dialogues with UK 
manufacturers and users of nanomaterials; and both have initiated and sponsored a range of joint 
industry projects and surveys.  
HSE initially drew together industrial stakeholders at a major international symposium on 
occupational health aspects of nanomaterials organized in October 2004 (HSL 2004); and 
discussions with corporate representative and industry experts have since continued under the 
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research program has strongly encouraged collaboration with industry to facilitate an 
understanding of industry sectors, risks and exposures in support of the development of good 
practice guidance (HSE 2009a). Like other UK authorities, HSE participates in and co-funds 
joint public-private research consortia, such as e.g. the international NOSH Consortium,4 with an 
aim to leverage expenditures and facilitate access to research data and experiences.  
Defra has likewise contracted extensively with the private sector under the ministry’s program 
of intra- and extramural research, with industry representatives serving on various project 
steering groups. The Nanotechnology Industries Association (NIA) – a trade body representing 
the interests of UK nanobusinesses – alone has been awarded several commissions focused on 
gathering evidence to support reliable exposure assessments. In addition to its role as private 
contractor, the association acted as interlocutor between government and industry, processing 
and aggregating responses to governmental information requests as well as facilitating contacts 
between regulators and individual companies. Encouraging joint public-private partnerships thus 
constitute a cornerstone of HM Government’s risk management strategy – an approach best 
exemplified by Britain’s contribution to the global safety assessment of nanomaterials under the 
OECD Sponsorship Program.  
Launched as a 50:50 public-private-partnership in 2009, the PROSPEcT5 project brought 
together agencies and public research institutions, several university laboratories and industry as 
joint sponsors. Each partner was represented by a senior researcher, who oversaw the 
consortium’s contributions and progress. Funded with £3.7 million, PROSPEcT represents one 
of the largest single contributions to the OECD Sponsorship Program. The consortium sought 
to produce new data concerning material characterization for two agreed nanomaterials (cerium 
oxide and zinc oxide) as well as develop seminal eco-toxicological test methods and protocols. 
PROSPEcT was expected to deliver important insights on the properties of these materials as 
well as improve the general reliability and feasibility of traditional toxicological methods. At the 
same time, PROSPEcT was also intended to promote the ability of UK companies to compete 
internationally by acting as a bridge to bring research on these nanomaterials to market. With the 
NIA acting as consortium manager, and the in-kind financial, scientific and technical 
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one official, has allowed HM Government to share the burden of a ‘massive’ research agenda 
with industry.6 For corporate participants, joint safety research entailed several benefits, including 
not only direct financial savings on toxicity testing, but also a visible commitment to the safety of 
their products. A more subtle benefit, if potentially of greater strategic value, was the opportunity 
to influence the basis for future regulatory decisions by shaping the design and methodology of 
QSARs7 used for predictive safety evaluations of novel nanomaterials.  
From a corporate risk-benefit perspective, however, joint research is not unproblematic: 
negative toxicity findings can generate adverse publicity and could fuel new regulatory 
restrictions. Given the high stakes riding on company test data, the design of research 
partnerships has nonetheless sparked remarkably little friction and has not dissuaded UK 
companies from contributing to joint safety ventures. Neither has the policy of sharing data from 
industry-sponsored research through the NRCG or other coordination bodies been perceived as 
a significant impediment to cooperation. In working jointly with governmental scientists and 
independent researchers from academia, UK companies have in short been forthcoming in 
setting aside what often prove controversial issues regarding study design, test protocols and 
reporting (McGarity and Wagner 2008; Monica and Monica 2009) – with HM Government in 
return accommodating corporate concerns over data ownership and access.8 The impact on 
research priorities, and hence ultimately on regulatory decision-making, leveraged by this 
information instead hints at the strong incentives for British companies to volunteer information 
to regulators.  
Voluntary Reporting Initiatives  
Beyond support for safety research, a second strand of HM Government’s regulatory strategy has 
been directed at gaining access to existing data and experience from industry. In September 2006, 
following extensive consultations with stakeholders, Defra introduced a two year trial Voluntary 
Reporting Scheme (VRS) for engineered nanoscale materials. Defra specifically sought 
information on the types and volumes of nanomaterials being manufactured, applied, and 
marketed as well as information on current risk management practices. Information submitted 
under the VRS was intended to assist Defra in determining levels of exposure and identifying 
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gather information need to evaluate existing regulatory mechanisms, while enabling a more 
informed debate and ultimately decisions about the nature of appropriate controls (Defra 2006d; 
2008a; 2008b).  
As the name suggest, the VRS was entirely voluntary and did not replace any existing 
reporting requirements. Defra did – briefly – consider the possibility of introducing new statutory 
requirements for nanomaterials, but ultimately abandoned the idea: a mandatory reporting 
requirement would have required new primary legislation, which was never on HM 
Government’s agenda. One Defra official laconically explained “even in those days it was quite a 
politically difficult thing to do.”9 Weighing on this decision was also concerns that mandatory 
reporting would “erode good will from industry […].” (Defra 2006b: 50) A further complication 
arose from the absence of clear definitions: a mandatory scheme would have run into problems 
of distinguishing between producers and non-producers of nanomaterials, making enforcement 
not only administratively difficult, but also burdensome to industry. A mandatory reporting 
requirement was on several counts then considered politically unattractive and technically 
infeasible. A voluntary scheme was in contrast viewed as the best low cost instrument to quickly 
shore up the evidence base. An added benefit was that a voluntary approach might build “trust 
with industry and other stakeholders, and [provide] them with an opportunity to be involved in 
policy development at an early stage.” (Defra 2006b: 49)  
As with similar initiatives in other countries, participation in the VRS has been limited: only 13 
submissions were received at the end of the two year period. Defra never appear to have set a 
clear baseline for how many submissions to expect. While the outcome has been described as 
disappointing, Defra has officially taken the position that the low number of submissions reflects 
‘the state of industry’. Whether a ‘grave disappointment’ or reflecting ‘commercial reality’, Defra 
had been warned that the large amounts of information requested, the resources needed to 
participate (especially with respect to SMEs) and particularly concerns regarding confidentiality 
might create significant obstacles to participation (Defra 2006c). Aware of such potential barriers, 
Defra made several concessions to accommodate the views and interests of industrial 
stakeholders.  
Initial consultation drafts for example made few specific allowances for the protection of 
intellectual property rights (Defra 2006b). Fearful of the implications for their competitiveness, 
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submitted data, including ownership and how reported information would be used by the 
ministry. Defra in turn guaranteed that any data submissions would be treated as confidential 
unless “expressly given permission by the data owner to do otherwise [and] consult the person 
who provided information should that information be subject to a request under the provisions 
of the Freedom of Information Act.” (Defra 2006d: 6) Defra moreover clarified that data would 
be held by the ministry, but “would be shared across Government as necessary for the 
development of appropriate controls.” (Defra 2006b: 24) The NRCG was asked to monitor and 
manage the use of reported information across government agencies; an arrangement welcomed 
by industry with the caveat that industry representation should be ensured during NRCG 
discussions of the data – a recommendation ultimately borne out as membership of the five 
taskforces was supplemented with industry experts.  
Finally, to facilitate industry participation, Defra engaged the NIA as intermediary: with 
industry skeptical of the value of the VRS, the NIA in turn assumed an instrumental role in the 
design and fate of the VRS. In fact, of the 13 submissions to the VRS, all industry submissions 
were made by NIA members, many anonymously through the association as an agent. In several 
instances, NIA staff sought out SMEs to assist them with completing the reporting form. The 
upshot of this direct involvement is that the association was in a position to, if not control, then 
at least keep abreast of the flow of information to regulators, ultimately reducing the risk that 
members experience unwelcome ‘surprises’. The value of the NIA as a trusted interlocutor can 
best be illustrated with Defra’s unsuccessful attempts to garner additional submissions. When 
Defra, disappointed with the initial nine responses in early 2007, commissioned the 
Nanotechnology Knowledge Transfer Network to solicit participation from another 1.100 
companies, it succeeded in securing only one additional submission.  
13 submissions may not seem of much; however, although quantitatively not impressive, the 
information received under the VRS did as an official explained enable government to  
“take a view on the quality of data that was being provided, on the quality of research that industry was 
doing, looking into the risks and benefits of particular nanomaterials. It enabled government to satisfy 
ourselves that particular nanomaterials were pretty much as safe as they could reasonably be expected to 
be. We were able to satisfy ourselves that there was no need to remove things from the market.”10  
Given the pervasive information deficiencies regarding use and exposure patterns, gaining access 
to detailed and specific product information, data and industry experiences did assist attempts to 




10  Interview, London, March 3, 2011. 
A Decade of Uncertainty 
67 
enabler of HM Government’s ambition of managing the potential human health and 
environmental risks of nanotechnologies. In return for its role as interlocutor between 
government and industry, the NIA – much to the frustration of some within the NGO 
community – managed to secure significant concessions on the overall design of the VRS, 
particularly in relation to issues of confidentiality.11 
Regulatory Relationships in Britain 
The policy process in Britain has above all taken shape by a commitment to collaboration with 
industry, civil society groups and the research community. In support of this commitment, 
governmental decision-makers has encouraged close and regular contacts among regulatory 
officials and industry representatives as the basis for an ongoing dialogue about research 
directions and the nature of appropriate controls. Corporate representatives and industry experts 
have been invited to participate across a range of decision-making venues, with governmental 
departments and agencies actively seeking the advice and views of industry on all major policy 
initiatives. Asked about the motivation for this strategy, one official bluntly exclaimed: “We have 
to, we have no choice really! The research agenda is massive and we can’t go it alone. We have to 
work together […] Hand in hand we move forward in a far better way than we can divided [and] 
industry is playing its part rather much.”12  
Indeed: UK companies have not hesitated in their response to the opportunities entailed by 
the invitation for dialogue and cooperation. Through informal consultation, negotiation and 
collaborations, industry has left a distinct mark on the development of UK nanotech policies, and 
has significantly contributed to building the scientific basis available to regulators for risk 
assessments of nanomaterials. UK safety research policies and regulators’ requests for existing 
industry information are thus characterized by dense and informal discussions among 
governmental entities, UK companies and their representatives. Despite arguably meager interest 
in the VRS, the initiative nonetheless demonstrates how disagreements have been approached in 
a spirit of accommodation, rather than confrontation. British companies have sought to 
cultivated close and congenial relationships with regulatory officials, resulting in extensive 
deliberations, compromise and broad agreement on the direction of British nanotechnology 
policy. Cooperation on advancing the regulatory agenda is thus in short an essential feature of the 
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not only crucial to gauge the need for immediate action, but also to adopt a clear set of strategic 
priorities. Industry has obviously not volunteered this information out of ‘corporate altruism’; 
rather, UK companies have in HM Government’s invitation to join in the policy process seen an 
opportunity to shape regulatory policies to their strategic advantage. To better appreciate the 
implications of this response, and the degree and nature of information volunteered to regulatory 
authorities, we will next consider the contrasting experience of nanotech regulation in the United 
States. 
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
Under the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), a presidential initiative announced in 2000, 
the Federal Government has adopted and promoted much the same range of policy instruments 
and research initiatives as HM Government: like Britain, the United States has committed 
significant resources to address uncertainties about the ecological behavior and toxicological 
properties of nanomaterials; like Britain, federal agencies have sought to canvass the views of 
stakeholders to inform the development of regulatory policies; and like Britain, the United States 
has prioritized active participation in international efforts to assist in a more informed response 
to nanotechnologies. Finally, like HM Government, federal decision-makers have strongly 
emphasized the strategic value of partnerships with industry and other stakeholder groups. At 
face value, then, the Federal Government would appear to share British perceptions of the 
challenges created by nanotechnologies – and their possible solutions. In contrast to Britain, 
however, comprehensive cooperation among government and industry never materialized. While 
presented with ostensibly similar prospects of shaping regulatory outcomes, American companies 
have been reluctant to embrace the strategies of their UK competitors. Rather U.S. companies 
have displayed manifest discomfort in cooperating with the federal regulators, resulting instead in 
patterns of formal and unstructured engagements.  
Risk Management Strategies and Safety Research Policy  
The National Nanotechnology Initiative, enacted by Congress in November 2000 and formally 
established in fiscal year 2001 with an initial investment of US$ 422 million, was created to 
provide a formal mechanism of coordination across federal nanotech research and development 
initiatives (NSTC 2000). The NNI aims to coordinate the activities of its 25 constituent agencies, 
provide funding for university laboratories, and support for U.S. companies pursuing commercial 
applications of nanotechnologies. NNI agencies participate in a variety of international fora to 
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cooperatively address issues related to metrology and standards, nomenclature, and nanoscale 
materials characterization. In 2003, Congress provided statutory foundations for the activities of 
the NNI through the 21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act. As mandated by the 
act, the NNI has developed, and periodically updated, a number of strategic plans (NSTC 2004; 
2007; 2011b) that provide the framework within which each agency carries out its own mission-
related nanotechnology programs. With the 2004 strategic plan, four overarching goals were 
identified – three focused on accelerating commercial applications, and a fourth intended to 
ensure the safe and responsible development of nanotechnologies by supporting “a broad 
spectrum of research to evaluate environmental, health and safety impacts […].” (NSTC 
2004: 10)  
In support of this goal, a Nanotechnology Environmental and Health Implications (NEHI) 
working group was created in 2003. Deliberations within the NEHI group are intended to 
facilitate inter-agency information exchange related to their human health and environmental 
activities. Informed by discussions among NEHI members, the NNI has adopted a number of 
strategies specifically targeted at environmental, health and safety research (NSTC 2006; 2008; 
2011a). A recurring theme of the NEHI strategies is the need to leverage research funded by 
other governments and the private sector. The 2006 Environmental, Health, and Safety Research Needs 
for Engineered Nanoscale Materials document, for example, emphasized that “it is clear that not only 
is coordination of research activities among the NNI agencies important, but also collaboration 
with industry and with other governments will be necessary in order to expedite progress.” 
(NSTC 2006:vi)  
Promoting partnerships with corporate stakeholders, while improving coordination among 
government, academia and industry, has thus emerged as a clear priority of federal nanotech 
policy. Most observers agree however that this has largely proven a wishful, if not naive, ambition 
– one, which the NNI has failed to realize. A NNI official acknowledged: “we are trying to do a 
better job of partnering with [industry] to get them to fund research. […] You will see very sector 
specific partnering […] but comprehensive [collaboration] or partnering for fundamental research 
– that’s harder!”13 An EPA official put it more candidly: “This criticism that the NNI is going to 
coordinate research [with industry], I don’t see that happening, because what Dow Chemical 




13  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 23, 2012. 
An Uncertain Business 
70 
do is get people to at least share more information.”14 Industry insiders have in the same vain 
tended to reject the idea of coordination.15  
This lack of interest can in part be explained with the neglect of measures to support 
collaboration. While the NEHI group for example operates with much the same mandate as the 
NRCG, deliberations are conducted in what critics describe as a ‘federal vacuum’ (National 
Research Council 2009: 48), devoid of direct input from companies or other stakeholders. NEHI 
is representative of the general situation. NNI has yet to establish a permanent channel through 
which stakeholder views can flow into the development and execution of research priorities and 
initiatives. The NNI instead rely on a more ad hoc format with inputs from stakeholders primarily 
secured through open workshops and formal consultations. Absent regular and direct access to 
NNI officials, U.S. companies have enjoyed fewer opportunities to shape decisions on research 
strategies and spending during their formative stages than their British competitors. But why have 
U.S. companies not mobilized to push for access to coordination bodies like the NEHI?  
The answer must, partly, be sought with the structure of the NNI: first, under the 
Nanotechnology Act, the NNI has interpreted its mandate as primarily promoting innovation 
and advancing commercial applications of nanotechnology. Although the act calls for NNI to 
ensure that human health and environmental concerns are integrated within broader federal 
nanotechnology research and development activities, skeptics question the initiative’s 
commitment to safety research; for example “they give lip-service to environmental health and 
safety issues, but that is not their primary focus. If you look at the law, the last thing on their list 
is safety and environmental health. […] Their attitude at times seems to be: ‘there have been no 
problems yet, so why do we need to worry about this’.”16 Secondly, congressional funding for the 
NNI is provided through appropriations to each of the 25 participating agencies. The NNI itself 
has no centralized source of funding. The NNI, including NEHI, therefore has essentially no 
leverage over individual agencies (National Research Council 2009: 50). As an EPA official 
explained, the NEHI group  
“is a good place to exchange information – to find out what the other agencies are doing. But what 
people don’t realize about the NNI is that they have no direct authority over each agency’s funding. While 
EPA might have 10 million dollars [to fund research], EPA decides what to do with that. They can have 
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If not a NNI priority, and with risk-related decisions made elsewhere – at the agency-level – it is 
hardly surprising that U.S. companies have displayed little interest in securing access for their 
views and regulatory interests.  
Unlike the ‘top-down’ coordination approach embodied in the NRCG, ‘bottom-up’ 
coordination in the U.S. has created fewer incentives for industry to engage the NEHI with an 
aim to shape the direction of federal research priorities and strategies. Yet, looking closer at the 
executive agencies, we observe much the same pattern of disengagement between officials and 
industry. Consider U.S. EPA. In 2004, EPA’s Science Policy Council formed a cross-agency 
working group to identify issues related to nanotechnology and the environment. In February 
2007, the group released a Nanotechnology White Paper (EPA 2007), which presented a number of 
recommendations with respect to future research needs and regulatory oversight. These 
recommendations were supplemented with a Nanomaterial Research Strategy released in 2009 (EPA 
2009a) and since implemented through the agency’s in-house research program and the Science 
to Achieve Results grant program (Savage, Thomas and Duncan 2007). 
Like the NNI, EPA has committed to promoting partnerships and dialogue with industry to 
inform research priorities and policy initiatives (EPA 2007: 63). Nonetheless, the degree of 
industry inputs to or involvement in agency decision-making processes have to date been 
marginal. While the agency has conducted various administrative hearings on its risk management 
policies, EPA has established neither the basis for an ongoing dialogue with industry nor 
managed to encourage joint research collaborations: companies can for example contribute to the 
agency’s research programs, but they are not eligible to receive grants, and participation is limited 
to supporting roles. Little wonder then if companies looking to commercialize the results of their 
research investments have shown little interest in partnering under these terms. Although EPA 
moreover has solicited public comment through administrative hearings and formal consultations 
of agency policies and strategies, stakeholder views have not been considered during their 
formative stages. Research initiatives and policy measures have instead been devised through 
internal agency deliberations.  
EPA’s approach is not unique; other agencies with a research mandate for nanotechnology, 
like the FDA or OSHA, have similarly maintained arm’s length relations with industry. While 
expressing interests in cooperation, the executive agencies have in effect failed to engage industry 
in a collaborative dialogue. In contrast to Britain, then, U.S. risk management strategies and 
research initiatives have been formulated and implemented in an environment largely void of 
government-industry collaboration. There is one notable exception to this general pattern, 
though. In 2011, U.S. agencies, with Environment Canada, in cooperation with several U.S. 
An Uncertain Business 
72 
manufacturers announced the launch of a joint research consortium. Managed by the 
International Life Science Institute (ILSI),18 the NanoRelease project is intended to identify 
available methods for evaluating release scenarios during the life cycle of product uses; assess the 
utility and reliability of these methods as applied to nanoscale materials; identify gaps, where new 
methods are needed; and eventually to fill those gaps by testing and evaluating selected methods. 
The NanoRelease steering committee is composed of risk management experts from 
government, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations. Key 
benefits of the project is expected to include the ability to evaluate and compare nanomaterial 
releases from commercially available products as well as expedite the development of new 
products by establishing broadly accepted evaluation methods. Such methods are expected to 
facilitate the appropriate calibration of risk management measures in occupational, consumer, 
and environmental contexts (Rizzuto 2012). Unlike the PROSPEcT project, which was intended 
to provide a full characterization of the analyzed materials, NanoRelease however considers only 
questions of exposure to nanomaterials. After an initial nine month assessment period, the 
steering committee selected multi-walled carbon nanotubes as the first nanomaterial to undergo 
testing, and ILSI is currently recruiting experts for the next phases of the project. NanoRelease 
thus represents a successful instance of government-industry collaboration; but the joint project 
remains the exception from the norm of formalized and arm’s length interactions among 
regulators and companies.  
Voluntary Reporting Initiatives  
In support of U.S. safety research policies, federal agencies have undertaken a range of evidence 
gathering initiatives to access existing data and practices from industry – with mixed results as 
illustrated by the experiences of two lead federal agencies: NIOSH and EPA. Whereas the 
NIOSH program of voluntary site inspections has won wide acclaim as a successful example of 
government-industry cooperation, evaluations of EPA’s Nanoscale Material Stewardship 
Program range from disappointment to a dismal failure. These voluntary initiatives nicely 
illustrate the conditions under which federal agencies have successfully engaged industry – and 
importantly the inherent limitations to cooperation in the United States. Consider each in turn. 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is tasked with identifying 
potential occupational hazards from exposures to chemical substances and to provide 
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agenda, NIOSH created a field team in 2005 to assess workplace processes, materials and control 
technologies through partnerships with industrial producers and users. To date, the field team has 
conducted voluntary inspections in a variety of facilities involved in the research, manufacture or 
use of nanomaterials. The program is fully funded by NIOSH and there are no monetary costs to 
participants. NIOSH has, moreover, issued extensive guarantees to participating companies that 
any proprietary information will be protected. The program has allowed NIOSH to gather 
baseline data to assess potential occupational safety and health implications of engineered 
nanomaterials. Information which the agency in turn has used to supplement its best practice 
guidance documents (NIOSH 2005; 2009).  
NIOSH is a research agency. As such, the agency has no authority to mandate site inspections. 
But unlike other federal entities, NIOSH has succeeded in securing access to industry 
information. And U.S. companies have indeed been welcoming of NIOSH’s activities. One 
industry representative exclaimed:  
“NIOSH is really on the leading edge. They have done some really wonderful work on occupational 
exposures […] They are basically providing a free consultant service to [companies] who didn’t have to 
pay anybody to come in and evaluate their situation or offer any potential solutions. It was a free 
consultation on NIOSH’s part, so both industry benefitted and NIOSH got the data on what was going 
on, so they benefitted as well.”19  
The representative however went on to emphasize: “NIOSH has the luxury of not being a 
regulatory agency, so industry is far more welcoming of NIOSH coming into their facility to take 
a look around, because they are not regulatory.”20 Corporate interest in the NIOSH voluntary 
initiative thus not only springs from the incentives created for participation; rather, cooperation 
has been facilitated by the absence of regulatory liabilities. Where such liabilities exist – i.e. where 
regulatory agencies have sought to encourage cooperation – the stakes for companies look radically 
different as illustrated by EPA’s unsuccessful bid to convince industry to volunteer information. 
Originally intended to run in tandem with the UK VRS, EPA’s voluntary reporting scheme, 
the Nanoscale Material Stewardship Program (NMSP), was delayed until January 2008. The 
NMSP was developed to provide EPA with a firmer scientific foundation for its nanotech 
policies by encouraging submission and development of new information for nanoscale materials 
(EPA 2009b: 3). Like the VRS, then, the NMSP was viewed as an instrument to quickly shore up 
the evidence base, allowing EPA to avoid a cumbersome rule-making process. That it took EPA 
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by the agency. Unlike the VRS, information submitted under the NMSP was not meant to 
facilitate decisions about future regulatory controls. As one observer noted: “industry would [not] 
have gone for that. It was meant to inform industry about how to be better players until there 
were regulations, so that when there were regulations they would already be complying.”21  
Notwithstanding the more modest ambition, interest in the NMSP has as in Britain been 
limited: as of December 8, 2008, a total of 29 companies had submitted information and a further 
seven companies had outstanding commitments. While the agency’s interim evaluation released 
in 2009 praised the NMSP’s achievements (EPA 2009b), EPA officials have in private expressed 
disappointment – a sentiment widely shared among stakeholders. Unlike Defra, EPA did 
establish a baseline for success: 240 submissions from about 180 companies. Participation has 
thus fallen far below the mark, above all with respect to SMEs. While NMSP did yield 
information on properties, commercial uses and basic manufacturing processes, few submissions 
provided either toxicity or fate studies (EPA 2009b: 9). Defra as we saw has referred the limited 
participation to the ‘state of industry’. EPA in contrast concluded that the “low rate of 
engagement […] suggests that most companies are not inclined to voluntarily test their nanoscale 
materials.” (EPA 2009b: 27) In April 2010, EPA announced that data received under the NMSP 
was insufficiently robust for the agency to make any general conclusions about the risks of 
nanoscale materials. And that the agency in consequence would begin to consider how its 
authority under existing federal statutes could be used to promulgate testing and reporting rules 
for nanomaterials.  
Regulators in Britain and the United States thus differ in the lessons drawn from the limited 
interest in voluntary data disclosure. Defra saw the VRS as an opportunity to maintain a 
constructive dialogue with industry and other stakeholders (Defra 2006b). The ministry 
consequently sought to encourage participation through informal guarantees, combined with a 
policy of proactive accommodation of industrial views and concerns. While EPA likewise 
undertook an extensive outreach campaign in support of the NMSP, decisions about program 
structure were ultimately taken behind closed agency doors – a policy heavily criticized by 
stakeholders. Despite concerns of an industry bias in the agency’s nanotech policy (see e.g. Rudd 
2008), EPA has in fact not been exceedingly accommodating of industry demands. During initial 
discussions of a voluntary program, industry representatives for example pushed for inclusion of 
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wanted to have no liability as a condition for participating.22 An agency official observed: 
“publicly we didn’t [reject the idea], but privately [we said:] ‘there is no way! If we get the 
information and there is something we have to act on, we’ll act on it. We can’t give you that 
guarantee.”23  
Contrast this with the VRS, where Defra never excluded that submissions could prompt 
regulatory action. Reported information was moreover fed into ministerial decision-making 
bodies, where it could – in principle – have propelled a new stricter policy on nanomaterials. And 
the ministry did this with industry blessing. EPA for its part was unable to share most of the 
information received under the NMSP with other federal agencies. Under the provisions 
safeguarding confidential business information in the United States, exchanging information 
claimed as such across the Federal Government is a notoriously complex affair (GAO 2005; 
Wagner 2004: 1699ff.). Participants have not surprisingly taken full advantage of these provisions, 
even to the extent that some companies claimed their identity as confidential (EPA 2009b). While 
the NRCG do operate within a framework of confidentiality, those familiar with the incentives 
created by the rules governing confidential business information in the United States would 
probably find it difficult to imagine companies signing on to a similar arrangement. An official 
remarked:  
“This is Washington – reality is what you see, and if you don’t see it – it’s not there. But I know [the 
information] is there! […] Part of their reluctance to share all that information [arise because they would] 
have to let out some of the information about what [they] are working on – don’t wanna do it! They don’t 
see it in their interest! […] If you let out the information [to demonstrate that products are safe] that 
would also let people know exactly which chemicals you are making. They are pretty secretive about – 
especially – specialty chemicals.”24  
Regulatory Relationships in the United States 
Like their colleagues in Whitehall, decision-makers in Washington have professed keen interest in 
partnering with industry groups and other stakeholders. The Federal Government has moreover 
adopted much the same range of policy instruments as HM Government and has launched on a 
broadly similar path to enable a coordinated response to nanotechnologies. In contrast to Britain, 
however, little progress has been made on securing input from and cooperation with industry. 
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in external views during the formative stages of decision-making. Contrast for example the UK 
policy of letting informal discussions with industry representatives inform research priorities, 
with the following assessment by a U.S. official:  
“It is inherently governmental for the agencies to decide what research should be funded next […] We are 
very confidential about the information: what the topic is going to be and what the details are and the science 
you can propose, until it goes public and everybody sees it together at the same time. The decisions about 
what to fund and those kinds of things are inherently governmental and only government people can decide 
them. There are some reasons for having some distance.”25  
Representatives of organized interests have consequently been kept at arm’s length. Laments 
chair of the ACC Nanotechnology Panel, Paul D. Ziegler (2007: 4): “To date, industry’s role has 
been largely restricted to passive review of decisions already made. Industry’s considerable 
experience could be better utilized by being actively engaged earlier in the process […].”  
U.S. companies for their part have however been equally skeptical of working closely with 
regulators. On occasion, partnerships and joint-ventures among federal agencies, research 
institutions and companies have played a supportive role. Yet, these collaborations fall short of 
the benchmark set in Britain, and remain exceptions from a more general pattern of unstructured 
dialogue, isolated engagements and formalized interactions among regulators and companies. The 
degree of industry inputs to or involvement in federal decision-making and research activities 
have thus been marginal. Skepticism regarding the intentions and agendas of federal agencies has 
in turn strongly spoken against a course of volunteering information to regulators. Consider the 
NMSP: as one industry insider explained,  
“there was a lack of clarity when you signed on to the Nanoscale Material Stewardship Program what 
exactly you were signing on to. Industry wanted a commitment from EPA that if we say yes we will have 
to do A, B, C, D and E, but not A, B, C, D, and E ad infinitum item. That lack of clarity was a real turn off 
to a business community that didn’t want to open its checkbook to an unlimited amount of data 
production.”26  
Contrast this with the VRS, where Defra issued nothing but an informal guarantee that the 
rights of data owners would be respected. While neither scheme can be consider particularly 
successful, they forcibly contrast the nature of regulatory relationships in Britain and the United 
States: whereas informal dialogue with manufacturers ensured industry backing for the goals of 
the VRS, no such support was forthcoming for the NMSP. In fact, a coalition of trade 
associations only came out in favor of the program, urging companies to submit data, six months 
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coincided with EPA’s announcement a week later in July 2008 that the agency was prepared to 
issue a mandatory reporting rule, if participation did not pick up – which it did with a sudden 300 
percent increase in submissions. Negative incentives more than anything thus appear to explain 
U.S. companies’ receptiveness to EPA’s appeals for ‘voluntary’ disclosure. Following a meeting 
with EPA officials, industry association SOCMA for example warned members that EPA  
“is eyeing a test rule. […] The test process would be mandatory, and proscribe specific actions for each 
company. However, SOCMA believes that the issuance of a test rule is not fait accompli. If one – or several 
– companies step forth and express a willingness to complete the in-depth portion of the Nanomaterials 
Stewardship Program, then the test rule may be held back.”27  
The policy process in the United States is in short characterized by a clear pattern of 
disengagement, reluctance, formal communications and ad hoc encounters among federal entities 
and industry representatives. Despite generous opportunities to participate in regulatory 
proceedings through administrative hearings or open workshops, industry has been reluctant to 
embrace the strategies of their UK competitors. Federal safety research has in consequence 
remained largely detached from parallel efforts in industry, with regulatory decisions and risk 
management activities shaped by internal agency processes, insulated from external inputs. One 
NNI official summarized the sentiment governing nanotech policy in the United States thus: 
“We’d all like to be friends, but we are a little bit wary of each other based on past experience.”28  
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES IN GERMANY 
German nanotechnology policy is characterized by a commitment to greatly expand the 
knowledge base on potential risks. Beyond considerable increases in public funding for safety 
research, a core element of federal nanotech policy has consisted of encouraging dialogues and 
cooperation with industry. Discussion of potential human health and environmental risks began 
in earnest in 2005, when the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU) organized a major international conference on synthetic nanoparticles 
(Anton et al. 2005). Based on recommendations emerging from the conference, the BMU decided 
to continue an open stakeholder dialogue. In late 2006, the BMU convened the German 
NanoKommission to foster dialogue and knowledge exchange among government, industry and 
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arrived at much the same diagnosis of – and approach to – nanotechnologies as governmental 
decision-makers in Britain and the United States. Like their British competitors, German 
companies have not hesitated in their response to the opportunities for influence entailed in the 
invitation for dialogue and cooperation. Companies and their representatives have taken every 
opportunity to consult and cooperate with federal authorities, pressing on decision-makers their 
concerns about scientific developments, technical feasibility and economic impacts. The German 
policy process is in turn ripe with examples of engagements, informal discussions and 
collaborations among industry and federal authorities.  
Risk Management Strategies and Safety Research Policy  
Following a strategic overhaul of innovation policy in 2002, the German government launched 
the overarching Nano-Initiative – Aktionsplan 2010 (BMBF 2007) as a stand-alone strategy within 
the national High-Tech Strategy (BMBF 2006). The action plan outlined measures to bundle 
cross-departmental and interdisciplinary research in a number of priority areas, including 
electronics, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and energy; reduce obstacles to innovation and 
development; invest in early stage training and knowledge transfer; foster cooperation at the 
international level; identify and mitigate possible human health and environmental risks; explore 
feasible regulatory mechanisms; and invite dialogue with the public and stakeholders (BMBF 
2007: 13f.; 2011a). The action plan commits the Federal Government to the safe and responsible 
development of nanotechnologies, emphasizing that “[i]t is imperative that we extend our 
knowledge on the consequences of releasing nanoparticles for the environment and health so 
that we can better evaluate the potential for harm.” (BMBF 2007: 25) Collaborations and 
dialogue with industry was in this context recognized as important strategic measures to realize 
this commitment, and have since constituted a consistent priority of federal nanotech policy. 
Both the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) and the Ministry of Economics 
and Technology (BMWi) have for example initiated sector dialogues to inform companies about 
the potential of nanotechnologies, fund new lead innovations, and support the uptake of the 
technology among SMEs. Branch-level industrial dialogues have further served to explain and 
clarify the opportunities – and risks – of nanotechnologies (BMBF 2007: 15). Dialogue on 
research priorities and the nature of regulatory controls is thus a defining feature of the policy 
process in Germany – a feature that has found its most visible expression in the German 
NanoKommission. 
Organized by the Ministry of the Environment, the Federal Government convened the 
NanoKommission in late 2006. Acting as steering committee for the wider federal 
NanoDialogue, the NanoKommission involved more than 100 experts and stakeholder 
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representatives. Discussions within the NanoKommission were intended to foster exchanges 
among government and stakeholder groups, offer advice and provide inputs to federal decision-
makers. Over the course of two dialogue phases – from 2006-2008 and again from 2009-2011 – 
the NanoKommission was organized around a number of working groups, each consisting of 
expert members representing environmental and consumer organizations, unions, independent 
scientists, industry and public authorities. In contrast to many civil society organizations, which 
expressed some initial reservations, industry readily jumped on the opportunity to engage federal 
authorities. A former participant recalled: “they were interested [in the dialogue] from the 
beginning, because they were afraid of the GMO debate […] they were really afraid that the 
opinion could turn around and then they would have a problem. So they were eager to already in 
the beginning discuss all these safety issues to not have the problems later on.”29 Unlike the NNI, 
then, the NanoKommission has in other words served as a ‘conduit’ through which industry – as 
well as other stakeholder – views and inputs could flow into the formulation and execution of 
federal research priorities and activities. Consider Working Group 2 as an illustration. 
At its constitutive meeting in March 2007, the NanoKommission asked members representing 
public authorities, industry and other stakeholder groups to provide an overview of current 
knowledge about safety issues and risks. Following extensive deliberations, the group drew up a 
set of physical, chemical and biological properties intended to facilitate comparisons across 
scientific studies. Members further agreed to a list of criteria indicating ‘concern’ or ‘no cause for 
concern’ as an initial step towards systematic risk assessment of nanomaterials 
(NanoKommission 2008b; Catenhusen and Grobe 2008). The list was welcomed by the Federal 
Government as useful guidance for future safety research; and federal decision-makers have since 
employed the criteria to inform research strategies and priorities (Bundesregierung 2012). With 
the Federal Government taking the various recommendations emerging from the dialogue 
process to heart, observes agree that the NanoKommission has left a distinct mark on the 
direction of German nanotech policy. And German companies and their representatives have 
thus enjoyed opportunities to shape decisions on research strategies and risk assessment priorities 
on a level at least comparable to their British competitors.  
As in other countries, ensuring a coordinated response has been a priority for the Federal 
Government (BMBF 2006; 2007; 2011a). For this purpose, the NanoKommission much like the 




29  Interview, Berlin, June 22, 2012. 
An Uncertain Business 
80 
related investments and policies. Coordination across federal entities with a research mandate for 
nanotechnologies has further been pursued through inter-ministerial deliberations under the 
auspice of a BMU steering group. Discussions in the steering group have sought to facilitate 
intra-governmental information exchange and consensus on open issues to ensure a common 
nanotech position. The ministerial steering group has at the same time supported lower level 
discussions among federal agencies.30 One illustrative output of these discussions is the joint 2007 
research strategy on health and environmental risks developed by three federal authorities – the 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA), the Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) 
and the Federal Environment Agency (UBA).  
To coordinate and prioritize their activities, the three agencies identified a number of strategic 
objectives equally important for occupational safety, consumer and environmental protection. In 
the course of drawing up the strategy, the three agencies consulted widely among representatives 
from industry and other groups, with a draft version discussed at conference in November 2006 
(BAuA, BfR and UBA 2006). Although the outcome of inter-agency deliberations, regular 
discussions with their respective constituents have nonetheless sheltered the strategy from the 
criticisms levied against the comparable U.S. NEHI strategies. Rather than viewed as formulated 
in a ‘federal vacuum’, the strategy was meant to communicate what from a regulatory perspective 
was perceived as the most pressing research needs to a broader audience31 – the strategy for 
example formed the initial basis for discussion among members of Working Group 2 
(NanoKommission 2008b).  
With their joint strategy, the three agencies advocated collaboration with industry as a sensible 
approach to systematically evaluate and bridge existing knowledge gaps. Similar commitments to 
cooperation abound in other governmental publications, and public-private research partnerships 
indeed figure prominently in the German approach to enable a targeted response to 
nanotechnologies. Beyond the three agencies’ own research investments and projects, 
implementation of their joint strategy has relied on the BMBF’s funding programs for nano 
safety research, most notably with the NanoCare cluster projects (NanoCare, INOS, and 
TRACER). Undertaken in cooperation with industry, the NanoCare projects collectively sought 
to investigate the potential risks of new nanoscale or nanostructured materials, while 
communicating the results to affected commercial interests and the public. The largest project 
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partnership. NanoCare was intended to define new and standardized methods for investigating 
nanomaterials and to generate new data concerning material characterization (NanoCare Project 
Consortium 2009b: 89). In addition to the manufacture and characterization of new metal oxide 
nanoparticles, the consortium aimed to establish titanium dioxide and carbon black as reference 
materials. With the INOS and TRACER projects, NanoCare sought to increase knowledge about 
the biological effects of nanomaterials as well as standardize analytic procedures (Nau and Krug 
2009: 1). NanoCare ultimately delivered important new insights and established several novel 
methods for characterization and occupational measurements; and the project was ultimately 
instrumental to Germany’s decision of assuming lead sponsorship for titanium dioxide in the 
OECD process (NanoCare Project Consortium 2009a; 2009b).  
Joint public-private partnerships are in short viewed as important enablers of federal risk 
management strategies (BMBF 2011a: 29). Observes a federal official: “there is an interest from 
politics to involve the industry in such projects. Because otherwise they would do the [research] 
and we would never see [the data]. It is also a way of controlling them.”32 Unlike the situation in 
the United States, industry has however voiced few reservations about partnering with federal 
authorities. The official offered this explanation: 
“If they develop applications after such collaborations, it will be harder for the federal agencies to criticize 
these products or these applications, because they would then say: ‘well, we had a collaboration together.’ 
So it is very sensible for them to collaborate, because they have their critics within the boat. That’s the 
rationality behind this: ‘if we collaborate in the first place or in the early stages, then we won’t have the 
problems later, because then we can say: ‘well, you have been in the project or you knew the data and so 
on.’ So this is a way of producing legitimacy for the applications later.”33 
For the authorities, on the other hand, the official emphasized:  
“We would rather take part in such a research project, because otherwise we would never see such data. 
So in a way, it is true […] that you become dependent upon industry, but on the other side [the agencies 
say]: ‘we take part in this, because otherwise we would never see such data.’ We want to give advice since 
we are in the project and we will talk about the design of experiments, we will talk about the materials that 
are tested in the experiments and so on. It comes from both sides: industry is not independent and can do 
what they want.”34 
In marked contrast to the quarrels, which plague questions of agency access to safety data in 
the United States, the issue is largely uncontroversial in Germany. Not however because 
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German companies have secured a different – and advantageous – settlement. Joint public-
private partnerships do of course increase the amount of information available to federal 
authorities; but their access to the raw data from joint safety studies is neither automatic nor 
guaranteed. Hence, officials from UBA explained that to acquire information from joint research 
projects, the agencies must approach the BMBF. The ministry in turn negotiates the terms of 
access with the consortium partners. The data is only released if all consortium partners 
consent.35 The BMBF – traditionally a strong ally of the German chemical industry (Paterson 
1991: 237f.; Grant, Paterson and Whitston 1988) – in short acts as gatekeeper. While public 
funds come with a demand for transparency, the agencies are in effect left with little leverage to 
convince consortium partners to reveal or share data that could infringe on their commercial 
interests. Viewed from the strategic risk-benefit calculations of German companies, it is thus 
hardly surprising, if joint research looks attractive.  
Voluntary Reporting Initiatives  
As a recurring theme in their joint strategy, the three federal agencies recognized the need to 
access information and experiences from industry to guide research priorities and assess the 
adequacy of existing regulatory frameworks. Acknowledging corporate concerns over 
confidentiality, the research strategy identified dialogue as a crucial means to encourage 
manufacturers and industrial users to volunteer information on materials characterization, 
production volumes, use patterns, et cetera (BAuA, BfR and UBA 2007). Despite their joint 
statement, however, the three agencies have in effect adopted different positions on how to 
convince companies to disclose information – with mixed experiences and outcomes as a result. 
In the United States, the diverging experiences of NIOSH and EPA can be attributed to 
corporate reluctance to incur regulatory liabilities. In Germany, however, corporate decisions to 
disclose or withhold information owe less to any inherent discomfort in cooperating with federal 
authorities. Rather we must look to variations in how officials have sought to accommodate 
corporate interests. The mixed experiences with data sharing in turn reflect more deep-seated 
differences in how the federal agencies interact with their industrial constituents; a conclusion 
again best illustrated in relation to worker and environmental protection.  
With the aim of collecting information on the manufacture and handling of nanomaterials at 
work, the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health in collaboration with the German 
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measures from 2006 to 2008. Based in part on a consensus emerging from two stakeholder 
conferences in September and October 2005 (VCI 2005; Löchtefeld and Claus 2005), the need 
for and design of the questionnaire was discussed and agreed among representatives from BAuA 
and VCI. Prior to the survey, a small group of companies went over the questions to ensure, as a 
VCI representative noted, “are these the correct questions, can we answer them at all and do they 
make sense.”36 The survey collected information on the number of companies producing, using 
and processing nanomaterials, the types and volumes of nanomaterials in production and the 
number of workers involved. The survey further sought an overview of occupational health and 
safety methods applied in the chemical industry. To facilitate participation, questionnaires were 
returned to and anonymized by VCI before the data was delivered and evaluated by BAuA 
(BAuA 2008: 1). 217 companies responded to the questionnaire. Compared to the limited 
participation in the VRS and the NMSP – 13 and 29 submissions during their respective two year 
operations – the joint BAuA-VCI survey would appear ‘astonishingly’ successful: quantitatively, 
this is correct, although the results probably owes more to differences in program design. Since 
the questionnaire addressed mostly issues of use patterns and risk management practices – 
information readily available to companies – filling in the questionnaire was less cumbersome 
than meeting the submission criteria under the VRS or the NMSP. In contrast to the VRS, for 
example, which requested detailed information on properties, behavior measurements and 
detection techniques, the survey thus only sought relatively basic information.  
The survey did nonetheless ask some questions, e.g. on chemical identity, which might conflict 
with commercial confidentiality. Procedures for handling sensitive data were consequently 
negotiated among BAuA and VCI representatives, with the association in turn assuming the role 
of interlocutor between agency and companies. On the conduct of the survey, a VCI 
representative observed: “We compiled this and made it anonymous. We just said this and this 
substance [is produced], but you could not relate it to the companies. [This ensured that] there is 
not one company that knows what the others are producing and what kind of results they have – 
this is guaranteed!”37 A BAuA official elaborated: “we have a contract with industry that we don’t 
[publish] detailed information […] because industry has a very, very deep fear that data will get to 
the public, especially when they tell us what substances they are working on, how much they 
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The official emphasized: “It is our idea of working [with industry] that we promise anonymity, if 
it is wanted. We can keep confidentiality, it is our business […] We promised it with the [survey, 
because] they said: ‘we want to be sure that the data can’t go out’ and so we have separated it.”39 
German companies in other words share the ‘deep fear’ of disclosure with their U.S. competitors. 
Rather than resist disclosure, however, companies could confidently rely on the vigilance of their 
association. The VCI in turn exercised significant control on the execution and overall design of 
the questionnaire, with the association and its members in effect able to decide the range of 
questions included in the survey.  
BAuA has – much like NIOSH – successfully employed partnerships with industry to gain a 
better understanding of actual work practices, exposure controls, and risk management routines. 
As a VCI representative recalled: “BAuA wanted to know what companies are doing with 
nanomaterials and also to know what kind of safety features they put in and what experience they 
had in workers medical surveillance.”40 Concerning the VCI’s role, the representative observed: 
“If they ask us, we typically [help them]. In the U.S., companies go to court and sue them. But we 
typically do this, because we say that is in the end of help [to us].”41 For industry, the value of the 
survey has most evidently been the publication of a number of guidance documents. During 
initial discussions, BAuA and VCI representatives agreed the need to develop best practice 
guidance, including recommendations and operating instructions for companies working with 
nanomaterials. As a result, and based on information collected in the survey, VCI published the 
joint Guidance for Handling and Use of Nanomaterials at the Workplace (BAuA and VCI 2007) in 2007. 
Combined with the more general report Responsible Production and Use of Nanomaterials (VCI 2008), 
these guidance documents provide detailed recommendations on worker protection as well as 
guidelines for regulatory compliance and risk assessment. Like NIOSH, then, partnerships with 
industry have yielded important inputs to the development of safety guidance. Unlike NIOSH, 
however, BAuA does have a regulatory mandate. Hence, the agency’s capacity to encourage 
voluntary disclosure cannot be explained by the absence of regulatory liabilities. Rather, ongoing 
dialogue with industrial stakeholders and accommodation of corporate interests has allowed 
BAuA to persuade companies to volunteer information – a conclusion further illustrated by the 
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UBA has variously sought to encourage industry to report information on a voluntary basis, 
appealing for “companies engaged in manufacturing and trade [to] submit any information 
available on the behaviour of nanoparticles with regard to possible exposure and their fate in the 
environment.” (UBA 2006: 15) Prior to 2006, UBA further expressed interest in a voluntary 
reporting scheme (BAuA, BfR and UBA 2006). Based in part on the disappointing experiences 
with the VRS and the NMSP, a voluntary initiative was however never implemented. But politics 
also stood in the way. Reflecting on the barriers to a voluntary scheme, one agency official noted: 
“UBA wouldn’t just start it without the consent at least of the BMU and the BMU wouldn’t do it 
without the consent of the other ministries.”42 Supplements another official, “and the other 
ministries thought it was senseless.”43 UBA thus failed to secure a political sign-off on a voluntary 
initiative; and neither have appeals for disclosure generated the response the agency had hoped 
for. UBA officials instead turned their attention towards statutory instruments.  
In 2009, the agency urged the introduction of a mandatory registration requirement, arguing 
that the German Chemicals Act contained the necessary statutory authority (Becker et al. 
2009: 19). UBA next persuaded the BMU to commission a legal feasibility study of a 
nanoproduct register. Co-authored by UBA, the study concluded that “[a] register of 
nanoproducts (nanomaterials, mixtures and articles) produced or placed on the market in 
Germany is legally viable and is workable in practice.” (Hermann and Möller 2010: 9) In the 
ensuing debate, UBA argued that a mandatory register was needed to ensure access to reliable 
data and thus enable an immediate response should hazards to human health or the environment 
be discovered (NanoKommission 2010c). A voluntary registration commitment was in contrast 
rejected, since it was unlikely to generate needed information and further would leave authorities 
without the possibility of ‘applying coercive measures or imposing sanctions’ to compel data 
disclosure (Hermann and Möller 2010: 75). Although a nanoregister won little political favor, 
UBA’s experience in short mirrors that of U.S. EPA: despite initial appeals for voluntary 
disclosure, scant interest from industry ultimately led the agency to embrace mandatory 
instruments.  
What lessons should we draw from the diverging experiences of BAuA and UBA? We must of 
course recognize the different nature of data sought by the two agencies: whereas companies 
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environmental effects or fates.44 Convincing companies to volunteer information about use 
patterns, production volumes or risk management procedures requires less effort than persuading 
them to disclose proprietary information on the characteristics of their materials. This was the 
situation facing NIOSH and EPA as it did BAuA and UBA. The roots of the diverging views and 
preferences of the two agencies run deeper, however. BAuA enjoys a long tradition of dialogue 
and cooperation with its industrial constituents. On the issue of reporting, a BAuA official noted:  
“We have different views [among the agencies], and from the view of occupational safety and health we say: 
‘the companies know what they are doing, that’s okay’, and the survey helped us get an idea on a more 
general level of what they are doing, and that is enough for us. But if you [look to] the environmental people 
or the people who are protecting consumers, they say that we need a register.”45  
UBA’s relationship with industry has in contrast traditionally been more uneasy (Grant, 
Paterson and Whitston 1988: 285f.; Paterson 1991: 231); and, the agency has indeed time and 
again found itself in opposition to the VCI and other industrial interests on the direction of 
German nanotech policy (See e.g. UBA 2006; VCI 2011; NanoKommission 2010c). While agency 
officials claim that relations with industry have improved,46 one observer noted,  
“with worker protection there has been a long history of cooperation between the agency and industry 
[but] there is not such a tradition […] with the environmental agency. It is rather the situation […] that 
industry often sees the environmental administration as being in opposition to them and vice versa as well – 
so they don’t get along that well.”47  
Faced with few compelling incentive to volunteer safety data, and with no interlocutor to 
facilitate dialogue and cooperation among the agency and companies, it is perhaps to be 
expected that UBA – like U.S. EPA – looks to create those incentives by mandatory 
instruments. Unlike EPA, however, UBA’s regulatory mandate is relatively limited. Rather 
than any inherent discomfort in sharing information with federal authorities, industry’s 
reluctance to work with UBA stems more from misgivings in the agency’s agendas and 
intentions.48  
Regulatory Relationships in Germany 
What emerges from this account of German nanotech policy is thus a general pattern of close 
and collaborative interactions among federal entities, German companies and their 
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nanotechnologies, industry drivers and the concerns of NGOs (BMBF 2002; Paschen et al. 2003; 
Anton et al. 2005) prompted federal decision-makers to embrace a strategy of ongoing dialogue. 
Although the German NanoKommission may represent a unique organizational format to 
address the regulatory challenges of nanotechnologies, the extent and nature of consultations, 
engagements and policy deliberations are nonetheless comparable to the situation in Britain. 
Federal authorities have actively sought the advice and views of industry on all major policy 
initiatives. Regular discussions have facilitated a range of collaborations, covering joint 
contributions to safety research, exposure mitigation and the development of risk management 
methodologies. Dialogue and cooperation with industry has in turn served as important enablers 
of the federal government’s regulatory ambitions for nanotechnologies. 
Participation in the NanoKommission and various other decision-making bodies have 
provided channels through which industry views and inputs could flow into the formulation and 
execution of federal nanotech policies and research initiatives. Regular consultations and informal 
deliberations have in turn allowed industry to leave a distinct mark on the development of 
German nanotech policy. Like their UK competitors, industry representatives have sought to 
nurture and reinforce cooperative relations with regulators, resulting in extensive discussions, 
accommodation of corporate interests and broad, if not universal agreement on the direction of 
German nanotech policy. While UBA’s failure to encourage disclosure does distort this general 
picture, it also stands relatively isolated. UBA’s experience however closely resembles the Danish 
nanotech story. 
REGULATING NANOTECHNOLOGIES IN DENMARK 
The regulatory process in Denmark has seen state authorities pursue a range of strategic 
measures and policy initiatives that by now will be familiar to the reader. Like their American and 
European peers, governmental decision-makers have committed considerable resources to 
address the uncertain risks of nanomaterials; and to guide the direction of Danish nanotech 
policy, state agencies have similarly prioritized initiatives to canvass the views of stakeholders. 
Ensuring the safe and responsible development of nanotechnologies has in short entailed a 
comparable commitment to dialogue and collaboration. Similar to the situation in the United 
States, however, cooperation among state authorities and industry never materialized. Despite an 
invitation for dialogue, Danish companies have been reluctant to pursue the strategies of their 
German and British competitors. With little notable industry mobilization, the Danish policy 
process has in consequence been dominated by state authorities – and the prevalence of irregular 
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and ad hoc engagements among officials and industry representatives. Although they have left little 
mark on Danish nanotech policy, companies and their representatives have nonetheless 
welcomed governmental initiatives and strategies. Even as a political agreement was concluded in 
2012 to introduce a mandatory nanoproduct register, business representatives have voiced few 
loud objections or protests. Acquiescence and adaptation to governmental policies are in short 
words that best describe the response of Danish industry. 
Risk Management Strategies and Safety Research Policy  
In October 2004, a broad political agreement named nanotechnology a priority of national 
science, technology, and innovation policy. Parallel to discussions in Parliament, a steering group 
established under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Development undertook a foresight 
exercise on Danish nanoscience and technology, culminating in the publication of an action plan 
in December 2004 (Ministeriet for Videnskab, Teknologi og Udvikling 2004). To ensure that 
Denmark derive maximum economic, environmental and societal benefits from 
nanotechnologies, the action plan called, first, for a significant boost in research funding; 
accompanied secondly by measures to promote training and knowledge transfer to ensure that 
future breakthroughs translate into product and market opportunities. The action plan further 
called for a coordinated strategy across ministerial departments and agencies to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of efforts. While primarily focused on the potential benefits of nanotechnologies, the 
action plan also noted the existence of new and partly unknown risks. To mitigate these risk 
uncertainties, the action plan urged collaboration among state authorities, research institutions 
and industry. The Ministry of the Environment was encouraged to assume the lead on promoting 
dialogue with the aim of indentifying and closing knowledge gaps, guide future research initiatives 
and enable an effective response to possible human and environmental risks (Ministeriet for 
Videnskab, Teknologi og Udvikling 2004: 37).  
In response to the action plan and recommendations made by the Danish Board of 
Technology (Teknologirådet 2006), governmental decision-makers since launched a range of 
policy measures that mirror public responses in other countries. State authorities have sponsored 
various initiatives to expand the evidence base, fund safety research and promote international 
cooperation. Coordination across governmental agencies, research institutions and university 
centers is facilitated through an informal network of civil servants and academic researchers 
organized by the Danish EPA, Miljøstyrelsen (MST). The network was established to inform 
research priorities by collecting, interpreting and disseminating experiences with risk assessment 
and management of nanomaterials. Coordination, dialogue and cooperation thus constitute 
consistent priorities of Danish nanotech policy; and decision-makers and regulatory authorities 
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have in short embraced a comparable diagnosis of – and approach to – nanotechnologies as their 
peers in other countries. It is rather when we look to the response of industry that the Danish 
policy process stands out.  
Danish companies and their representatives have played little or no role in either of the 
research initiatives or policy discussions undertaken by state authorities since 2004. Although 
open to non-governmental experts, industry representatives for example never joined MST’s 
coordination network. There have been few regular contacts among state authorities and industry 
and no ongoing dialogue to inform the direction of Danish nanotech policy. Discussions have 
instead occurred on a largely ad hoc basis: individual companies have on occasion approached 
MST to voice their concerns; but as an official emphasized these contacts have primarily been 
motivated by a desire to clarify their responsibilities and learn about international developments.49 
Although companies have sought information from state authorities, they have offered few 
inputs in return.  
Beyond such informal, but irregular contacts, the policy process in Denmark has seen issue-
specific conferences and occasional consultations among public authorities, industry 
representatives and other stakeholder groups. In November 2007, for example, MST with the 
Danish Chamber of Commerce and the Confederation of Danish Industry hosted an open 
workshop for industry, NGOs and other stakeholders (Miljøstyrelsen 2007).50 Although 
welcomed by industry representatives as an opportunity to exchange views and promote mutual 
understandings,51 the broad contours of Danish nanotech policy had nonetheless coalesced before 
the workshop. According to a MST official, the workshop thus did little to change or influence 
agency policies or priorities.52 In contrast to e.g. the NanoKommission, the workshop was in fact 
not intended to inform the direction of Danish nanotech policy by canvassing the views 
stakeholders. It served instead primarily as a vehicle to communicate regulatory initiatives and 
international developments to a wider audience.  
While state authorities have consulted broadly on all major initiatives and called a number of 
orientation meetings, their policies, priorities and designs have not taken shape through an 
dialogue with industrial stakeholders. Policy initiatives and strategic measures have instead been 
informed and decided through inter- and intra-agency deliberations. The 2010 adoption of a new 




49  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
50  The workshop was held as part of Kemikaliedag, a yearly reoccurring stakeholder event in the chemicals area. 
51  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
52  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
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commitments to nanotechnologies, calling for an intensification of national and international 
efforts to identify and manage potential human health and environmental risks (Regeringen 
2010). Prior to drafting the action plan, MST called an orientation meeting to discuss potential 
priorities and elements. The agency again circulated an updated draft to stakeholders before 
introducing the plan in Parliament. While stakeholders thus were encouraged to offer their views, 
an industry representative remarked that the final plan ultimately had changed little from initial 
drafts.53  
Policy strategies and initiatives have in short been drawn up by officials without prior 
discussion – and only then been communicated to external stakeholders. Rather than cater to the 
interests of Danish industry, the 2010 chemicals plan for example reflects a mix of administrative 
interpretations, conclusions and evaluations of nanotech, general chemical safety considerations, 
and a set of specific political circumstances.54 Observers have thus suggested that 
nanotechnologies were prioritized in response to growing political attention – and that the action 
plan was primarily meant to anticipate demands for further national initiatives by demonstrating a 
clear governmental commitment to nano safety.55 Whether or not political contingencies did 
indeed persuade MST is an open question – the push to include nanotech however did not 
originate with industry. An MST official observed: 
“The Confederation of Danish Industry […] is where you would turn for an industry view on nano. Aside 
from Kemikaliedag [the stakeholder workshop], however, I cannot recall an issue where they voiced an 
opinion. They voice opinions about endocrine disruptors or chemicals in general, but I actually cannot 
recall an occasion where they voiced an opinion on nanotechnology – which perhaps simply reflects that 
the issue has been uncontroversial so far.”56 (My translation)  
Since they have voiced few opinions and demands, Danish companies have in effect left all 
major decisions to state authorities. Looking to the implementation of strategic research 
initiatives and safety studies, we find much the same pattern. Following recommendations made 
in the 2004 action plan, grant authorities have prioritized research focused on the toxicity, 
epidemiology, and bioaccumulation of manufactured nanomaterials, with additional funding 
allocated to support the development of risk management methodologies and instrumentation. 
Internationally, the Danish Agency for Science, Research and Innovation closely monitors 
ongoing developments in the OECD and the EU with a view to guide national research 




53  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
54  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
55  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
56  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
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Nordic contribution to the OECD Sponsorship Program. National research institutions and 
universities have meanwhile established permanent research groups and centers, which link to 
international programs. Since 2005, the National Research Centre for the Working Environment, 
NFA, has for example housed a research group focused on occupational health and safety 
aspects of nanomaterials. With the aim of strengthening and consolidating NFA’s activities, the 
2012 national budget established a Danish Nano Safety Centre. Beyond its own in-house safety 
research, the Centre intends to collect and disseminate international scientific results among state 
authorities and national stakeholders. The Centre further targets commercial users of 
nanomaterials to ensure that they have access to comprehensive information about potential risks 
in their products and manufacturing processes.  
Although the Danish Nano Safety Centre signals a commitment to knowledge exchange, 
examples of joint public-private research partnerships are rare. In part because Danish authorities 
have not encouraged joint research ventures on a scale similar to e.g. the German NanoCare 
projects, industry has made few direct contributions to government-sponsored safety studies, and 
reactions to calls for collaborations have been mixed. Some NFA research projects have been co-
sponsored by industry, but only through financial commitments to research carried out by 
university or governmental researchers – corporate experts and scientists have not participated 
directly.57 The Danish Coating and Adhesives Association has for instance agreed to act as joint 
sponsor of a toxicity and exposure study undertaken by the NFA. Test materials were selected in 
collaboration with representatives from industry, who agreed to supply industrial samples (Saber, 
Wallin and Vogel 2011). The scope of joint research ventures in Denmark is thus more 
reminiscent of the situation in the United States than comparable German or British initiatives. 
Unlike the NanoCare, PROSPEcT or NanoRelease projects, however, industrial sponsors had no 
say in how the study was designed or reported. Questions of design, methodology and reporting 
were instead decided exclusively by NFA researchers. Nonetheless, data access and ownership 
never emerged as an issue.58  
But why would the association and its members agree to finance a study over which they had 
no control? There is a straightforward reason for this: the application of nanotechnologies by the 
Danish coating industry relies on nanomaterials imported from international manufacturers 
(Tønning and Poulsen 2007). As industrial users of nanomaterials, the stakes of corporate 




57  Phone interview, July 2, 2013. 
58  Phone interview, July 2, 2013. 
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Adverse results – which might inflict serious harm on the commercial interests of the producer – 
would not to a comparable extend be deemed problematic for the association and its members. 
In fact, learning about possible adverse effects – unknown to the users and perhaps only vaguely 
apprehended and therefore not communicated by the manufacturer – would allow corporate 
sponsors to undertake protective measures, anticipate future restrictions or if necessary look for 
substitute materials. More than a vested interest in their materials, worker protection was in other 
words the primary motivation of corporate sponsors. The procedure – industrial samples 
provided anonymously through their association – meanwhile meant that individual sponsors 
would be sheltered from negative publicity should hazards for their contributions be discovered.  
Safety research in Denmark has in short only to a limited extend been informed by the 
commercial interests and experiences of industry. Rather the direction of safety research has been 
defined by the interests of university researchers and government experts.59 This is not to 
diminish the value of government-funded research in Denmark: indeed, university researchers 
and research institutions have made important contributions to the global safety assessment of 
nanomaterials. What these efforts only to a lesser extent have achieved is to assess business-
related needs with respect to nanotechnologies. Research institutions and regulators have on 
occasion engaged corporate representatives in dialogue and cooperation; yet on the whole 
decision-makers have been unable to tap current experiences from industry or information on the 
state of applied research.60  
Voluntary Reporting Initiatives  
Spurred by the April 2006 MagicNano incident,61 MST commissioned two projects to gain an 
overview of industrial uses of nanomaterials in Denmark and assess information on consumer 
exposure. The first of these projects, mapping nanomaterials in consumer products, was finalized 
in spring 2007. The report identified 243 nano-enhanced articles and products on the Danish 
market. For most products, the report was however unable to verify concentration levels or 
obtain documentation of material properties (Stuer-Lauridsen et al. 2007: 9). The Danish 
Technological Institute meanwhile conducted a survey of industrial production and use of 




59  Interview, Copenhagen, June 1, 2011. 
60  Interview, Copenhagen, June 1, 2011. 
61  In April 2006, the German Federal Institute for Risk Assessment issued an immediate recall of two nano-
enhanced products that allegedly had caused close to one hundred reported health incidents. Paradoxically, 
the agency eventually concluded that MagicNano did not contain any nano-sized particles.  
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industry, current risk management measures and waste disposal practices. A questionnaire was 
circulated among 165 companies, which in different contexts had expressed an interest in 
nanotechnology (Tønning and Poulsen 2007). The two projects were intended to assist MST 
determine levels of exposure, collect information on the manufacture and handling of 
nanomaterials and inform considerations on appropriate regulatory controls.  
With similar projects undertaken in 2011 and 2012 (Mikkelsen et al. 2011; Tønning et al. 2012), 
MST has demonstrated much the same interest in convincing companies to volunteer 
information as authorities in Britain, Germany and the United States. MST however launched 
these initiatives without prior discussion of the need for or design of the surveys. The projects 
were instead commissioned with consultants and industry views were not considered in their 
formulation and implementation. The market survey for example merely screened existing 
product databases, but did not directly engage producers or retailers. Although the survey thus 
did produce a market overview, it generated little additional information. For most products, the 
authors were unable to access information on concentration levels or the chemical identity of the 
nanomaterials in question. Acknowledging that the results likely underestimate the number of 
products in commerce, the report in part attributed the difficulties encounter by the project team 
to the absence of an industry intermediary that could have assisted in identifying and convincing 
companies to divulge product information (Stuer-Lauridsen et al. 2007: 69). As the project team 
discovered, producers and retailers were in fact not exactly forthcoming in sharing information 
about their products and activities. By way of contrast, consider comparable German attempts to 
improve knowledge about the occurrence of nanomaterials in household products.  
Prior to 2006, BfR expressed similar interests in a market survey (BAuA, BfR and UBA 
2006: 6f.). Talks with industry representatives however dissuaded the agency from further 
pursuing this course.62 BfR instead engaged experts from industry and other stakeholder groups 
to identify nanomaterials already used in food, cosmetics, surface coatings and textiles – or likely 
to enter commerce in the near future. Feedback from these discussions in turn helped the agency 
identify sources of exposure, anticipate future development trajectories in food and other 
consumer products, and thus informed its strategies to mitigate potential risks (Zimmer, Hertel 
and Böl 2010a: 25). While the Danish mapping initiatives provided regulators with a market 
overview, they did little to improve their understanding of how the uses of nanomaterials and the 




62  Interview, Berlin, June 22, 2012. 
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survey in 2011, the authors – using the same method – found that the number of nano-enabled 
product had increased by almost 300 percent (Mikkelsen et al. 2011). Contrasting MST’s 2007 
industrial survey with the joint BAuA-VCI survey further illustrates the diverging responses of 
German and Danish companies to appeals for voluntary disclosure. 
Although the two reporting instruments at surface value are comparable, their similarities 
disguise important, if subtle, differences in how regulators have sought to encourage companies 
to volunteer information. With the aim of collecting information on the handling of 
nanomaterials in a workplace setting, BAuA as we saw above engaged the VCI as interlocutor. 
Ongoing dialogue with VCI representatives and accommodation of corporate concerns in turn 
helped BAuA persuade companies to volunteer commercially sensitive information. MST sought 
no such dialogue with Danish business representatives. Although various trade associations were 
contacted in an attempt to identify potential participants (Tønning and Poulsen 2007: 26f.), the 
final list of recipients for the questionnaire were drawn up based on existing registers and inputs 
from university researchers. The questionnaire itself was designed in collaboration with research 
institutions, but without prior consultation of industry. No procedure for anonymity was agreed 
and MST did not explicitly spelled out how and for what purposes information might be used 
(Tønning and Poulsen 2007). MST in short demonstrated little explicit appreciation for potential 
corporate concerns. The agency instead limited the extent and nature of information requested 
from industry.  
Recall that issues of e.g. chemical identity were of major concern to German companies; and 
that the active participation of the VCI and extensive deliberations among representatives from 
BAuA and industry allowed the agency to convince companies to report such information. In 
Denmark, such challenges were avoided – by excluding questions on chemical identity from the 
survey. The Danish survey instead only sought information on the class, not identity of 
nanomaterials used by industry. Although MST thus did gain access to information on 
commercial applications and risk management practices, important knowledge gaps persisted. 
Hence, knowing that specific branches of industry work with nanoparticles is obviously 
important for risk management. Should hazards be discovered for specific nanomaterials, however, 
information about classes of nanomaterials will not suffice to mitigate potential exposures. If for 
example the risks of say nano-silver were deemed sufficient to justify a regulatory response, only 
knowledge about where, how and for what purposes nano-silver is used would allow MST to take 
action to control human and environmental risks. It is of course difficult to say how Danish 
companies would have responded had MST requested information about the identity of their 
materials. Based on UBA’s experience, a qualified guess would however emphasize that since 
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MST did not discuss the need for, design and purpose of an industry survey with manufacturers 
and users, the agency would have found it difficult to persuade companies to divulge sensitive 
information.  
What we can say with relative confidence, though, is that the results of the survey were not 
picked up by Danish industry: because MST neglected to – or could not – secure the active 
support of industry representatives in the implementation of the reporting exercise, there was no 
interlocutor to act on the results as the basis for formulating guidance documents. Although the 
Industrial Occupational Health Committee, I-Bar, published such guidance in 2011 – 
independent of the survey – Danish companies meanwhile had to look to the authorities to 
clarify the extent of their regulatory responsibilities. MST has however prioritized measures to 
map the existence and application of nanomaterials over attempts to formulate guidance 
documents. The Danish Working Environment Authority, Arbejdstilsynet, likewise did not issue 
statements on nanomaterials until May 2013. The industrial survey in short did little to establish 
or explain the industry standard of care – nor for that matter assist companies working with 
nanomaterials minimize potential risks to their workers.  
Dialogue and collaboration with industrial stakeholder helped convince BAuA that no further 
reporting measures were required. MST drew different lessons. Although initially satisfied with 
what the agency learned from its various surveys and mapping initiatives, the story of data 
sharing in Denmark does not end here. Instead and much to the dismay of industry, the 2012 
national budget saw the conclusion of a narrow political agreement on a mandatory nanoproduct 
register. Passed as an amendment to the Danish Chemicals Act in March 2013, manufacturers 
and importers will from 2014 be required to register their products and available information 
with MST. The experience with voluntary reporting in Denmark thus led MST to draw 
conclusions that parallel those of U.S. EPA and UBA. Despite initial interests in voluntary 
reporting, meager results and scant industry participation ultimately convinced the agency that 
mandatory requirements were necessary. Where the experience of regulators in Denmark does 
diverge from their colleagues in the United States and Germany is however that MST’s limited 
capacity to persuade industry to divulge information convinced the agency’s political principals 
that a new legal mandate was required. For Danish companies, the outcome of the policy process 
was thus – for the time being – an unhappy one.  
Regulatory Relationship in Denmark 
The Danish nanotech story is in comparative perspective at once familiar and distinct: familiar in 
the policies and priorities of its government; but distinct by the acquiescent and subdued 
response of industry. State authorities have allocated considerable resources to address 
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uncertainties about the ecological behavior and toxicological properties of nanomaterials; and in 
support of these activities, governmental agencies have urged cooperation among all relevant 
stakeholders. With the exception of a political agreement to introduce a mandatory nanoregister, 
governmental strategies and initiatives in short mirror public responses in other countries. Where 
the Danish nanotech experience does stand out is however in the role and response of industry 
to the invitation for dialogue and cooperation. The policy process has witnessed little industry 
mobilization to influence the direction of Danish nanotech policy. Decisions on priorities, 
strategies and initiatives have in consequence been the rather exclusive domain of state 
authorities and their contacts among governmental experts and university researchers. The 
Danish policy process is thus characterized by ad hoc engagements, informal, but irregular 
contacts and arm’s length relations among regulators and companies. While information has been 
exchanged among stakeholders in Denmark, this exchange is better characterized as a monologue 
than a dialogue. State authorities have communicated their preferences, agendas and initiatives to 
industry. Companies have sought this information to clarify the extent of the responsibilities and 
anticipate future developments; but they have voiced few demands and offered little input in 
return. Because industry has played no discernible role in the policy process, with regulators 
instead relying on their own in-house capabilities and external consultants to inform risk 
management decisions, companies have in short left little mark on Danish nanotech policies.  
Despite a preference for informal contacts, relations among state authorities and industry have 
thus remained detached and arm’s length. The Danish nanotech story is however not one of 
antagonism, conflict or even deep-seated distrust of state authorities. Chemical safety policy in 
Denmark is governed by consensus and consultation of affected interests. Observes a MST 
official: 
“We do of course talk to one another. We consult the full range of views – the trade associations, the 
unions, the environmental groups, the consumer organizations. Since we have this Kemikaliedag [the 
stakeholder event] as a recurring and common event, we find it easier to interact and communicate. It 
helps build trust and we are I think therefore able to discuss things in an altogether more fruitful way.”63 
(My translation) 
Concurs an industry representative: “We are of course aware that we have different backgrounds 
and different interests, but we also share a reasonable level of respect for the professionalism of 
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together with everything that entails.”78 While relations among stakeholders in the Danish 
chemicals sector thus resemble the situation in Germany – with the nanotech debate undertaken 
by a small group of ‘usual suspects’79 – the nature of their exchanges nonetheless differ. A MST 
official sums up the situation: “The business associations have not voiced major views on nano – 
so perhaps they are simply satisfied with our [approach].” (My translation)  
CONCLUSION 
Upon assuming the regulatory challenge of nanotech, governments in America and Europe 
confronted a number of immediate and intricate problems arising from the uncertain and ill-
understood nature of the technology. Guided by what can best be described by an ambition of 
‘getting it right’, authorities in Britain, Denmark, Germany and the United States embarked on a 
regulatory path intended to ensure the safe and responsible development of nanotechnologies. 
The scope of their regulatory initiatives, investments and policies are nuanced only by slight 
differences, and it is thus the commonalities of government responses which stand out from the 
analysis. But while the political reactions to the uncertain risks of nanomaterials are largely 
comparable, industry responses differ remarkably: whereas UK and German companies have 
pursued a course of close, informal collaboration with governmental officials, their U.S. and 
Danish competitors have in contrast been reluctant to cooperate with regulators; relations among 
regulatory authorities and industry in the United States and Denmark have instead remained 
detached and arm’s length. Table 3.1 presents a tabular overview of governmental risk 
management strategies in the four countries, the role of companies and their representatives in 
policy process, and the character of relations among state authorities and industry. As is evident 
from the preceding analysis, companies in these four countries have displayed manifest and 
systematic variation in their inclination to volunteer information to state authorities. Why the 
reactions of U.S. and UK companies differed is the subject of the next chapter, while chapter five 





78  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 




Alternative Routes to Influence: The Politics of 
Nanotech Regulation in Britain and the United States 
 
 
Conventional wisdom would lead us to expect that industries in liberal market economies should 
react alike to similar state policies. Confronted with comparable governmental preferences and 
strategies, U.S. and UK companies have nonetheless responded remarkably different: dissociation 
from regulatory decision-makers in the United States and close, informal cooperation with 
government officials in Britain. The different reactions of American and British companies are in 
short puzzling and invite a closer inspection of the institutional drivers of business strategies in 
the two countries. I contend that the varied responses of UK and U.S. companies result from 
variations in how their political systems concentrate or diffuse regulatory power and authority. 
Disengagement from regulators in the United States and cooperation in Britain are in turn 
business responses that grow from the distinct opportunities for influencing regulatory decisions 
and policies on either side of the Atlantic. 
In areas of high scientific and technical uncertainty, such as nanotechnologies, new 
information can exercise significant influence on regulatory agendas, priorities and policies. This 
can work in industry’s favor, if disclosing information succeeds in convincing state bureaucrats to 
make decisions that benefits industry. But disclosure is also a dangerous course for industry: 
while regulators certainly appreciate information volunteered by industry, they may value the 
information differently than originally anticipated. Companies will therefore only volunteer 
information to state bureaucrats if they are confident that it will not be used to the detriment of 
their interests. Companies use their understanding of how formal institutions and their operating 
procedures structure regulatory action to anticipate the probable responses of state authorities; 
and how withholding or disclosing information might serve to guide the direction of regulatory 
politics. Whether companies will decide to disclose, bias or conceal information depends in short 
on the expected behavior of their regulatory adversaries and the nature of their commitments.  
The varieties of capitalism literature suggests that the credibility of governmental 
commitments is systematically linked to their policy-making powers. Whereas dispersion of 
An Uncertain Business 
100 
decision-making authority promotes the stability and hence predictability of government policy, 
concentration of state powers in the political executive breads uncertainty and undercuts the 
credibility of governmental commitments (Hall and Soskice 2001: 48; Wood 2001: 259). In 
contrast to this view, I argue that concentration of regulatory authority in state bureaucracies can 
create the critical impetus for cooperation. Independent state authorities are not easily swayed by 
changing political and economic conditions, but focus instead on achieving their statutory 
objectives. Limits on political interference or judicial scrutiny may therefore convince 
manufacturers that a commitment to pursue a set of stable and predictable policies is credible. 
Since information and expertise is the most relevant currency in convincing state bureaucrats, 
concentration of regulatory powers can create potent incentives for companies to divulge 
information, if this can be exchanged for influence over administrative decisions and policies. 
Fragmentation of regulatory powers in contrast undermines the credibility of bureaucratic 
commitments. Litigation or political intervention motivated by appeals from competing interests 
can compel state bureaucrats to sudden reversals in policy. Uncertainty regarding the future 
behavior of state bureaucrats reduces the value of cooperation as benefits are either doubtful or 
unknown. But diffusion of regulatory powers also creates alternative routes for companies to 
influence regulatory outcomes by convincing other state actors to intervene on their behalf. As 
the possibilities to obstruct regulatory decisions proliferate, the incentives to divulge information 
to the agencies responsible for regulating their conduct decline. 
In pursuing this argument, the chapter falls in three parts. A first section presents the 
backdrop for nanotech regulation in Britain and the United States by introducing their respective 
chemical control regimes. In sections two and three, I connect the different responses of 
American and British companies to the distribution of regulatory powers in their political 
systems. I demonstrate how the autonomy of administrative authorities to pursue regulatory 
policies, insulated from pressures originating from other branches of government, determines 
their capacity to commit to predictable outcomes; and how the distinct nature of bureaucratic 
commitments in the two countries weighs on business incentives to volunteer information to 
state authorities. A final section concludes. 
ORGANIZING FOR CHEMICAL SAFETY IN AMERICA AND BRITAIN 
In the United States, the control of chemical hazards is primarily the responsibility of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Under the Occupational Health and Safety Act, OSHA is responsible for defining and enforcing 
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exposure limits and protective standards. The act authorizes OSHA to promulgate specific 
requirements for risk assessment, medical management, and other aspects of chemical safety at 
work. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) empowers EPA to regulate new and existing 
chemicals, and authorizes the agency to mandate development of safety data for substances that 
in the view of the agency may present an unreasonable risk to human health and the 
environment. Both statutes were enacted in response to the environmental consciousness of the 
1970s, when Congress greatly expanded agency authority to intervene in the affairs of the 
chemical industry. Congress at the same time however also sought to circumscribe the broad 
delegation of powers through systematic checks on the use of administrative discretion. Both the 
OSHAct and TSCA are thus heavily freighted with procedural requirements and they define the 
obligations of federal officials much more precisely than do comparable British statutes. 
British chemical safety policy is largely in the hands of the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs and the Health and Safety Executive. The 1990 Environmental 
Protection Act contains powers to prohibit or restrict import, use or storage of substances. The 
1974 Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act defines the duties of manufacturers to notify, test and, 
if necessary, label substances used in a workplace setting. The act enables a broad control regime 
implemented through statutory instruments, which in the years since 1974 has generated an 
extensive system of specific provisions for various industries, disciplines and risks. From 2008, 
earlier statutory instruments are progressively being repelled by the European Union Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) Regulation. While British 
chemical control laws do endow regulatory agencies with more or less specific powers, they rarely 
stipulate the conditions under which government must act or the procedures it must follow. Both 
acts thus reflect a penchant for broad enabling legislation that confers open-ended regulatory 
authority on governmental departments (Vogel 1986: 177).  
The chemical industry has a long and successful history in Britain. One of the most 
prosperous sectors of the postwar British economy, chemical companies recorded steady growth 
in production, stable employment, trade surpluses, and healthy profit margins. This unusual 
success won industry many friends in Whitehall and relations between governmental departments 
and the chemical industry have traditionally been intimate. In the past, the UK Chemical 
Industries Association (CIA) occupied a central position in the British chemicals sector. 
Representatives from leading companies and the CIA maintained strong ties with officials at the 
Department of Trade and Industry, the HSE, and the Department of the Environment 
(Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985: 226f.). Although never quite as influential and powerful as 
the German Chemical Industry Association, VCI, the CIA nonetheless exhibited similar features, 
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acting as the peak organization for the British chemical and allied industries. Many smaller 
sectoral associations representing chemical users and specialty producers originated or were in 
some way affiliated to it. Over the past three decades, interest representation in the British 
chemical sector has however given way to greater fragmentation, with several smaller associations 
now vying for influence. While the CIA remains important, not least because it is the only group 
trying to cover the entire sector (Grote and Schneider 2006: 132f.), it has nonetheless largely 
fallen to other, younger organizations, such as the Nanotechnology Industries Association, to 
represent the interests of UK nanobusinesses.  
Reflecting the economic diversity of the American chemical industry, the associational 
landscape in the U.S. chemical sector is vastly more complex and divided. Large numbers of 
specialized, partly overlapping trade associations compete for influence in Washington and in the 
state capitals, with little in way of an overall structure for concerted action. Owing to the 
competitive context, the U.S. chemical industry has tended to behave less consistently and 
predictably than its European counterparts: major regulatory issues have time and again found 
industry acting essentially as a multitude of competing and uncoordinated companies. Under 
these circumstances, the best industry can achieve is frequently loose, temporary alliances, 
plagued by internal friction (Badaracco 1985). Smaller companies, in effect represented by the 
Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA), have been among the most ardent 
critics of governmental intervention in the affairs of the chemical industry. The American 
Chemistry Council (ACC), the largest U.S. chemical trade association, has seen a steady increase 
in influence, since the regulatory debates of the 1970s. As the representative of many firms with 
varying interests and styles, ACC has however often been unable to find a position that 
represents its membership as a whole. At these times, individual firms have preferred to plead 
their own case in Washington. While both ACC and SOCMA have established affiliates to 
represent the nanotechnology interests of their members, independent trade associations, such as 
the NanoBusiness Alliance has also sprung up, adding to the cacophony of voices claiming to 
speak for the interests of American nanobusinesses. 
PLAYING THE DELAY GAME: BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN AMERICA 
The political strategies of American businesses grow from the realities of a complex decision-
making environment. Congress, the president, the executive agencies, and the courts all have 
separate and distinct roles in relation to chemical control policy. While U.S. chemical safety laws 
confer broad powers of intervention on the executive agencies, systematic checks imposed by 
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Congress significantly constrain their de facto authority. Relations between Congress and the 
administrative agencies, not complacent in the best of circumstances, are exceptionally 
demanding and competitive in matters of chemical control (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985). 
These tensions are reflected in frequent and often disruptive use of congressional oversight and 
reauthorization powers. Congress routinely interferes in administrative decision-making either by 
withholding funds or by issuing reports that tell agencies precisely what to do. Although these 
reports are not legally binding, an agency jeopardizes its relations with Congress if their 
instructions are ignored. Powerful members of Congress in consequence can and do wield 
considerable influence over regulatory outcomes.  
Apart from the watchful eye of Congress, regulators must contend with an extremely active 
judiciary. Liberal standing rules, coupled with elaborate legal definitions of agency responsibilities, 
have generated a multitude of lawsuits that keep American administrators continually on the 
defensive. As a result, the courts enjoy an unparalleled opportunity to second-guess 
administrative decisions. Taking their cue from Congress, the courts have adopted an adversarial 
posture towards the executive agencies. Judicial scrutiny has time and again forced administrators 
to revise their plans, regulations, practices and decisions (Kagan 2007: 102f.). Since statutory 
mandates finally are sufficiently flexible to permit systematic downgrading of considerations seen 
as extraneous to agency goals, it has fallen to the White House to guarantee consistency across 
the executive branch. Centralized review of agency actions by the Executive Office of the 
President reflects a long-standing preoccupation with regaining control over the regulatory 
process to ensure that the executive bureaucracy follow presidential policies and priorities 
(Percival 1991; Steinzor 2012). Mandatory economic analysis, performed under the critical 
supervision of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), adds another layer of procedure to 
the rule-making process and fosters competitive relations within the executive branch.  
The dispersion of power in the American regulatory system breeds robust competition within 
and between each branch of government and their overlapping jurisdictions undercut the 
authority of each. As Stephen Krasner (1978: 20) notes: “In the American political system 
negative power prevails: one actor can block the initiatives of another but cannot carry through 
its own preferences.” While responsibility for nanomaterials thus has fallen squarely within the 
statutory ambit of the executive agencies, attention has not been confined to the domain of 
administrative decision-making. In the decade since the inception of the NNI, both House and 
Senate committees have convened various hearings on the human health and environmental 
implications of nanotechnologies. Both the coordination and funding activities of the NNI 
agencies have been targeted for congressional scrutiny, with the Government Accountability 
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Office – an independent investigative arm of Congress – launching reviews to assess EPA’s 
efforts to understand and regulate the risks of nanomaterials (GAO 2008; 2010; 2012).  
Separation of powers in turn provides organized interests with multiple points of access. 
Groups unable to work out an accommodation with a particular department or agency have 
numerous other political mechanisms at their disposal: they can turn to Congress, the courts, or 
the White House (Vogel 1986: 279). Since access is easily available at all levels, private interests 
distribute their attention correspondingly. Tailoring their actions to the adversarial format of rule-
making, they maintain a combative and competitive stance against each other as well as against 
public officials. Gaining and maintaining influence in the open, complex and adversarial 
American system thus place fundamentally different demands on U.S. companies than their UK 
competitors. Because administrative decisions and policies can be challenged, revised or 
overturned at other stages of the regulatory process, companies face few incentives to seek 
collaborative settlements with the agencies responsible for regulating their conduct. Even if 
manufacturers could work out an accommodation on say nano-silver regulation, other groups can 
obstruct its implementation by appealing to Congress or filling court challenges. Environmental 
groups indeed appear increasingly bent on pursuing such strategies: both FDA and EPA have 
been dragged before federal courts to compel speedier and more stringent statutory action on 
nanomaterials. The complexities of the American decision-making environment hence give 
companies little reason to believe that administrators will be able to uphold their end of a 
cooperative arrangement. Fragmentation of regulatory powers, combined with the open decision-
making process, in short renders administrative commitments ambiguous. 
But the permeability of the American regulatory system cuts both ways. Just as their 
adversaries, American companies use the multiple channels of access to influence the direction of 
regulatory policy. The upshot of a policy process structured to facilitate broad participation in the 
formulation, implementation, and litigation of policy is that companies rarely need to look to the 
executive agencies to see their interests satisfied. Recourse to Congress, the courts and the White 
House affords companies alternative routes of influence – opportunities, which often translates 
into a de facto veto over regulatory action. Dispersion of political authority therefore detracts from 
the value of maintaining relationships with regulators on congenial terms. One observer 
concluded: “It is too easy to bring court suits and legal case against the government, against 
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that persistent challenge and loud protest can make a difference instead encourages companies to 
embrace a strategy of active resistance in regulatory affairs. A less aggressive posture would 
permit competing interests to seize the initiative and make unfavorable swings in policy more 
likely (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985: 247). The ensuing struggle for control cast opposing 
interests as adversaries and put a premium on their knowledge and expertise. 
The adversarial nature of business-government relations in the American context has long 
intrigued political observers. Agency-industry relations on issues of human health and 
environmental safety are variously described as conflict-ridden or acrimonious, if not outright 
hostile. An observer remarked: “The culture in the United States is a longstanding one of 
antagonism between the industry and the government at least on these kinds of issues [and this] 
antagonistic, legalistic and combative relationship […] is an impediment to constructive 
cooperation.”2 ‘Political culture’, ‘ideology’ or ‘American exceptionalism’ may in part be to blame; 
but neither presents us with persuasive answers to why American companies have been reluctant 
to embrace the strategies of their UK competitors. The Federal Government’s invitation for 
dialogue and cooperation did present companies with opportunities to directly influence 
regulatory decision-making and shape federal research priorities to suit their commercial needs; 
yet, while presented with ostensibly similar prospects of shaping regulatory policies, American 
companies have displayed manifest discomfort in cooperating with the federal regulators. Rather 
than revert to stereotypes concerning American business ideology, we must instead consider how 
decisions to disclose, bias or withhold information may advance or impair the interests of U.S. 
companies.  
Fragmentation of authority and the adversarial system of regulation is as David Vogel 
(1986: 286) notes the political analogue to the highly competitive relationships that exists within 
the American business community. For U.S. companies, survival in the marketplace therefore not 
only depend on their ability to protect proprietary information from the prying eyes of 
competitors; equally, if not more important, is the need to limit information about their 
operations in the course of regulatory proceedings. The dispersion of regulatory powers 
encourages and rewards a series of tactics designed to protract, deflect and obstruct regulatory 
action. Because the proficiency of these ‘delay’ tactics ultimately depends on the careful 
management of information, nondisclosure remains a prudent business response. Cooperation 
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bureaucratic commitments, but because it can be construed as tacit admission of the validity of 
opposing views (Badaracco 1985: 129) and in many cases will make regulation more likely. 
Explaining the course of nondisclosure observed in chapter three in short invites a look at how 
the diffusion of regulatory powers in the American political system allows companies to guide the 
direction of regulatory policy by withholding or biasing information; and importantly how 
information disclosure undermines the ability to minimize regulatory interference. 
The fragmentation of political authority leaves U.S. administrators in a peculiarly vulnerable 
position. Elected politicians and judges each guard their institutional prerogatives with caution 
and even jealousy (Carpenter 2001: 17). Statutory mandates must be implemented under the 
critical eye of other governmental institutions, and in full view of warring private interests, each 
advancing interpretations of law, science and economics consistent with their narrow objectives. 
While in principle endowed with broad powers of intervention, the de facto authority and 
autonomy of regulators is minimal. Congress is a fickle mistress, quick to defund and even 
quicker to blame the bureaucracy when a lack of resources undermines its capacity to prevent 
regulatory failures. The ambiguous delegation of power in U.S. chemical control legislation 
reflects a long-standing congressional preference for constraining administrative discretion 
through complex rule-making procedures, economic analysis requirements, implementation 
deadlines, and expanded judicial review. U.S. toxic substance laws in effect place the entire 
burden of data collection and risk assessment on agencies without the budgetary means to carry 
out their mandates. Although not technically required to engage in active information production 
and research, in reality neither OSHA nor EPA can intervene against suspect products and 
practices in the absence of such information. In consequence, companies, “who want to 
minimize regulatory intervention have little incentive to produce information showing that their 
products or activities are safe. Instead, they are best advised to maintain a status quo of 
ignorance.” (Wagner 2004: 1680f.) 
While TSCA for example directs EPA to regulate new and existing chemicals, no substance 
needs to be tested unless there is some evidence that it presents a potential risk; yet, this 
provision creates a ‘Catch 22’ for the agency:  
“Before the EPA can ask the producer to provide data to help in risk assessment of a chemical, the 
agency needs to show that the chemical presents an unreasonable risk to human health or the 
environment. EPA thus needs toxicity and exposure data that producers are not obligated to provide 
unless the EPA can first show that a risk exists!” (Choi, Ramachandran and Kandlikar 2009: 3030) 
Although the ‘unreasonable risk’ standard adopted under TSCA and other federal statutes does 
not demand definitive proof of harm, it does require that an agency has some evidence that a 
substance presents a risk before it can impose testing requirements, warnings or use restrictions. 
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Manufacturers have time and again employed this loophole to challenge any new test 
requirements by arguing that EPA has insufficient evidence to demonstrate a risk of harm 
sufficient to justify testing (Applegate 1991). As a result, twenty two years after TSCA was 
enacted, EPA had tested only 263 high-priority chemicals for some specific effect, or 0.4 percent 
of the approximately 70,000 in commercial use in 1979 (Collins 2010: 117). While EPA spends 
millions of dollars each year on research related to toxic chemicals, its testing program for 
specific substances is relatively small. The agency instead relies heavily on information voluntarily 
submitted by industry when drafting proposed regulations. Because any adverse information in 
turn can be employed to justify stricter standards, volunteering existing data or undertaking joint 
safety research to enable risk management methods constitutes a risky proposition. Companies, 
of course, can avoid this entire scenario simply by “minimizing the amount or credibility of any 
existing information which indicates toxicity.” (Lyndon 1989: 1820)  
Elaborate statutory requirements and congressional oversight on the other hand leave little 
administrative discretion for deciding the course of enforcement. TSCA for instance mandates 
that EPA screen all chemical substances to ensure that they present no human health and 
environmental hazards. Where evidence of risk exists, EPA has little room to waiver a regulatory 
response. Companies disclosing information about their operations are therefore more likely to 
be greeted with fines and increased restrictions than with regulatory rewards and letters of 
commendation (Wagner 2004: 1625). With such irresistible reasons to resist producing 
information, it is no surprise that companies not only tend to shy away from cooperation, but 
actively seek legal protections in exchange for disclosing information, hence industry’s – 
unsuccessful – push for incorporation of liability waivers under the NMSP. Most federal statutes 
thus forcefully discourage actions, which could facilitate regulators’ access to information 
relevant to hazard or exposure assessment. An EPA official elaborated:  
“industry has a lot of data laying around, showing that certain chemicals don’t have any effects. Now, they 
are not required by law to submit that to us and then go on their merry way. But they are not submitting 
that to us. […] You would think that if you were an industry and you had data that said this chemical is 
okay you would make sure the whole damn world knew. But that is not happening. So if they are not 
sharing good information… what [else] are they not sharing?”3  
Critics maintain that U.S. toxic substances laws perpetuate perverse incentives for companies to 
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industry, in any case, faces high stakes in controlling adverse information and to release it only 
slowly (Rudd 2008: 235).  
The considerations commanding corporate dealings with the agencies are further buttressed 
by judicial doctrines. In remanding OSHA’s benzene standard,4 the U.S. Supreme Court 
inadvertently created incentives for companies to employ information as an offensive weapon. 
Searching review has forced administrators towards greater formality and rigor in building the 
evidence to support their decisions. Every comment that raises a credible-sounding issue – even a 
peripheral one – must receive a complete and detailed response. Submitting volumes of highly 
specific, very detailed, extensively documented comments on every conceivable point of 
contention, backed by the threat of litigation, permit companies to bury ‘incriminating’ 
information in a mountain of ‘irrelevant’ material with the effect of slowing down the rule-
making process to a virtual standstill (Sass and Rosenberg 2011). A continuous barrage of letters, 
meetings, follow-up memoranda, formal and post-rule comments, petitions for reconsideration, 
and notices of appeal over the life cycle of a rule-making can wear down an already overstretched 
agency. It is thus not uncommon for the rule-making record of a single control standard to run 
into hundreds of pages of dense technical discussions. Overloading the rule-making process rests 
on the ability to make only ‘carefully selected facts’ available, withholding others, and if delay is 
useful flooding an agency with more information than it can absorb (Wagner 2010: 1400) – 
neither of which is conducive to candid discussions about potential sources of and solutions to 
hazards and exposure, which might assist agency officials filter through scores of irrelevant 
material.  
Information excess then can be a conscious strategy deployed to exhaust federal agencies, 
browbeating them into capitulating on their demands by reinforcing each technical complaint and 
criticism with a threat of litigation (Wagner 2010: 1339). Judicial challenge of agency decisions in 
turn offers generous opportunities to sway the tide of regulatory action as illustrated by EPA’s 
botched attempt to ban asbestos. A known carcinogen, 60 countries worldwide have banned the 
use of asbestos. Each year, ten thousand people die from asbestos-related diseases in the United 




4  In 1980, the Supreme Court invalidated OSHA’s updated standard regulating benzene, a carcinogenic 
component of petroleum, on the grounds that OSHA had failed to make quantitative estimates of the 
benefits of the standard and weigh them against the costs to see if the balance was ‘unreasonable’. The 
Benzene decision created ambiguity as to how extensive OSHA needs to be in its risk analyses, forcing the 
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avoid the outcome reached in Benzene. 
Alternative Routes to Influence 
109 
research, public meetings and regulatory impact analyses, EPA issued a final rule to prohibit the 
future manufacture, import, processing and distribution of asbestos in almost all products. The 
asbestos industry responded promptly by filling suit against EPA, arguing that the rule was not 
promulgated on the basis of unreasonable risks. In October 1991, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit found in favor of the claimants, concluding that EPA had failed to muster 
substantial evidence to justify its asbestos ban (Collins 2010: 118f.).5  
Despite overwhelming evidence that it is deadly, EPA has never succeeded in promulgating a 
ban on asbestos. Nor has EPA prohibited a single substance under TSCA since. But how is a 
substance, which globally has caused the premature deaths of thousands, if not millions, relevant 
to nanomaterials, which have yet – decisively – to be linked to a single health incident? Asbestos 
is in many ways the perfect illustration of the stakes for U.S. companies. EPA’s inability to amass 
the scientific evidence to effectuate a ban on asbestos demonstrates the potency of court 
challenges as a tactic to obstruct regulatory intervention. What the asbestos and other industries 
learned from this experience was that mounting a successful court challenge hinges upon the 
ability to discredit and contest the scientific results underlying agencies’ rule-making. Corporate 
lawyers have since become adept at employing litigation tactics designed to refute, contest and 
ultimately thwart regulatory action. A proficient trial lawyer will proceed from denying that a 
product or substance is harmful over insisting that expose is either negligible or those 
extrapolations from laboratory settings are unrealistic to blame avoidance citing improper use or 
ignorance.  
Since the only reliable source of information on exposure and possible harms is often the very 
same companies, which stand to benefit from a successful challenge, lifting the burden of proof 
presents a herculean task for under-staffed and under-resourced agencies. Volunteering 
information to regulators may in contrast be tantamount to providing the leverage needed to 
justify greater regulatory interference. Consider the implications of a joint safety study: while 
collaborative research could help legitimize claims of safety, government inputs or funding will 
be accompanied by demands for influence on the design and conduct of the study as well as how 
it is reported. Corporate sponsors could therefore wind up in the unfortunate situation of 
funding a study that is not in their best interests. Companies inclined to underwrite a joint study 




5  In its ruling, the court concluded that EPA did not present sufficient evidence to justify the ban on asbestos. 
Specifically, the court found that because EPA had not considered all necessary evidence, the agency had 
failed to show that the control action it chose was the least burdensome regulation required to adequately 
protect human health or the environment (GAO 2005: 28f.). 
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Should those results form the basis for a subsequent rule-making, corporate sponsors would in 
effect have renounced one of their most potent means of influencing regulatory outcomes 
(Monica and Monica 2009: 401). While no challenge has been filled to date, corporate lawyers 
have indeed been sharpening their litigation defenses. In response to the highly publicized 
‘Poland study’ (Poland et al. 2008), purporting to demonstrate health concerns for carbon 
nanotubes, trail lawyers have for example criticized the findings based on issues ranging from 
reliability, design and execution over underlying assumptions to the specific strain of mice 
employed in the study (Monica and Monica 2008). In this context, it is not difficult to imagine 
the likely response should EPA or OSHA decide to take strict action on CNTs. 
Centralized White House review finally creates opportunities for industry to protract and 
obstruct agency rule-making through the backdoor. The Office of Management and Budget 
oversees the regulatory activities of all federal agencies to ensure that presidential policies are 
followed and that economic analysis is undertaken to inform regulatory policy. The heart of the 
presidential review program, as administered by OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), is the power to return a draft rule to an agency for further consideration. 
Because agencies must refrain from publishing rules until they have cleared White House review, 
OIRA can de facto block any regulation it finds objectionable for an indefinite period of time 
(Olson 1984; Steinzor, Patoka and Goodwin 2011). While relatively unknown, OIRA serves as an 
extraordinarily powerful gatekeeper for regulatory proposals to enter the outside world (GAO 
2003; Steinzor 2012). EPA’s rule-making record in the wake of the NMSP disappointment 
illustrates. 
Skeptical of further voluntary initiatives, EPA began to look for ways of using its existing 
authority under TSCA. On 22 November 2010, EPA submitted a proposed Section 8(a) 
reporting rule for OMB review. OIRA is required to complete its review within 90 days of an 
agency submitting a draft regulation. This period can be extended by 30 days once, for a total of 
120 days. At the time of writing – some 900 days later – EPA’s proposed rule is still awaiting 
OMB approval.6 An EPA official explained: 
“There is definitely a political football here. […] Currently, the way our government is operating, there is a 
big enough group in government that doesn’t want to see those rules out. The Office of Management and 
Budget has to consider everybody’s comments. They are not just going do whatever EPA wants. So there 
are enough people who are saying there is a problem with these rules. It could just be OMB itself is saying 
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is that OMB is supposed to review them for a certain amount of time and say ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Well, OMB 
won’t say no, we will not withdraw the rules, so I don’t know where you go from there, when you have 
that stalemate. This Office of Management and Budget does not seem willing to say no to rules and I 
think that is because they may have somebody in their office but also people in the White House with 
different views.”7  
An observer added: “[The rule] is being held up because the chemical manufacturers, whose 
products would be subject to review by that, are holding it up – because they don’t like it.”8 The 
proposed rule would require manufacturers to notify EPA of intended uses, production volumes, 
and methods of manufacture and processing as well as available exposure, release and toxicity 
information. According to EPA, reporting of these activities would provide needed information 
to consider appropriate action under TSCA.9 Little wonder then if manufacturers ‘not inclined to 
voluntarily test their nanoscale materials’ (EPA 2009b: 27) might find relief in seeing a mandatory 
requirement gummed up at the OMB.  
In its 30 years of existence, OIRA has earned a reputation as a business-friendly forum – a 
court of last resort for companies that fail to convince agency experts to weaken pending 
regulations (Livermore and Revesz 2013: 156-161; Bagley and Revesz 2006: 1265). Correct or 
not, economic analysis as practiced by OIRA does hold certain promises for industries looking to 
minimize regulatory interference. Because OIRA is tasked with ensuring that the benefits of 
regulations justify their costs, the information most likely to influence OIRA decision-makers 
would address the estimated costs and benefits of regulation, preferably in economic terms. 
Bracketing the inherent difficulties involved in monetizing the social value of a cleaner 
environment, much of the information needed to quantify costs lies exclusively within the 
particular knowledge of industry. Since the only reliable source of data needed to prepare cost 
estimates is often the very same companies, which stand to benefit from delay or inaction, they 
consequently face strong incentives to inflate such estimates. Critics maintain that within the 
formal cost-benefit framework, numbers that are biased, speculative, or even arbitrary are 
preferable to no numbers at all (Driesen 2006; Steinzor, Patoka and Goodwin 2011: 62). 
Influence in the OMB process then not only depends on the ability to alert OIRA – and 
indirectly the White House – to the political stakes involved; equally valuable is the leverage 
afforded over OIRA decision-making purchased by supplying inflated estimates of technology 
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information to regulatory authorities: disclosure would serve nothing but undermine industry’s 
informational advantage and allow other groups to dispute inflated cost estimates by facilitating 
access to ‘inside information’ about an industry’s operating costs. Worse still, volunteering 
information would assist regulators defend their rules and resists OMB arm-twisting (Olson 1984; 
Wagner 2004). Just as in their direct dealings with the agencies, withholding and biasing 
information in the OMB procedure thus present temptations which cannot easily be set aside. 
Whether working through backchannels at the OMB, lobbying members of Congress, 
testifying at hearings or aggressively pursuing court challenges, American companies in short 
rarely see their interests served by volunteering information to regulatory authorities. On the 
contrary, companies disclosing information about products or activities seldom find their good 
faith rewarded. Fragmentation of political authority and the open policy process imply that 
companies trust administrative commitments to the detriment of their interests. Reflecting on the 
issue of testing, an observer noted:  
“[Companies] don’t know how the public or EPA is going to respond, if they test their materials. They 
don’t know if this test or that test is going to be considered valid. […] It could cost somewhere between a 
couple of million and up to ten million dollars to run a chemical all the way through the tests […] and if 
EPA is going to say: ‘No, we haven’t decided whether they will work for nanomaterials or not’, then it 
only hurts you if no one else has to do it.”10 
The other side of the coin is of course that American companies do not need the federal 
agencies to realize their interest. Recourse to Congress, the courts and the White House affords 
companies generous alternative routes of influence – and rewards a series of tactics designed to 
protract, deflect and obstruct regulatory action: these include submitting volumes of data or 
public comments to challenge or discredit studies showing evidence of harm; using Congress to 
delay agency assessments via letters or budget riders; or clogging up the OMB review process 
through inflated cost estimates (Sass and Rosenberg 2011). The delay which can be purchased by 
litigation alone is often sufficient to undertake measures to reduce or eliminate the costs of an 
eventual adverse decision. While nondisclosure does not guarantee inaction, uncertainty and a 
lack of knowledge certainly act to delay a regulatory response. The very length of the regulatory 
debate favors industry, endowed as it is with superior organization and resources. Success in the 
open and adversarial American setting thus requires the marshalling of scientific and economic 
evidence and constant vigilance from one end of the policy process to the other. The adversarial 
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possible, if necessary with the scientific evidence to buttress their views. A less aggressive stance 
– whether during lawsuits, congressional or administrative hearings – could be construed as tacit 
admission of the validity of opposing views and hence increase the risk of regulatory 
interferences. Given the ambiguity of bureaucratic commitments and because the efficacy of their 
delay tactics depends on the careful management of information, nondisclosure remains a 
sensible business response.  
Strongly compelled to resist disclosure, U.S. companies have as we saw in chapter three 
nonetheless in isolated instances chosen to cooperate with federal agencies, e.g. through the 
NIOSH voluntary program or the NanoRelease project. Corporate decision-makers are unlikely 
to mistake their interests. So how can we account for these examples of government-industry 
collaboration? Again, exploring the risk-benefit calculations of participating companies yields a 
plausible explanation: in all instances, cooperation involved undeniable benefits for participants; 
crucially, however, cooperation entailed only marginal regulatory liabilities. Interest in 
collaborating with NIOSH can thus in part be attributed to the tangible benefits provided to 
industrial partners. Data collected by the field team was used to inform NIOSH’s occupational 
health and safety guidance documents (NIOSH 2005; 2009), thus allowing companies to learn 
from the practices of their competitors. An observer explained: “the courts and the states have 
tended to adopt the NIOSH standards, so that they become in effect regulatory. They become 
binding. So to the extent that there is regulation of occupational safety and health issues in 
general and nano in particular it is coming from NIOSH, not from OSHA.”11 Partnering with 
NIOSH in short presented opportunities for industry to shape the future worker protection 
regime. The interest in the voluntary program thus demonstrates that U.S. companies like their 
UK competitors readily seek direct influence, even if it entails cooperating with federal agencies. 
Here recognizing NIOSH’s statutory mandate is important. NIOSH is as define by the 
OSHAct, OSHA’s principle source of expertise. As NIOSH learns about industry practices, 
should companies not fear that OSHA would respond with new occupational health and safety 
standards? Hardly! A series of court rulings and congressional interventions have forced OSHA 
into a state of near-paralysis (Michaels 2008): since 2001, OSHA has issued only four new rules – 
all narrow in scope and uncontroversial to industry – and the agency has regulated only two 
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past proven to be a significant impediment to funneling the agency’s recommendations into the 
regulatory process (Jasanoff 1990: 34f.). The two agencies tend in effect to pursue their objectives 
independently, and coordinated research programs have been few. OSHA, moreover, has acted 
on relatively few of the recommendations issued by NIOSH, and in several cases, where OSHA 
did take action, the proposed or promulgated standard varied from the NIOSH 
recommendation, often in the direction of greater leniency (Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 
1985: 159).13 Whatever NIOSH might learn from cooperation, regulation is in other words 
unlikely to follow. Contrast this with the implications of volunteering information under the 
NMSP: with EPA unable or reluctant to guarantee liability waivers, information submitted under 
the scheme could trigger penalties ranging from a slap on the wrist to onerous new restrictions. 
No wonder then if companies felt uncomfortable volunteering information to the agency. 
The NanoRelease project on the other hand illustrates that U.S. manufacturers are in fact 
ready to cooperate with regulators, including EPA. Again, however, industry would appear to 
incur only marginal risks of interference. The NanoRelease project is not primarily designed for 
regulatory purposes, but aims to develop the scientific tools necessary to support decision-
making among NGOs, businesses, and governments. Unlike the British PROSPEcT project, 
which intends to provide a full characterization of the analyzed materials, NanoRelease considers 
only release and exposure scenarios. Insights to such questions may prove valuable for 
developing quality exposure and risk assessments. But as ILSI emphasizes, “[d]ata generated from 
this project alone is not sufficient to characterize exposures and thus, would not be sufficient to 
assess risk or determine regulatory outcomes.”14 These are not merely empty gestures to 
encourage manufacturers to submit their materials for testing.  
Participating companies are expected to submit candidate test materials to a third-party 
coordinator for repackaging and labeling with random sample numbers. Repackaged samples are 
sent to testing laboratories for blind analyses. All results are reported to the steering committee 
by sample numbers only – neither laboratory nor steering committee members will know which 
sample numbers correspond to which company (Roberts 2011). The implications are subtle, but 
profound: neither EPA nor other federal agencies will have access to the ‘raw’ data from the 




13  NIOSH has for example identified 682 toxic chemicals to which workers are exposed. OSHA has no existing 
regulations for 244 of these chemicals – workers can be exposed to them at any level. For another 196 
chemicals, OSHA’s standards offer less protection than NIOSH’s recommendation. In some cases, OSHA 
rules allow for exposure at levels that are hundreds of times higher than NIOSH guidelines (Feldman 
2011: 9). 
14  www.ilsi.org/ResearchFoundation/RSIA/Pages/NanoReleaseFAQs.aspx [Accessed April 9, 2013] 
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management methodologies, the aggregate results alone will be insufficient to justify stricter 
regulations to curb exposure to carbon nanotubes or other nanoscale materials. Only the raw data 
would suffice to lift the burden of demonstrating unreasonable risk. Even if evidence of potential 
harms for CNTs are established in the future, the range of release scenarios documented by the 
NanoRelease project and the anonymity guaranteed by the steering committee will in short leave 
ample room for manufacturers to deny specific exposure to their products. And, regardless of 
what the project may find, questions of how evidence of harm should be interpreted and 
extrapolated remain of course free game for trial lawyers. 
PERSUADING WHITEHALL: BUSINESS STRATEGIES IN BRITAIN 
Few, if any, of the delay tactics employed by American industry are available to UK companies. 
Where opportunities for obstruction exist, they are best avoided by companies seeking to sway 
the direction of British chemical control policy. Deference to administrative decisions is instead a 
sound strategy under a political regime which vests authority firmly in the hands of the executive. 
The combination of parliamentary sovereignty and a first-past-the-post electoral system endows 
Britain with enormously powerful single-party governments. Once elected, British governments 
face few significant constitutional or political checks on their legislative powers (Wood 2001). 
Unlike Congress, Parliament enjoys neither the independent expertise nor the separate political 
base needed to compete with the executive. The bonds of party affiliation significantly reduce the 
autonomy of the Commons, while the powers of the House of Lords have whittled away by 
successive acts of Parliament. Oversight through special investigations addresses only the 
broadest policy issues, with the parliamentary question representing virtually the only device for 
calling ministers to account on more specific administrative decisions. Cooperation between the 
two policy-making branches is thus the rule in British politics. Parliamentary sovereignty affords 
the judiciary only limited powers to review statutes passed by Parliament. Suits against 
governmental agencies by private parties are extremely rare, even where regulatory policies 
seriously impinge on their economic interests. Cabinet government finally eliminates most of the 
competitive dynamics characteristic of the American executive. Institutionalized inter-ministerial 
consultation and negotiation reinforces the authoritative character of chemicals regulation by 
placing the government as a whole behind decisions to intervene.  
The legal and institutional factors, which predispose the Federal Government to internal 
competition, are thus largely absent in Britain. Centralization of regulatory powers in Whitehall 
allows the executive to exercise unquestioned leadership in the formulation and implementation 
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of chemical control policy. Contrast for example legislative interests in nanotechnologies in 
Britain with the United States: Congress has as we saw above taken a keen interest in federal 
activities related to the human health and environmental implications of nanotechnologies. No 
similar display of interest is evident in Britain. Parliamentary questions in the Commons have 
been confined to broad inquiries concerning funding for nanoscience and technology, with little 
or no concern expressed for potential adverse effects and much less for governmental efforts to 
address them. In 2010, the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee launched an 
inquiry into the use of nanotechnologies in the food sector. Highly critical of the food industry 
for failing to be transparent about the uses of nanomaterials, the Committee however took no 
issue with governmental policies. Rather, the Committee commended HM Government’s 
commitment to enable appropriate controls, with recommendations limited to calls for 
government to ensure adequate research funding (House of Lords 2010a; 2010b).  
Neither legislative scrutiny nor reviews by independent non-departmental bodies such as the 
Council for Science and Technology (2007) or the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution (2008) have thus given HM Government cause to reconsider its regulatory priorities or 
strategies (HM Government 2008; 2009; 2010). Because the executive controls the process of 
drafting legislation, statutory objectives conform rather closely to the government’s regulatory 
agenda. Parliament ratifies the broad outlines of policy in enabling legislation, committing the 
details of implementation to the discretion of the executive. Representatives of economic and 
social actors consequently enjoy fewer avenues for directly influencing policy outcomes (Rose 
2004: 189f.); and UK companies therefore confronts a very different decision-making 
environment than their U.S. competitors. Steward Wood (2001: 259) observes, “the legislative 
strength of British governments brings uncertainty to the political economy […]. Because 
governments have the capacity to introduce radical changes of policy at will […] companies face 
overwhelming incentives to withhold rather than share information […].” Yet, this presents us 
with conundrum. If governmental commitments are of a questionable nature, how can we 
account for the story of nanotech regulation in the United Kingdom, fraught as it is with 
examples of collaborative engagements and extensive information sharing among governmental 
entities, companies and their representatives? 
Doubts concerning a commitment to uphold a collaborative agreement would certainly merit 
caution. Policy preferences change over time; and if left unchecked, the use of the state’s 
discretionary powers could inflict significant harm on business. In democratic politics, short-term 
shifts in government policy are more often than not driven by concerns for the prospect of  
(re-)election. Neither chemical safety however – nor nanotechnologies for that matter – is of a 
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nature to make or break the electoral fortunes of governments. Unlike economic or labor market 
policy, questions of chemical safety, by virtue of their technical obscurity, rarely lend weight to 
partisan contestation. Except for a few instances, where specific regulatory issues have achieve a 
high political profile, chemical control policy in Britain remains a matter of executive discretion. 
Just as Parliament is content to confer open-ended regulatory authority on ministers, so 
successive governments have preferred to entrust virtually all important decisions to civil 
servants. Although the legislative strength of British governments thus may bring uncertainty to 
the political economy, delegation of regulatory powers to administrative authorities exercises a 
significant stabilizing influence on the direction of chemical control policy. Insulated from the 
political process, state bureaucrats face different incentives than elected politicians: as they are 
not subject to the short time horizons imposed by the electoral process, state bureaucrats can 
pursue their statutory objectives, even when those objectives no longer enjoy popular support. 
The absence of legislative-executive competition moreover eliminates the pressure for rigorous 
procedural and judicial controls on the bureaucracy. Since Parliament have neither the means nor 
the incentives to exercise effective post-legislative control, British regulators enjoy considerable 
independence in implementing chemical control laws. In contrast to the United States, then, the 
locus of regulatory authority rests with the executive bureaucracy; and this dictates a strategic 
orientation towards the regulatory authorities not found in the American separation of powers 
system. 
Concentration of regulatory powers on one hand affords UK companies opportunities not 
enjoyed by their U.S. competitors – but it also weighs heavily on their strategic options. Industry 
may find some measure of protection against meddling bureaucrats in the process of inter-
ministerial consultation and negotiation. In the past, the UK chemical industry could rely on the 
Department of Trade and Industry, which acted as its sponsoring department, to defend industry 
against overly zealous environmental health and safety regulations (Paterson 1991: 237; Grant, 
Paterson and Whitston 1988: 77ff.). Interviews with officials at the now reconstituted 
Department of Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) made clear that old sympathies for industry 
and its main trade association, CIA, still linger in the ministry.15 With BIS assuming the lead on 
UK nanotech policy in 2008, recourse to their traditional ‘champion in government’ might serve 
to place a break on regulatory action. Appealing to the ministers charged with workplace or 




15  Interview, London, March 3, 2011. 
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day responsibility ultimately a question of administrative discretion, UK companies cannot afford 
to ignore much less antagonize the executive bureaucracies.  
Gaining influence in the British regulatory system thus hinges upon convincing state 
bureaucrats by the expertise social actors bring to the table. In contrast to their American 
colleagues, British regulators are largely free to structure and manage access to administrative 
proceedings. As in the legislative process, limiting access to the administrative decision-making 
process enhances bureaucratic control over regulatory outcomes. Groups consciously or 
inadvertently excluded from consultation may find that their views fall on deaf ears. Those 
allowed to comment on rules, especially during their formative stages, can in contrast exercise 
considerable influence on their final formulation. Expertise and information is of course the most 
effective key to unlocking the door of consultative proceedings; but companies are not the only 
source of information; and they certainly do not have a monopoly on expertise. Although 
comparatively disadvantaged in terms of resources, other groups also offer advice on chemical 
hazards. State bureaucrats likewise have their own sources of information. Exclusion from 
administrative deliberations therefore risks the imposition of decisions that run counter to 
corporate interests as competing interests seize opportunities to guide the direction of chemical 
control policy.  
Since influence is purchased through access to state authorities, companies must in other 
words be cautious of tactics that could be viewed as disruptive to ongoing relationships. While 
the tactics of American industry are well-suited to protract and impede regulatory rule-making, 
their first concern is not with maintaining relationships with regulators on congenial terms 
(Coglianese 1996). Overlapping jurisdictions and the open decision-making process in the United 
States mitigates this problem. But this is a luxury not afforded to UK companies. Industry stands 
to gain little from taking agencies to court, launching media campaigns and lobbying individual 
MPs – tactics which when used have often cost industries more friends than they gained (See e.g. 
Macmillan and Turner 1987). Organized interests fielding tactics viewed as disruptive or 
subversive have in the past found their access to regulatory proceeding impaired by barely 
concealed bureaucratic animosity (Grant 2004: 408f.). Disputing or obstructing bureaucratic 
decisions thus remains a precarious gambit, lest industry risk exchanging the blissful opacity of 
administrative decision-making for the noisy politics of partisan contestation or the court of 
public opinion (Culpepper 2011: 181ff.).  
Absent recourse to the courts or Parliament – and knowing full-well that regulators at Defra 
and HSE had the power to decide policy – companies could tread few alternatives paths to 
influence the outcome of the regulatory process. Because companies have to win what they can 
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during administrative deliberations, volunteering information, sharing expertise and collaborating 
with regulators is often the sensible response; and as we have seen UK companies have indeed 
sought to cultivate relationships with regulators that emphasize close and informal cooperation. 
The limited prospects of political interference or judicial scrutiny on the other hand also helped 
bolster corporate confidence that administrative decisions and policies would not suffer sudden 
or unpredictable reversals. Since regulators in other words were largely free to carve out a 
regulatory response to nanotech according to their interpretations, conclusions and priorities, 
industry readily accepted that the commitment to pursue a set of collaborative policies was 
credible. The promise of influence entailed by HM Government’s regulatory strategy in turn 
presented compelling incentives for UK companies to embark on a strategy of information 
disclosure with the aim of molding regulatory decisions to their strategic advantage. Through 
informal consultation, negotiation and collaborations, industry has left a distinct mark on the 
development of UK nanotech policy, and has significantly contributed to building the scientific 
basis available to regulators for risk assessment and management of nanomaterials. Concentration 
of regulatory powers in state bureaucracies has thus in short created the critical impetus for 
cooperation. 
A quarter century ago, Ronald Brickman and colleagues (1985: 227) writing on chemical 
control policy concluded: “Informality is the preferred way of conducting regulatory business in 
Britain; a legacy of trust and good feelings has permitted the tackling of tough policy problems in 
a spirit of accommodation rather than confrontation.” At first glance, the story of nanotech 
regulation in Britain would appear to share some affinity with this assessment. We should of 
course be wary of unquestioningly accepting an enduring ‘British style of regulation’. Much can – 
and has changed in the span of 25 years, including the nature of business regulation. Writing in 
the mid-1980s, Brickman and colleagues drew on observations of a system of governance which 
has largely ceased to be. From the late 1980s, business in Britain faced a policy environment very 
different from that which had historically been dominant: one where many assumptions about 
the right of business to control its own affairs were now open to challenge. The broader trends 
underlying this transformation are familiar: the exhaustion of old modes of governing, 
Thatcherism, and a radical shift in the scope and style of regulation has ushered in a new division 
of labor between state and society (Levi-Faur 2005).  
Michael Moran (2003) admirably demonstrates how these developments have been associated 
with the breakdown of old, enclosed regulatory communities to be replaced by what he labels a 
‘new’ British regulatory state. Presenting evidence from a wide range of domains – from 
environmental regulation over the newly privatized utilities to competition policy – Moran paints 
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a consistent picture. Domains once regulated informally and cooperatively with business have 
seen a shift to more elaborately codified regulatory frameworks coupled with a greater insistence 
on enforcement of rules against regulated entities. The decline of the British consensual style is 
said to have been accompanied by a parallel increase in the formality of relations between 
regulators and regulated. The development of more codified frameworks for industry has been 
associated with a marked decline in the reliance on informal compliance and the cooperative 
character of relations (Wilks 1999: 347ff.). The reorganization of regulatory institutions, 
combined with a new tendency to formalize both substance and procedures has caused a shift 
towards a more adversarial system, where regulators no longer hesitate to threaten, and use, legal 
sanctions (Moran 2003: 131-136). The rise of the regulatory state is in short seen as a harbinger 
of a new, more transparent, open and adversarial system, which has unsettled the wider system of 
business regulation in Britain. But how should we reconcile this diagnosis with the informal and 
cooperative nature of relationships evident in the story of nanotech regulation in the United 
Kingdom?  
Broader trends always risk obscuring important sectoral variations.16 Rather than an isolated 
instance of cooperation or a resurgence of the patterns of old, the UK nanotech story must 
however be understood in the wider context of governmental strategies for chemical safety in 
Britain and in Europe. The demise in Britain of the institutions and culture of ‘cooperative 
regulation’ (Moran 2006: 461) has coincided with the accession of EU competences in areas of 
human health and environmental integrity. The increased scope and intensity of EU regulation 
has significantly contributed to unraveling the cohesiveness of regulatory communities and their 
replacement by more formally organized, codified regulatory regimes. Widely recognized as “the 
most sensible legislative framework for the regulation of nanomaterials” (HM Government 
2009: 19), the ambitious new EU chemicals regime, REACH, might therefore be expected to 
herald similar transformations in the chemical control area. Such expectations are nonetheless 
premature.  
A profoundly complex regime, at its core, REACH consists of two elements: an innovative 




16  Curiously, one area, which sits uncomfortably within the new formalized and codified approach to governing 
depictured by Moran, is chemical safety at work (2003: 136ff.): the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Etc. Act 
established the Health and Safety Commission as the competent policy-making body, with the HSE acting as 
its executive arm. Until its merger with HSE in 2008, the Commission was formally constituted on a tripartite 
basis with equal representation for local governments, labor, and management. Under the current setup, 
HSE’s advisory network retains important elements of the old tripartite system, particularly with respect to 
the type of interests represented on advisory bodies and the reliance on informal relations. 
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(European Commission 2007; Fisher 2008). REACH privatizes information collection, provision 
and assessment: to place substances on the European market, manufacturers, importers and users 
of chemicals must demonstrate that risks are adequately controlled or that their socio-economic 
benefits outweigh the risks. REACH in short reverses the burden of proof from regulatory 
authorities to industry. But although REACH marks an important watershed in EU chemicals 
policy, this will neither fundamentally alter nor alleviate the dynamics of chemical control policy 
outlined in chapter two; and its impact on the nature of regulatory decision-making in the UK 
chemical safety sector has been – and will likely remain – relatively minor. 
While the new European chemicals regulator, ECHA, receives and evaluates registrations for 
their compliance, evaluation of selected substances is undertaken by national authorities. The 
interests and especially capabilities of national authorities will thus be paramount to the 
implementation of the new chemicals regime. Current projections expect that Member States will 
be able to evaluate four to six substances per year. As presently planned, observers therefore 
predict that it will take some 60 years to complete the substance evaluation process (Williams, 
Panko and Paustenbach 2009: 567). Far from rendering voluntary information disclosure 
irrelevant, their taxing responsibilities under REACH only accentuates the need for national 
regulators to gain access to industry data and expertise. Although REACH in short endows 
regulators with new authority to mandate data production and disclosure, determining whether 
companies have provided complete responses remains as before a challenge. A failure to make 
any response will be clear, but inaccurate submissions are hard to police, if regulators cannot 
independently verify the information (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 2004: 306f.).  
Encouraging companies to volunteer information and share their expertise with regulators 
therefore remains an attractive strategy – a strategic priority moreover which has proven 
remarkably resilient to the broader dismantling of regulatory communities in Britain: the 1999 
UK Chemicals Strategy, published in the lead up to the reorientation of European chemicals 
policy, thus acknowledged that protecting human health and environmental integrity “can only be 
achieved effectively through partnership between Government [and] the chemical industry […].” 
(DETR 1999: 10) The strategy cements past commitments to cooperation, voluntary action and 
dialogue, emphasizing that “[r]isk management strategies in partnership with industry will be 
agreed without having to wait for lengthy legislative processes.” (DETR 1999: 7f.) With the aim 
of building trust, the strategy established new institutional venues to allow industry expertise and 
views to flow into the formulation of policy and priorities. Collaboration among companies and 
regulatory authorities in the context of nanotechnologies thus builds on and reflects a broader 
pattern of voluntarism, informal consultation and partnership in the UK chemical safety area.  
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For industry on the other hand the new European chemicals regime has not rendered 
domestic regulators irrelevant. Insofar national authorities exercise significant influence in the 
ECHA decision-making process, recourse to state bureaucrats continues to present opportunities 
worth cultivating. Although the locus of policy-making may have shifted towards the European 
Union, creating new venues and access points for organized interests, the ‘national route’ remains 
important (Mazey and Richardson 1992: 98; 2006: 263f.; Bennett 1997). Whether sensitizing 
national decision-makers to their views and interests prior to European negotiations or in the 
subsequent implementation and enforcement process, access to state bureaucrats is a singularly 
important, if no longer exclusive route of influence for UK companies. As decisions about the 
regulatory status of nanomaterials under REACH will be made in coming years, industry will in 
short find its capacity to influence regulatory outcomes dependent on access to national decision-
makers; and, as in the past, influence will be predicated on maintaining relationships on congenial 
terms. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a postscript to the story of nanotech regulation in the United States. After several years 
of speculating whether, when, and how EPA might choose to regulate nanoscale materials under 
TSCA, the agency in fairly rapid succession undertook a number of formal regulatory actions. 
Reversing the agency’s much criticized position on nanomaterials under TSCA,17 EPA in late 
2008 began promulgating significant new use rules (SNURs) covering carbon nanotubes and 
other specific nanomaterials. A SNUR affords EPA the opportunity to review the designated use 
of a chemical in a manner virtually identical to the way it reviews a new chemical substance: 
manufacturers of nanomaterials subject to a SNUR are compelled to notify EPA at least 90 days 
before they begin production. Pre-manufacture notice permits EPA to evaluate the intended use 
of a substance and decide whether more information is needed to assess its risks or if necessary 
issue an order that prohibits or restricts use. There is a catch to this sudden burst of regulatory 
activity at EPA, however. A SNUR does not regulate a chemical’s production or use. It only 




17  In January 2008, EPA published a General Approach for determining if a nanoscale material is a new chemical 
substance under TSCA (EPA 2008). Controversy over this approach arose, because EPA’s insistence on 
molecular identity ignored physical attributes, such as e.g. particle size. Nanoscale versions of well-known 
substances, such as graphite (carbon), would consequently not be subject to TSCA provisions on notification 
and testing of new chemicals (Bashaw 2009: 479f.). 
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may commence. Any restrictions on production or use require EPA to demonstrate 
‘unreasonable risk’ and promulgate a separate rule. EPA in other words confronts the familiar 
‘Catch 22’ situation; i.e. before the agency can demonstrate ‘unreasonable risk’ it needs to 
convince producers to provide toxicity and exposure data that they are not obliged to provide 
unless there is some evidence of a potential risk (Wagner 2004: 1671). As before, then, companies 
face overwhelming incentives to withhold rather than share information – SNURs and pre-
manufacture notice do little to alter this picture.18 
An industry insider concluded: “EPA is now reviewing any nanoscale material [and] there is a 
public perception of EPA review and approval and now a more predictable business response. 
[This] gives industry some comfort that there is a predictable regulatory response, so it is not 
nearly as intimidating as it used to be.”19 The insider continued:  
“There has been a lack of widespread understanding of what [impact] these TSCA rules or any rule would 
have on the commercialization of nanotechnology. […] Some people think ‘no regulation is appropriate’, 
while others of us believe that if you don’t have some EPA review the likelihood of getting widespread 
stakeholder buy-in on the safety front is much more difficult […]. To me you can’t have it both ways. 
You can’t say ‘no TSCA reform and no SNURs, status quo’ and expect people to buy into the safety 
proposition. [But] there is no appetite for [regulation] in industry right now, because less regulation is 
preferable. It’s cheaper, but ultimately it is just not very good for the technology.”20 
Contrast the situation in the United States with UK policies on carbon nanotubes: responding 
to evidence that certain CNTs could produce reactions similar to asbestos fibers, Defra sought 
advice from the academic and industrial research community on the use of CNTs in consumer 
products. Defra next commissioned life cycle exposure studies with the Food and Environment 
Research Agency, carried out in cooperation with industrial experts. Satisfied that current 
applications of CNTs were unlikely to present serious risks to the public, Defra concluded that 
no further protective measures were needed. Drawing on inputs from its advisory network, HSE 
meanwhile issued first general guidance on management issues related to nanomaterials, followed 
in spring 2009 by specific guidance on the safe use and handling of carbon nanotubes (HSE 
2009b). UK policies for bridging and managing the potential human health and environmental 
risks of CNTs thus illustrate a penchant for drawing in industrial expertise in deciding the proper 
course of action. The impact on regulatory decision-making leveraged by such information hints 




18  EPA for example estimates that most pre-manufacture notices do not include test data of any type, and only 
about 15 percent include health or safety test data (GAO 2005: 11). 
19  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012. 
20  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012.  
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Table 5.1  Drivers of British and U.S. Business Responses  
 BRITAIN UNITED STATES 
   
Regulatory 
Strategy 
Encourage cooperation Encourage cooperation 
   
Regulatory  
Powers 
State bureaucrats endowed with  
broad discretionary authority 
State bureaucrats enjoy limited 
discretionary authority 
   
  The limited prospect of 
parliamentary interference or judicial 
scrutiny reduces uncertainties about 
the future direction of UK nanotech 
policy 
 The prospect of congressional, 
White House or judicial interference 
creates uncertainty about the future 
direction of federal nanotech 
policies 
  Industry targets administrative 
authorities in an attempt to influence 
regulatory agendas and priorities 
 Industry diverts efforts to influence 
federal nanotech policies across 
multiple policy-making venues  
  State authorities signal interest in 
accommodating corporate concerns 
in the design and implementation of 
UK nanotech policies 
 Elaborate statutory requirements 
and congressional oversight limits 
the scope for accommodation of 
corporate interests in the design of 
federal nanotech policies 
  HM Government’s regulatory 
strategy creates compelling 
incentives for UK companies to 
disclose sensitive information in 
exchange for influence over 
administrate decisions and policies 
 The unpredictability of regulatory 
responses, coupled with generous 
access to other decision-making 
venues, creates few incentives for 





Business Response Disclosure Nondisclosure 
Outcome  Joint Decisions Governmental Inaction 
Nature of  
Industry Influence 
Direct Indirect 




Best practice guidelines 
Stakeholder confidence 
Business predictability 
Lack of test methods and  
statutory guidance documents 
   
 
Neither SNURs nor HSE guidance documents imposes significant burdens or compliance 
costs on American or British companies. From an industry perspective each outcome may be 
equally agreeable. But whereas safeguarding their interests requires American companies to keep 
agencies guessing about the nature of their products and operations, concentration of regulatory 
powers in Britain dictates a strategic orientation towards the executive bureaucracy. Table 4.1 
summarizes the different drivers of business responses to the regulatory process and its results 
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across the two countries (classified according to the ‘outcomes’ sketched in chapter two). 
Leverage over the course of UK regulatory politics is thus purchased by volunteering information 
and making industrial expertise available to the authorities responsible for regulating their 
behavior. British companies in consequence sought to cultivate close and collaborative 
relationships with regulatory officials. And, through informal consultation, negotiation and 
collaborations, industry has as we have seen left a distinct mark on the development of UK 
nanotech policies. Ongoing dialogue among officials and industry representatives has witnessed 
extensive accommodation of corporate interests and the identification of agreed research 
priorities, development of new risk management methodologies and the joint drafting of 
statutory guidance documents. Broad agreement on the future course of British nanotechnology 
policy has in short facilitated greater regulatory certainty and hence helped stabilize the 
commercial environment for UK companies. 
Because the American political system in contrast diffuses and fragments political authority, 
companies able to navigate the multiple decision-making venues rarely need to look to federal 
regulators to see their interests satisfied. When information is sorely incomplete, controverted, or 
effectively unobtainable, the executive agencies usually find it impossible to justify strict 
regulatory action. And, they are in effect forced to refrain from intervening against suspect 
substances or, as illustrated by EPA’s rule-making record, limit intervention to minor adjustments 
under existing statutes. But while the regulatory process thus has brought greater business 
predictability, it has also failed to address some of the persistent challenges in the current 
commercial environment. The absence of certified test methods, in combination with a lack of 
guidance documents on environmental safety precautions, continues to create market frictions, in 
particular as a result of uncertainties over the industry’s long-term liability exposure – with 
observers now heralding the coming age of mass nanotech litigation (Delany 2006; DeVries, 
Gotting and Liebfarth 2010). 
The regulatory process did nonetheless bring relief for an industry keen on clarifying the 
extent of its statutory obligations. And, with the generous opportunities to protract, obstruct and 
ultimately deflect regulatory intervention that result from the realities of the American political 
system, this may well translate into a long-term stable outcome – albeit it will as before demand 
the marshalling of scientific and economic evidence and constant vigilance from one end of the 
policy process to the other. Given industry’s superior resources and informational advantages, 
overlapping jurisdictions thus allow companies to guide the direction of regulatory policy through 
indirect means. Since inaction serves their interests in minimizing regulatory burdens, American 
companies have in short had little reason to embark on a risky strategy of information disclosure. 
An Uncertain Business 
126 
With the business predictability that flows from the status quo, the benefits cannot be dismissed, 
although it may as predicted by the industry insider carry long-term implications for public 







A Meeting of Minds: The Politics of 
Nanotech Regulation in Germany and Denmark 
 
 
The acquiescent reactions of Danish companies to the evolving regulatory process stand in sharp 
contrast to the assiduous response of their German competitors. In this chapter, we explore the 
roots of the diverging industry responses in the two countries. The patterns of behavior observed 
in chapter three invite our curiosity on two counts. First, Germany and Denmark belong to the 
group of coordinated market economies. From a varieties of capitalism perspective, the varied 
reactions of German and Danish companies to comparable state policies must therefore appear 
as puzzling as the contrasting strategies of their Anglo-American competitors. Despite German 
federalism, the nature of legal and institutional relationships found in the two countries chemicals 
sectors are however comparable, and the different business responses thus cannot reflect 
variations in the prospect of political or judicial interference in regulatory proceedings.  
Second, while the reactions of German companies differ markedly from their Danish 
competitors, their responses also compares to that of British companies. In both countries, 
industry adopted a strategy of close, informal cooperation with government officials. The 
coincidence of business responses in Britain and Germany alerts us to a perhaps more 
fundamental conundrum. Whether we insist that business strategies are born of the distinct 
organizing logic of a country’s political economy, its state-society traditions or some third 
configuration of institutions and processes, Britain and Germany are invariably placed in 
different categories. Conventional wisdom in short would lead us to expect different – not similar 
– reactions and behaviors from industries in Britain and Germany. How can we account for the 
coincidence of business responses observed in these two countries? And why did German and 
Danish companies not react alike? To answer these questions, this chapter further probes the 
institutional drivers of business strategies in regulatory politics. I contend that the different 
responses of German and Danish companies – and the coincidence of business strategies in 
Germany and Britain – are rooted in the institutions that structure communications among state 
actors and industry representatives.  
An Uncertain Business 
128 
State bureaucrats are in all three countries empowered to determine what chemicals to 
regulate, in what order, by what means, and how stringently. Scrutiny by national parliaments or 
the courts has little direct bearing on administrative proceedings and regulatory outcomes. 
Formal institutions and their operating procedures in other words exercise a similar effect on 
business expectations about the future behavior of state bureaucrats. But the strategic 
environment for chemical control policy in Britain, Germany and Denmark nonetheless differs. 
No government wants to regulate a chemical unless it shows a high potential for inflicting harm 
on humans or the environment. But in many cases the evidence of harm is sketchy, based on 
studies of variable design and quality, and subject to interpretation according to changing 
assumptions and analytic judgments. Depending on their specific agendas, priorities and 
preferences, regulators may react remarkably different to evidence of harm. Unless companies 
understand the designs and intentions of their regulatory adversaries, they cannot predict how 
requested information might be put to use – and they must therefore be cautious of sharing 
information about their operations. Deliberative institutions I contend are in turn crucial to 
dispel possible misgivings in bureaucratic commitments. 
In the varieties of capitalism tradition, deliberative institutions are seen as important elements 
of the coordinated market economy that endow actors with a capacity for strategic action when 
faced with new or unfamiliar challenges (Culpepper 2001: 79f.; Hall and Thelen 2009: 12f.). In 
regulatory politics, deliberative institutions predominantly take the format of advisory bodies that 
allow state bureaucrats to consult external sources of expertise and garner the views of 
stakeholders. Advisory committees and stakeholder panels create opportunities for participants to 
develop common understandings of difficult-to-resolve scientific and technical problems, craft 
agreed solutions and settle disagreements through discussion and negotiation. As vehicles of 
organized discussion among officials and representatives from industry, advisory bodies afford 
industry opportunities to learn how officials understand the evidence of harm and evaluate the 
need for new controls. Based on this knowledge, companies are better able to gauge the 
intentions of state bureaucrats and hence predict their probable reactions to new information. 
Confidence in the designs of state bureaucrats can in turn persuade companies to volunteer 
sensitive information. Where such expectations in contrast are not well-founded, companies must 
remain vigilant to possible concealed agendas. Insulated bureaucratic decision-making processes 
broken only by ad hoc consultations do not give industry representatives the same opportunities 
for ‘a meeting of minds’ and companies are therefore left without a reliable basis to predict 
probable outcomes. Discomfort in the intentions of regulators and the unpredictability of their 
responses consequently hampers incentives to volunteer information. 
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The chapter proceeds in six steps: a first section introduces the German and Danish chemical 
control regimes. Sections two, three and four connect the different industry responses to the 
institutions that structure communications among regulators and companies. I demonstrate how 
the extensive reliance on advisory bodies in the German chemical safety sector buttress the 
credibility of bureaucratic commitments; and how confidence in the intentions of federal 
authorities have created compelling incentives for companies to share their information, expertise 
and experiences. I further show how uncertainty about the designs of state bureaucrats in 
Denmark inhibits incentives to volunteer information. A fifth section revisits the American and 
British nanotech experiences to consider potential overlaps between my account of business 
responses in this and the preceding chapter. I demonstrate how deliberative institutions are an 
important element of the UK nanotech story; and how their impact on business responses in the 
United States in contrast has been negligible. A final section reflects on what lessons we can draw 
from the analysis of nanotech regulation in America and Europe. 
ORGANIZING FOR CHEMICAL SAFETY IN GERMANY AND DENMARK 
In Germany, the Federal Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs share responsibility for the formulation and administration of chemical control policy. 
The Hazardous Substances Ordinance contains powers to restrict or ban production and use of 
substances as well as issue specific rules for handling. The ordinance is implemented through 
technical rules elaborated on a tripartite basis by the Committee on Hazardous Substances. The 
1980 Chemicals Act regulates a manufacturer’s duties to notify, test and, if necessary, label new 
substances. Notifications are validated by the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health and then forwarded to other federal agencies for further expert and risk assessment. 
While the Chemicals Act entails powers to prohibit hazardous substances, it also defines in 
specific detail the responsibilities of the administration and the precise notification and testing 
obligations of industry: substances marketed in quantities of less than 10 kilos per year are 
exempt from notification and long-term effects must be tested only when a substance is 
marketed in quantities of more than 100 tons a year. There are no provisions for testing existing 
chemicals. The relatively narrow scope of the Chemicals Act reflects a political compromise with 
industry meant to limit the act’s economic impact and ensure a predictable regulatory 
environment. 
The postwar economic recovery in Germany is intimately tied to the chemical industry. With a 
broad technological base, a preference for large-scale enterprise, and an excellent working 
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relationship with labor, the chemical industry responded to the lucrative opportunities at home 
and in the European common market with remarkable growth records. The German chemical 
industry is the dominant European chemical industry, second only to the United States and 
Japan. In this environment, there was little need for the state (Ilgen 1983; Grant, Paterson and 
Whitston 1988); and governmental intervention in the affairs of the chemical industry developed 
only slowly. In the debates over national environmental policy in the 1970s, the practice of 
formal discussion and consultation was raised to an organizing principle (Kooperationsprinzip) 
(Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985; Schneider 1985: 182f.). Regular cooperation among specified 
interest groups remains today a requirement for the development of toxic substance regulations. 
The Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VCI) represents the interests of more than 90 percent 
of the enterprises operating in the German chemical sector (Grote and Schneider 2006: 129). 
Regional associations deal with matters of concern in the individual Länder, while specialized 
sector associations are responsible for specific groups of products or product areas (e.g. organic 
chemistry or food additives). With a near monopoly on representation, there is no significant 
branch or sector association outside the peak association.  
In Denmark, chemical control policy is laid down in broad enabling legislation that confers 
open-ended regulatory authority on state authorities. Similar to Britain, chemical safety standards 
are implemented through statutory instruments that are routinely negotiated among authorities 
and affected interests (Andersen, Christiansen and Winter 1998; Christiansen, Nørgaard and 
Sidenius 2004). Administrative responsibility for chemical safety policy lies with the Danish 
Environmental Protection Agency, Miljøstyrelsen, and the Danish Working Environment 
Authority, Arbejdstilsynet. An employer’s obligations for occupational health and safety are 
defined by the Working Environment Act and implemented though statutory orders prescribing 
more specific measures concerning the handling of substances and products. The 1979 Act on 
Chemical Substances and Products empowers MST to regulate new and existing chemicals. In 
combination with the 1973 Environmental Protection Act, the Chemicals Act enables a broad 
control regime covering notification, classification and labelling of substances, procedures for 
evaluating the risks of existing chemicals and restrictions on hazardous substances and 
preparations. While chemicals regulation is one of the most harmonized sectors of the EU, 
Denmark has in the past made extensive use of Treaty provisions enabling more stringent 
national regulation to ban or restrict use of specific substances (See Boye and Ege 1999).  
Although moderately successful in economic terms, the Danish chemical industry boasts little 
of the political clout and influence of its powerful German counterpart. Whereas for example the 
agricultural sector time and again has demonstrated the political strength to resist or obstruct 
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governmental policies, the question facing chemical companies has instead been how to adapt to 
and if possible benefit from state intervention. The chemical sector is de facto split between the 
two main representational branches of Danish industry: the Confederation of Danish Industry, 
DI, organizes industrial users of chemicals, while the Danish Chamber of Commerce, Dansk 
Erhverv, represents the interests of commercial importers and distributers of chemicals as well as 
major allied branches of the chemicals industry, such as pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and 
detergents. Pesticide manufacturers – in effect large international chemical corporations – have 
meanwhile preferred to establish representative organizations independent of DI and Dansk 
Erhverv. Although these organizational divisions do not necessarily give rise to competition, they 
do preclude the industry from speaking with the weight that follows from being organized under 
one roof. New independent ‘nanobusiness’ associations have finally been created in neither 
Germany nor Denmark. In both countries, it has instead fallen to established associations to 
voice the views and interests of members commercializing nanotechnologies. 
GERMANY: DELIBERATING NANOTECH  
In Germany, the nanotech debate was funneled through organizational venues that promote 
ongoing, collective discussion among participants. Membership of these deliberative fora brings 
experts from industry in close and permanent contact with their academic and governmental 
peers, and encourages members to develop common understandings of joint problems, gather 
and analyze information about the consequences of different decisions and reach agreed 
recommendations. We encountered the most conspicuous such venue in chapter three: the 
German NanoKommission. Established in late 2006, the commission involved more than 100 
experts and representatives from federal and Länder authorities, individual scientists, industry and 
civil society organizations. Acting as the steering committee for the national NanoDialogue, the 
NanoKommission oversaw the coordination of federal departments and their nanotech initiatives 
and policies. Discussions within the NanoKommission were meant to inform federal decision-
makers on issues ranging from research priorities to the evaluation of scientific developments. 
Extensive deliberations and – at times – intense negotiations among participants generated 
recommendations on the implementation of preliminary assessment criteria, principles for 
responsible use of nanomaterials, and market transparency for consumers. A former participant 
emphasized:  
“the process itself was necessary and it was very helpful, because everyone had the possibility to talk 
about their problems, about their fears, and the others could give solutions. […] The idea was to separate 
those problems, which can be solved by the parties themselves. The dialogue meant that [some issues] 
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have not popped up so high because [we] talked about it – so we didn’t need to make the public aware of 
all the little problems we had.”1  
The NanoKommission provided a forum for regular exchanges among public authorities and 
private stakeholders and hence facilitated the formulation of agreed positions. Discussion allowed 
participants to develop a common diagnosis of the major challenges created by nanotechnologies, 
gather and disseminate information about scientific developments and debate the consequences 
of different policies and instruments; and the dialogue process has in turn help establish mutual 
expectations about the direction of German nanotech policy. Discussions within the 
NanoKommission have contributed to a more discerning societal debate with few signs of 
polarization thus far. This is not to suggest an exclusively consensual process, however. In 
chapter three, we for example saw how the views of UBA and VCI clashed over the issue of a 
German nanoregister. Members of the NanoKommission, who had been asked to analyze 
options for regulation based on the precautionary principle and – where possible – to make 
recommendations, were likewise unable to reach common ground – even on such fundamental 
issues as a definition of nanomaterials (NanoKommission 2010a; Grobe 2011). Observes a 
participant:  
“It was a dialogue. It was not necessary to have consensus at the end. It was necessary to say: ‘we have 
consensus here, there and there, but not there.’ That was okay. They were not forced to have consensus, 
because sometimes they know it is not possible. [The politicians did not say]: you have to go in like 
selecting the pope and we wait to see if the white smoke is coming out. That was not the point. The point 
was: sit together, talk about it and tell us at least what can you say. […] And even if we don’t [agree to] 
fixed regulations, we have ideas about what we want and where to go. […] At least, it’s important to be 
clear about what the others think [so you] have that in mind when you come together at a later stage.”2  
Although participants have not seen eye-to-eye on all issues, the NanoKommission did create 
opportunities for federal decision-makers to engage industry representatives in discussion and 
communicate their positions on and perceptions of different instruments and policy measures. 
Industry representatives for their part were thus able to learn how federal authorities understood 
and evaluated the available body of knowledge – and they therefore gained a better grasp of 
governmental intentions and ambitions for nanotech. By communicating information about 
federal agendas, priorities and preferences, the dialogue process in turn helped convince 
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The NanoDialogue was meanwhile supplemented – and often preceded – by parallel 
discussions in other venues. Major elements of the nanotech agenda have been channeled 
through existing advisory committees and stakeholder fora, in the process creating ample 
occasions for federal regulators to engage industry representatives in detailed technical 
discussions and debate possible prevention strategies. Consider consumer protection as an 
illustration. The BfR cultivates contacts with and inputs from external advisors through its 15 
expert panel. Drawing their members from universities, industry associations, consumer and 
environmental protection associations, other public authorities and private laboratories, this 
expert network facilitates access to external expertise in support of risk assessments of food, 
feed, chemicals and consumer products. In chapter three, we for example observed how BfR 
drew on feedback from this network to inform its risk management strategies (Zimmer, Hertel 
and Böl 2010a). The BfR committees routinely bring industry experts together with their 
academic and governmental counterparts to debate current and likely future scientific and 
regulatory developments. The BfR committee for consumer products has for example discussed 
the use of nanomaterials in textiles at length and in great technical detail. By attending committee 
meetings, members gained access to up-to-date information on current developments as well as 
on the views and positions of other participants. The committee along with other BfR panels in 
other words provides a forum, where members can exchange information and experiences as well 
as learn about agency agendas and priorities, including how officials evaluate the need for new 
controls to mitigate possible risks to consumers.  
We can glean additional insights into how deliberative institutions structure corporate risk-
benefit calculations by turning to the German system of worker protection. Both the Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) and the Ministry’s technical arm, BAuA, routinely 
rely on expert bodies for advice on scientific and technical developments. Interactions under the 
Committee on Hazardous Substances (AGS) in particular exert a major influence on the 
formulation and implementation of worker protection in Germany. Constituted on a tripartite 
basis with representatives from Länder authorities, employers, unions and the statutory accident 
insurers, the AGS advises BMAS on all aspects of occupational safety and hazardous materials. 
An important element of the committee’s work is therefore structured around the need to collect, 
analyze and evaluate scientific results and technical experiences. Under the Hazardous Substances 
Ordinance, the AGS is further responsible for elaborating occupational exposure values as well as 
issue specific protective standards. Given the pervasive risk uncertainties, nanomaterials have not 
surprisingly figured prominently among AGS’s priorities. Questions of worker exposure have 
been raised on several meetings, and the committee is currently exploring mechanisms to 
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minimize possible risks. At its meeting in November 2010, the committee decided to initiate a 
rule-making procedure for activities involving nanomaterials (AGS 2011).  
The AGS, then, supports deliberations of occupational safety issues and ongoing discussion of 
possible strategies for prevention, control and management of harmful substances. Regular 
meetings among a small group of experts encourage joint analysis of technical issues and 
scientific evidence. Conflicts of opinion, where they arise, are resolved through debate and 
negotiation. A BAuA official emphasized: “[in the AGS] we have a lot of consensus processes. 
[…] We concentrate on dialogue, it is our idea. It is better to have joint ideas that everyone can 
stick to than to make regulations. We do regulation if it is necessary, but it is not the first idea to 
deal with these problems.”3 Although the AGS and its various subcommittees on occasion invite 
external expertise for specific issues and topics, meetings are not open to the public. Members of 
the AGS are in consequence able to resolve their differences out of the public eye and with little 
external interference from the competent minister or Parliament – a setup which favors and 
encourages candid discussions. Observers an industry representative:  
“[Our differences of opinion and interest are] not too big a problem, probably because we all know each 
other. […] Most of the problems arise because we haven’t understood what we are talking about. But 
after you get everybody on the same level of knowledge, then it’s much better to discuss and then you can 
discuss on a quite pragmatic [level].”4 
Regular interactions channeled through the AGS and similar deliberative bodies in turn help 
improve corporate understandings of agency intentions and agendas. And they are therefore 
essential to convince German companies that federal official can be trusted with sensitive 
information. A VCI representative explained:  
“we always talk with each other very often – government, industry and others. We sometimes initiate 
[joint collaborations] without being forced by politics. Typically, people are on their job for 20 years, and 
they know each other. They know how the others are thinking, plus they have experience, which is very 
important. They know what they are talking about and understand the issue, and secondly they know the 
other people at least on a very good professional level […] and of course we can always call them and 
discuss [and say] ‘why shouldn’t we do it together, it is probably good for both parties’. And you know 
them for 20 years, you have trust in them, and you know [that] your partner is competent. Whereas in 
other countries, where you have a switch every 2 years, you neither establish professionalism in your 
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Advisory bodies and stakeholder fora provide institutional umbrellas under which personal 
relations and trust can develop among representatives from industry and federal authorities. And 
the formal advisory system thus acts to sponsor an undergrowth of informal discussions among 
ministerial officials, regulators and industry representatives. In chapter three, we saw how such 
discussions resulted in the joint BAuA-VCI industry survey and various other examples of 
collaborations. A BAuA official noted:  
“Working with the VCI is usual for us. We nearly always try to have partners [in our projects]. Our 
German idea of regulating is that we bring the employers, the representatives of the employees, the 
scientific persons and the authorities together and then make joint decisions […] From this idea, we 
usually try to find other persons, when we are discussing problems or are trying to solve them. And that is 
why when we are talking about nano, VCI was a good partner, because they know the industries, where 
they really use it, not where it is [only] an idea to use it. They are very, very active, so it was an idea to say: 
‘let’s come together and make those things we have [now] done’.”6 
The German story of nanotech regulation thus illustrates that for regulators and industry 
representatives, who interact under the auspice of deliberative institutions, information disclosure 
need not be problematic. Ongoing deliberations have allowed industry representatives to learn 
how federal authorities interpreted the available body of knowledge – and therefore anticipate 
how authorities might react to new information. The extensive reliance on advisory bodies in 
deciding the course of German chemical safety policies is thus instrumental to underpin the 
credibility of bureaucratic commitments. An official phrased it succinctly: “In other areas, like 
industrial chemicals and biocides, there is always a dialogue with industry, in the general law-
making process, but also in the specific authorization processes. With nano, it’s just a very long-
term discussion.”7 
DENMARK: ABSENCE OF A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE  
Despite a comparable commitment to dialogue, discussions among state officials, government 
researchers and industry representatives in Denmark have not been organized around joint 
membership of deliberative fora. Relations among state authorities and industry have 
consequently remained detached and arms’ length. The Danish nanotech story is however not 
one of antagonism, conflict or even deep-seated distrust of state authorities. It is an account 
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confidence in the agendas, priorities and preferences of state authorities. With no permanent 
venues to organize and promote discussion of how the evidence for nanotech should be 
interpreted, there has been no clearing of mutual expectations and few occasions to develop 
common understandings of the challenges facing regulators and companies. Unlike their German 
competitors, Danish companies were presented with few opportunities to learn how state 
authorities understood the evidence and evaluated the need for new controls. And their cautious 
and acquiescent response to the regulatory process is thus rooted in uncertainty about 
governmental ambitions for nanotech.  
Deliberative institutions do exist in the Danish chemicals sector. Danish regulators are no 
more than their German colleagues able to penetrate the arcane realms of science and 
engineering without the aid of specialists. Officials routinely seek the advice of experts to 
interpret the evidence of harm, to access international experiences or to estimate the 
effectiveness and cost of alternative control measures. State authorities likewise readily recognize 
the need to canvass the views of industry and other stakeholder groups. Advisory bodies and 
stakeholder fora are in short as much a feature of Danish environmental and worker protection 
policy-making as they are of the German policy-making environment. But while these 
deliberative fora operate with similar mandates as their German counterparts, their impact on 
corporate risk-benefit calculations have nonetheless been marginal: in Denmark, advisory bodies 
have not promoted dialogue and exchanges among state bureaucrats and corporate representative 
– and they have failed to do so either because they were discontinued; they did not invite industry 
participants; or because their mandate meant that nanotech is only now emerging as an issue of 
concern. 
In chapter three, we saw that Danish policy-makers and regulators have not been oblivious to 
the value of dialogue as a means to inform decisions on the direction of national nanotech policy. 
With the aim of encouraging knowledge exchange and networking, a stakeholder forum, NaNet, 
was therefore established with public funding in 2005. Yet, although NaNet was created with 
much the same ambitions as the NanoKommission, albeit on a much smaller scale, the forum 
quickly ceased operations – just in fact as the nanotech debate began to gain momentum in 
Denmark. The termination of NaNet left regulators and industry without a forum, where they 
could meet on a regular basis to debate scientific developments, analyze the roots of joint 
problems and craft agreed solutions. Discussions have instead occurred on an infrequent and 
issue-specific basis. Both state authorities and trade associations have convened occasional 
‘dialogue’ meetings. Such events of course have their merits, and participants have in general 
expressed satisfaction with this format. Unlike an ongoing dialogue process, however, these 
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meetings were merely meant to inform interested parties about international and national 
developments. Despite their name, ‘dialogue’ meeting have created only limited opportunities for 
participants to engage in detailed discussions of complex technical issues. We can illustrate by 
examining comparable experiences from Germany. 
The German policy process has witness its share of open workshops and consultations on a 
wide range of specific topics. Federal ministries and agencies alike have all convened one-day 
conferences to identify consumer risks and perceptions, sources of occupational exposure and 
discuss the viability of different regulatory mechanisms. During interviews federal officials readily 
acknowledged the value of workshops as occasions for participants to present – in general terms 
– their views and positions. But such meetings the officials emphasized rarely encourage 
discussions of scientific data or how the results should be interpreted.8 A similar observation 
applies to Denmark: dialogue meeting have seen information flow from state authorities to 
industry – but not from companies to regulators. Orientation meetings allowed state authorities 
to communicate their views to a wider audience. But because such meetings have been convened 
on an irregular and infrequent basis, Danish companies have been unable to keep abreast of how 
the rapidly evolving international nanotech debate might influence agency agendas and priorities. 
Without regular opportunities to learn how state bureaucrats understood scientific developments, 
corporate representatives had no reliable basis to inform their expectations about probable 
regulatory reactions. We are thus presented with a first clue to their cautious and subdued 
response.  
A closer look at how state authorities have sought to cultivate expert advice allows us to 
unpack corporate risk-benefit calculations in greater detail. Just like their German colleagues, 
Danish officials have relied on external sources of expertise to inform their risk management 
decisions. State authorities have routinely sought inputs through informal contact as well as 
through standing advisory committees. The Danish Health and Medicines Authority’s 
(Sundhedsstyrelsen) scientific advisory committee has for example demonstrated great concern 
for the human health and environmental implications of nanomaterials. Sundhedsstyrelsen and 
other state authorities rely on the committee to identify potential sources of harm and where 
possible recommend mitigation strategies. In this capacity, the committee is asked to gather, 
translate and disseminate scientific evidence and international experiences among participants, 
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analytic judgments, industry participation might have afforded representatives from state 
authorities, academia and industry opportunities to develop a common diagnosis of nanotech. 
Unlike similar expert panels in Germany, committee membership is however confined to 
representatives from named academic and governmental research institutions. Representatives 
from industry are excluded. While the committee assists regulators access information and 
scientific interpretations, it does not bring experts from industry in close and permanent contact 
with their academic and governmental peers; and regulators cannot use the committee as a venue 
to discretely communicate their agendas and priorities to industry.  
Beyond interactions under established advisory bodies, the Danish nanotech debate has been 
organized around MST’s informal expert network. Members of this network have however been 
drawn exclusively from governmental research institutions and universities. Experts from 
industry have not participated in or otherwise contributed to their discussions, and they have thus 
been denied the same opportunities for ‘a meeting of minds’ as their German colleagues. The 
absence of an institutionalized dialogue has in turn inspired little confidence in the 
professionalism of academic and governmental experts. An industry insider voiced these 
frustrations: 
“They rely on their own contacts – one academic asks the next academic. They show little interests for 
reaching beyond their own circles and much less for how they might access ‘hands on’ experiences with 
these issues. Let me put it bluntly: academic ‘reality’ has long since been outpaced by commercial 
developments. We are so far ahead that they have about a snowball’s chance in hell of catching up with 
us. The problem is that the authorities are not listening to us, because we are ‘dangerous’ – we are the bad 
guys. They listen to academics [who still] discuss how Adam met Eve in Paradise. It may sound grotesque, 
but I cannot help but think: ‘wake up people! We know so much more than that.’ And still they talk and 
get nowhere. […] They of all people ought to be asking: ‘where is [nanotech] taking us and what 
regulatory response is required?’ But my word no: they are looking to regulate, where we raced past them 
five years ago. And that is absolutely grotesque […] I do not know how many times I have thrown 
documentation, international studies, EU funded studies, REACH reports… I have thrown countless 
studies at the Environmental Protection Agency and the Working Environment Authority, at the 
regulatory decision-makers, at the universities, at the public authorities, even at the politicians to say: 
‘listen, the knowledge is already available!’ How is it that no one in the Kingdom of Denmark has the 
capacity to absorb that knowledge? Because they sit in their own little pond and ask only the duck next 
door.”9 (My translation) 
Absent consultation or exchanges among the group of academic and governmental experts 




9  Interview, Copenhagen, June 1, 2011. 
A Meeting of Minds 
139 
governmental ambitions and designs for nanotech; and their understandings of and expectations 
about possible governmental reactions were consequently hazy. But even where the Danish 
chemical control regime does institutionalize discussion, negotiation and collaboration among 
state authorities and industry – the system of worker protection – nanotech has not given rise to 
extensive deliberations of scientific evidence or possible control measures.  
Worker protection is where the Danish chemical control regime most closely resembles the 
situation in Germany: the Danish Working Environment Council, Arbejdsmiljørådet (AMR), 
includes representatives from the social partners and serves to advice the Minister for 
Employment. AMR is responsible for drafting regulatory proposals and must be consulted prior 
to the promulgation of new statutory instruments. The Council monitors developments related to 
workplace safety in Denmark and gathers current information and international experiences 
about potential sources of harm. Like the AGS, AMR creates opportunities for members from 
state authorities, businesses, and unions to settle disagreements through discussion, develop 
common understandings and negotiate agreed solutions. The Council has nonetheless had little 
impact on the nanotech agenda in Denmark: the potential human health risks of nanomaterials 
have occasionally surfaced on Council meetings – but only as an issue that might warrant future 
attention. Members have requested that the Minister of Employment keep the Council informed 
of ongoing developments, but they have so far demonstrated little concern for or independent 
interests in nanotechnologies.  
Like the AGS, AMR is focused on preventing workplace harm by formulating measures to 
reduce or mitigate sources of exposure. While the Council thus provides a forum, where 
members can meet to gather, share and discuss information, its mandate does not extend to the 
generation of evidence to support the identification of occupational hazards.10 Members instead 
rely on state authorities to fund, organize and produce the basic research required for risk 
assessment and management; and the Council’s agenda and deliberations is therefore intimately 
tied to the regulatory activities of the Danish Working Environment Authority (AT). Like 
authorities in other countries, AT has prioritized initiatives to build the knowledge base to 
evaluate the need for new regulations. The agency has in consequence looked to the National 
Research Centre for the Working Environment – an independent research institution under the 
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possible occupational risks. But this approach also limited the role of AMR members in the 
nanotech debate. 
Although representatives from NFA participate as observers in AMR meetings and may be 
asked to participate in the formulation of technical rules, there are few institutionalized contacts 
or exchanges among researchers from NFA and members of the AMR.11 NFA initiatives and 
results have not been communicated to the Council on a regular basis and have therefore sparked 
only limited interest among its members. This lack of attention to nanotech is meanwhile 
reinforced by AMR’s mandate: the Council must be consulted on new statutory instruments and 
AT does routinely seek inputs from members – once a decision to regulate is made. Members 
thus participate in policy discussions of reduction strategies or mitigation instruments. But AT 
alone decides which substances are taken up for review. While researchers at NFA now advocate 
the need for new regulations to control occupational exposure to nanomaterials, AT has 
indicated that new measures must await the conclusion of ongoing discussions at the European 
level. Short of issuing new binding rules, the agency instead published statements in May 2013 
intended to clarify the responsibilities of employers.  
With AT restricting its activities to building the evidence, there has been little reason for 
Council members to discuss nanotech. Since the nanotech agenda in effect has been funneled 
around – not through – the AMR, members were given few occasions to learn how officials at 
AT understood the evidence and evaluated the need for future controls. Although the AMR thus 
demonstrates a capacity for deliberation, negotiation and consensus among state authorities and 
the social partners, the Council has had little impact on business expectations about the probable 
responses of state authorities. Insulated bureaucratic decision-making processes broken only by 
ad hoc consultations in short left Danish companies without a sense of the bigger picture. And 
they therefore reacted cautiously to governmental appeals for cooperation. 
THE ROOTS OF GERMAN AND DANISH BUSINESS RESPONSES  
Variations I submit in the capacity to predict the probable reactions of state bureaucrats explain 
the varied responses of German and Danish companies. In Germany, regular contacts and policy 
deliberations among federal decision-makers, companies and their representatives have focused 
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out a regulatory response to ensure the safe and responsible development of nanotechnologies. 
Since discussions were embedded in a dense network of advisory committees and similar 
deliberative fora, German companies were presented with ample opportunities to learn how 
federal decision-makers understood the evidence for nanotech and how they evaluated the need 
for new controls. The dialogue process helped industry gauge the intentions of federal 
authorities, and it in turn bolstered corporate confidence that their views and interests would be 
considered and respected. Knowledge about the designs and priorities of federal authorities thus 
helped dispel possible misgivings in their commitments. Since information is instrumental in 
shaping regulators’ interpretation of the evidence, their diagnosis of and solutions to regulatory 
problems, this confidence created compelling incentives for companies to volunteer their 
expertise and experiences to federal officials. Disclosure and dialogue have in other words 
permitted industry to shape the direction of German nanotech policies. An official observed: 
“It is always a compromise which comes out in the end. It is tit-for-tat in a way: you get information, you 
know what the industry is working on, you know their interests, and on the other side […] the companies 
then know what the federal agencies need or what they want to know. [Companies] can influence the 
public authorities [by saying:] ‘don’t make [the regulations] that strict.’ It can work fine, because you get a 
regulatory system, which can work.”12  
Danish companies have in contrast enjoyed few occasions to learn how state bureaucrats 
understood and evaluated the available body of evidence. While deliberative institutions do exist 
in Denmark, the policy process did not accord representatives from state authorities and industry 
regular opportunities to debate scientific developments, develop common understandings, and 
reach agreed conclusions. Laments an industry insider:  
“Denmark lags far behind other countries and the so-called experts simply do not have the necessary 
knowledge and understanding [of these issues]. The problem in Denmark is that we – the commercial 
stakeholders – are not consulted. […] We do not influence the agenda and we are not heard by the 
politicians or the authorities. We are only heard, when the media is thrown a bone. […] Because we have 
commercial interests, we are considered ‘dangerous’.” (My translation)  
Companies were in consequence left without a reliable basis to predict how state authorities 
might react to new information – and whether and how such a response might consider their 
views and interests. A cautious and timid stance was therefore a sensible response to the policy 
process; and reluctance to volunteer sensitive information to state authorities a strategy to 
minimize the economic and administrative impact of decisions over which companies had little 
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introduce a mandatory nanoregister. In March 2011, a MST official observed: “There has been a 
discussion of separate regulations for nanoproducts. At the moment, we do not see the need for 
new regulations, because there is no evidence that nanomaterials should be treated any different 
than other substances. Then again, you never know…”13 (My translation) 18 months later a 
nanoregister was a reality in Denmark.  
While the decision to introduce registration obligations reflects part of a political compromise 
over the 2012 national budget, MST’s position and preferences on a nanoregister had also 
shifted. Rejecting arguments from industry that the 2007 mapping exercises had succeeded in 
generating needed and sufficient information – and that statutory requirements in consequence 
were futile and unreasonably burdensome for industry – MST (2012: 11) noted: 
“Experiences with voluntary reporting in for example the UK as well as the projects undertaken in 
Denmark […] have shown that [voluntary] approaches are insufficient to provide an overview of the 
number of nanoproducts in commerce. A mandatory reporting requirement is therefore considered 
proportional.” (My translation)  
Prior to March 2011, companies had been given few reasons to expect that Denmark would be 
among the first countries to introduce mandatory obligations for manufacturers and users of 
nanomaterials. MST had raised – and dismissed – the possibility of a reporting requirement at 
previous orientation meetings. Since however decisions on the direction of Danish nanotech 
policy were informed by discussions among a closed group of governmental and academic 
experts, industry was not presented with indications that the evaluation of a nanoregister was 
changing. Because industry representatives did not participate in these policy deliberations, they 
in short had little basis to predict a reversal of the agency’s position of a nanoregister.  
Despite the disparate nature of the German and Danish nanotech experience, some overlap 
does nonetheless exist. In chapter three, we for example observed how UBA’s attempt to 
encourage companies to volunteer information met a silent response. Because it sheds further 
light on the conclusions reached in chapter four, we will briefly dwell at the roots of UBA’s 
‘uneasy’ relations with industry. The weakest of the federal agencies, UBA serves mainly an 
advisory role to the BMU and other federal ministries. The creation of UBA in 1974 was widely 
interpreted by the chemical industry as “a signal that the government was no longer going to 
depend exclusively on ‘the closed circle of experts’ for advice on the formulation and 
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established scientific community for advice.” (Paterson 1991: 231) Viewed as a competing source 
of expertise, industry came to adopt a belligerent stance towards the new agency.  
UBA is endowed with few statutory powers, but must rely instead on its powers of persuasion 
to influence regulatory outcomes. Recall that the ambiguous delegation of regulatory powers in 
U.S. chemical control legislation implies that American companies seldom look to the federal 
agencies to advance their interests. Fragmentation of powers affords companies alternative routes 
of influence and they often see little value in maintaining relations with regulators on congenial 
terms. A comparable situation exists for UBA. We can illustrate with the German debate over a 
possible nanoproduct register. Intensely debated during the NanoKommission’s second phase, 
no consensus on the need for or design of a register was reached. While the idea found support 
among environmental and consumer organizations (NanoKommission 2010c), VCI and other 
industry groups flatly rejected mandatory requirements “on the grounds of overlap with existing 
registries, the complexity, the high administrative costs and the risk that consumers could 
perceive this as a sign of unexplained or general risks inherent to all nanomaterials or ‘nano-
products’.” (VCI 2011) (My translation) Described as a ‘touchy subject’ by observers,14 a 
nanoproduct register ultimately won little political support. Although the Environmental Minister 
appeared in favor of introducing reporting obligations, “not much happened, because he didn’t 
have support from the other resorts in government – the Ministry of Economics for instance or 
the Consumer Ministry didn’t support him.”15  
Despite UBA recommendations, and BMU’s more ‘progressive stand on nanotech 
regulation’,16 opposition from other ministries served to thwart a compromise. The ensuing 
stalemate within the Federal Government draws our attention to what has in the past been a well 
travelled avenue of influence for industry. Like their UK competitors, German companies could 
rely on their capacity to persuade ministerial officials sympathetic to the views of industry to 
defend their interest. Because political decisions – whether on a nanoregister or chemical safety 
policy – must be cleared through interdepartmental coordination and negotiations, the VCI and 
its members has often managed to place a break on ‘meddling’ bureaucrats from the 
environmental administration by convincing the BMBF and especially the powerful Ministry of 
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and ensures that industry is consulted prior to the launch of new initiatives;17 and as illustrated by 
the debate over a German nanoregister, this situation translates into generous opportunities to 
indirectly influence the direction of chemical control policy. Since the chemical industry is thus 
afforded alternative routes of influence, companies have found little need for or value of 
attempting to cultivate close and cooperative relations with regulators from UBA.18  
But the reluctance to share information with UBA officials also demonstrates a lack of 
confidence in the intentions of an agency traditionally viewed as competing source of expertise. 
Unlike BAuA or BfR, UBA does not entertain an institutionalized dialogue with industry. UBA 
does look to advisory bodies for expert inputs – none of which however includes members from 
industry. Officials do not engage industry representative in routine discussions about potential 
sources of environmental harm or their possible solutions – such discussions are instead 
organized and sponsored by UBA’s resort ministry, BMU.19 UBA has – like authorities in 
Denmark – in effect limited its interactions with industrial stakeholders to occasional conferences 
and issue-specific consultations. Although UBA officials did participated in discussions under the 
NanoKommission, disagreements often emerged among UBA and NGOs on one side and 
industry on the other. Despite the general pattern of collaborative interactions among federal 
entities, German companies and their representatives, UBA’s experience in short mirrors the 
Danish nanotech story. Absent secure channels to communicate the agency’s agendas and 
priorities, UBA has been unable to convince German companies to volunteer information.  
The gentle reader might object that this account neglects the most enduring source of 
divergence between the German and Danish chemical industries: their vastly different sizes. 
Whereas the chemical industry was an economic powerhouse of postwar Germany, the same 
cannot be said for its Danish counterpart. Although moderately successful in economic terms, 
the Danish chemical industry dwarfs in international comparison. Germany leads in Europe by 
the number of companies commercializing nanotechnologies – the industrial uptake of nanotech 
in Denmark barely registers in comparison (BMBF 2009; 2011b; Andersen and Rasmussen 2006; 
Tønning and Poulsen 2007). The different experience, scale of operations, and importance of the 
chemical industries in the German and Danish political economies clearly hold implications for 
their political options and behavior. An alternative reading of the German and Danish nanotech 
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the large and powerful German chemical industry can shape and bend the rules – in Germany, in 
Europe and globally – to its advantage, smaller industries have few options, but to swim with the 
tide. Given its diminutive size, the Danish industry must in short take, not make the rules that 
governs its conduct. German and Danish companies thus had very different stakes in 
governmental decisions concerning nanomaterials – a fact that explains why Danish companies 
have not demonstrated greater interest in and concern for the regulatory process.  
The size of national industries does undeniably influence their political options and behavior. 
Rather than view this as a problem for my account of business responses in Germany and 
Denmark, I suggest that we might instead understand it as an opportunity to explore the absence 
of institutionalized policy deliberations among state bureaucrats and Danish companies. To 
unpack this narrative, we need to make a brief detour to explore historical patterns of chemicals 
regulation in Denmark, past interactions among state bureaucrats and chemical companies and 
how this has influenced their reactions to state intervention.  
Although chemicals are indispensable for industrial production, the core chemicals sector does 
not represent a major branch of Danish manufacturing industry. Denmark has no production of 
basic chemicals of note and the industry consists almost exclusively of downstream users and 
distributors of imported chemicals. Small and medium sized enterprises specialized in 
intermediate and end products dominate the Danish chemicals sector. The industry’s weak 
economic basis and fragmented structure translated into weakness in political terms. The interests 
of the Danish chemical industry have found no ministerial champion comparable to the BMBF 
or the powerful BMWi. Unlike the agrichemical industry, which could count on the Ministry of 
Agriculture to defend its interests – where they coincided with those of farmers – producers and 
industrial users of chemicals were left to fend for their own interests. Since the state had no 
significant industry to protect, decisions to intervene in the affairs of the chemical industry were 
not moderated by the need to accommodate major producer interests. Denmark has in 
consequence often been among the first countries to restrict problematic chemicals (Boye and 
Ege 1999). The absence of major manufacturers and strong producer interests on the other hand 
also meant that Danish chemicals policy is characterized by continuity of preferences and 
priorities. Control policies changed little from one government to the next; and Denmark has 
been spared many of the protracted controversies, which have riddled countries, where producer 
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The industry’s relative economic and political weakness in turn gave rise to a distinct pattern 
of interactions among its representatives and state bureaucrats. Lacking the economic weight of 
their German competitors, Danish companies did not have the political strength or resources to 
pry open administrative proceedings or demand representation on scientific advisory panels. State 
agencies seldom sought the advice of industrial experts to support hazard identification and risks 
assessment; instead, they relied on the expertise of academic researchers to evaluate and interpret 
scientific evidence. Drawing on international experiences and knowledge generated by public 
research institutions, decisions on whether and when the state should intervene to restrict specific 
chemicals have de facto been left to state bureaucrats. Companies accepted that initiative rests with 
the state, and the relevant question has instead been how to adapt to and if possible benefit from 
state intervention.  
While this pattern can be traced to the early reaches of the 20th Century (Steensberg 1981), it 
was formalized with the 1979 Chemicals Act, which consolidated the state’s responsibilities for 
chemical safety. Unlike the pesticides area, where the act created an advisory board with 
representatives from agriculture, pesticide manufacturers, and civil society organizations, similar 
arrangement for industrial chemicals were rejected. In the negotiations preceding the enactment 
of the Chemicals Act, the Ministry of the Environment effectively opposed proposals to establish 
an advisory committee with a pluralistic or corporatist composition. The Ministry instead insisted 
on separating expert advice from the articulation of partisan interests, fearful that a procedure 
which granted access for industry expertise might blur the boundaries. While the negotiations saw 
the Ministry of Agriculture intercede to guarantee representation for agrichemical companies on 
the newly established council for pest management products, manufacturers and users of 
industrial chemicals had nowhere to turn for support. Without the backing of a ministerial 
sponsor, the chemical industry had little choice but to accept the position of the Ministry of 
Environment (Jensen 1983). 
Rather than institutionalize policy deliberations among state authorities and industrial 
stakeholders, the 1979 Chemicals Act demonstrated a clear preference for building bureaucratic 
expertise in the areas of toxicology, eco-toxicology and epidemiology – a preference which 
resurfaced throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In the debates over biotechnology, for instance, the 
Environment Ministry again chose to develop in-house expertise rather than institutionalize 
access for industry representatives through a standing advisory committee (Levidov 1998). 
Although stakeholder fora have since been established for specific sectors or product areas, such 
as electronics, textiles or construction, a forum where representatives from academia, industry 
and authorities could meet and discuss issues pertaining to industrial chemicals was never created. 
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Proposals to establish such a permanent venue have been rejected – often with arguments that 
echo the Environment Ministry’s initial resistance to a pluralistic advisory committee (see e.g. 
Teknologirådet 1999).  
Accepting state initiative however also came easier for an industry which had no strong vested 
interests in the manufacture of specific chemicals. Since control policies often sought to temper 
the disruptive impacts of substance bans or use restrictions through generous transition schemes, 
the economic stakes for industry were seldom sufficient to induce fierce mobilization. With 
virtually all chemicals imported for use by small and medium sized enterprises, Danish companies 
lacked the resources – and incentives – to develop the requisite knowledge and expertise to 
penetrate administrative risk assessment proceedings. A VCI representative was adamant about 
the implications: “You need the expertise of the big companies. [Small companies] don’t have the 
expertise. They don’t have the manpower.”21 SMEs abound in the Danish chemicals sector, but 
there are no major chemical corporations with production capabilities or facilities in Denmark. 
Large international manufacturers do operate on the Danish market, but their activities are 
limited to distribution. Whereas the Danish chemical industry in other words lacked the 
economic resources to invest in general scientific knowledge and expertise, its larger German 
competitor in contrast allocates significant resources to chemistry science and related fields. 
Based on member contributions, the VCI for example administers the Fonds der Chemischen 
Industrie to support basic scientific research in universities. These commitments have not only 
helped build industrial expertise and scientific capabilities, but have also resulted in close links 
and long-standing sympathies among industry and the academic community (Martinelli and 
Grant 1991: 281).  
Because Danish companies in general do not manufacture their own chemicals – but rely on 
substances imported from upstream suppliers – they also faced fewer incentives to learn about 
their possible adverse effects. Chemicals manufacturers have vested interests in their substances, 
and they therefore have good reason to learn as much as possible about their effects (Applegate 
1991: 299). The manufacturer’s costumers – the industrial users – however have very different 
stakes in the substance. While a particular chemical may constitute an essential component of the 
users’ production processes or products, their responsibilities for the substance is nonetheless 
limited. Adverse effects – provided the guidance issued by the supplier has been followed – 
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for suitable replacements. Although restrictions on use or mandatory substitution obviously are 
not desirable from a user perspective, the financial implications and technical impediments are 
nevertheless minor compared to the manufacturers that might be forced to rethink and redesign 
their substances or processes entirely, suffer significant losses of revenue or worse have to cease 
production all together. As downstream users, then, Danish companies had little need to invest in 
scientific expertise, develop independent understandings of the properties of their imported 
chemicals, and fewer reasons still to undertake – expensive – testing and analysis. Whether the 
question is bulk chemicals or nanomaterials, the major source of information about possible 
human health and environmental effects for Danish companies thus remains their suppliers – 
and state authorities.  
Given its structural characteristics, the Danish chemical industry in short had neither the 
resources nor incentives to develop the expertise and knowledge necessary to penetrate 
administrative risk assessment proceedings. With little privileged knowledge relevant to hazard 
identification or the requisite expertise to deliberate analytic assumptions and scientific 
judgments, access to the advisory process held little promise of influence. Danish companies 
instead resigned to await state initiative. State bureaucrats for their part showed little inclinations 
to seek the advice and judgment of industry in identifying problematic chemicals. Deliberations 
among experts from state authorities, academic institutions and industry were therefore never 
institutionalized as a mechanism to promote consensus on difficult-to-resolve scientific or 
technological issues. For German companies in contrast participation in administrative risk 
assessment procedures constitutes an opportunity to mold the knowledge and understandings of 
federal bureaucrats. Rather than resign to state initiative, institutionalized deliberations among 
industry and federal authorities create opportunities to shape and divert decisions to intervene 
against specific chemicals. In this sense – the political weakness of the Danish chemical industry 
and its structural reliance on the knowledge of suppliers – it is therefore correct that the vastly 
different sizes of the German and Danish chemical industries influenced their disparate 
responses to nanotech. Since Danish companies do not participate in decisions to regulate 
specific chemicals – whether bulk or nanoscale – their acquiescent response to the regulatory 
process is perhaps to be expected. 
Does this mean that Danish companies had no information of value to the regulatory process 
– and no concern for its outcome? Of course not! Notes an observer:  
“It may well be that we do not quite understand the risks. But that is no excuse for not knowing how may 
Danish companies [are working with nanomaterials], what materials they use, how many workers are 
exposed, what products are available, which materials are used in those products, in what concentrations 
and so on. All this basic information, which you also need to do a risk assessment, this information has 
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not been compiled. Say you were to discover that certain nanomaterials were absurdly problematic – then 
you would have no idea about where in the consumer and production chains they are used and who the 
Danish manufacturers might be. And that is problematic to say the least.”22 (My translation) 
State authorities posed these questions to industry. Companies knew the answers – but showed 
only limited appetite for disclosing the requested information. I have argued that discomfort in 
the intentions of state bureaucrats explains this response. With the benefit of the historical 
context for chemicals regulation in Denmark, we are now in a position to further elaborate 
corporate risk-benefit calculations and the roots of their subdued response.  
In chapter three, I mentioned that the Danish chemicals sector is governed by consensus and 
inclusion of affected interests. This is in part an expression of a wider corporatist legacy: 
negotiations and compromises with organized interests were encouraged to facilitate 
parliamentary approval of new legislation and its subsequent implementation (Andersen, 
Christiansen and Winter 1998; Christiansen, Nørgaard and Sidenius 2004). But it also reflects 
how decisions of chemical control policy depend on inputs from industry. In the words of a MST 
official: 
“It is very difficult for us here at Miljøstyrelsen to target activities for regulation unless we have some 
understanding of what is happening on the ground. But from behind my desk, you simply got to acknowledge 
that our understanding of what actually goes on at some factory is rather limited. So we need to talk with 
those who have that understanding. […] Unless you talk to the parties, there is a very, very good chance that 
you’ll draw up something which either doesn’t work or else has some completely unintended consequences, 
which means that you’ll have to do it all over again.”23 (My translation) 
Responsibility for the identification of chemicals hazards may well rest with state bureaucrats. 
But that still leaves the important question of how the state should intervene to control those 
hazards. Because the effectiveness and cost of alternative control measures are difficult to 
estimate, regulators necessarily seek guidance from those with the requisite technical expertise, 
information and experience – in effect the companies working with the chemicals regulators are 
looking to control. Despite its diminutive size, state authorities have routinely negotiated the 
design of statutory instruments with representatives of the chemical industry. Rather than 
question administrative decisions to intervene against specific chemicals, companies have instead 
focused their efforts on shaping the choice of statutory instruments. Companies can in short 
countenance state initiative, secure in the knowledge that the instruments of intervention are 
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Nanotechnologies thus presented Danish companies with a familiar situation: as state 
authorities were gathering evidence in support of a decision to intervene or not, companies had 
little reason to mobilize – knowing full well that disclosure would not significantly influence or 
alter this decision. Biding their time, nondisclosure was in contrast attractive from a corporate 
risk-benefit perspective: should state bureaucrats decide not to intervene – all the better for 
industry. Should state authorities – as they indeed did – decide that new regulations were required 
and justified, corporate interests might be better served by withholding information until their 
representatives were called upon to negotiate the terms of intervention.24 While business 
associations thus have voiced few opinions on nanotech, the first real display of concern came 
with the decision to introduce a nanoregister. Industry had no say in this decision and was unable 
to divert its passage through Parliament. Yet, while the bill empowers MST to introduce a 
reporting requirement, it did not specify the design of this requirement. Questions of the number 
and type of products subject to registration, possible exceptions, the definition of nanomaterials, 
the frequency of registrations, the scope and extent of information required for registrations, data 
access and protection of confidential business information et cetera were all left to administrative 
discretion – and were therefore open to negotiation. At the time of writing – August 2013 – 
discussions among MST officials and industry are still ongoing and speculations concerning their 
eventual outcome are probably unproductive. Yet, while Danish companies were unable to 
prevent the creation of a nanoregister, they are now nonetheless in a position to influence its 
scope, design and implementation. Since their capacity to persuade state bureaucrats will depend 
on the arguments, information and expertise they bring to the negotiations, their interests were 
better served by not disclosing it prematurely. Although in short the diminutive size of the 
Danish industry undeniably influenced its response to the regulatory process, it did not determine 
that response. The industry’s political and economic weakness, and its structural reliance on 
information provided by upstream suppliers, is rather a precondition for understanding the roots 
of the acquiescent and subdued responses of Danish companies. 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES REVISITED 
This account of German and Danish business strategies differs from the explanation I offered for 
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regulatory powers in state bureaucracies explain their capacity to commit to cooperation with 
industry; and I demonstrated how variations in bureaucratic autonomy account for the varied 
responses of American and British companies. Both accounts depart from the premise that 
business responses grow from expectations about the probable behavior of state bureaucrats. 
Because they transmit information on the intentions, agendas and strategies of regulators, the 
configuration of institutions and processes of chemical control regimes help companies 
formulate strategies to anticipate regulatory risks and opportunities. But the two accounts identify 
different sources of information about the possible reactions of state bureaucrats: in chapter four, 
I demonstrated how companies use their understanding of formal institutions and their operating 
procedures to predict probable outcomes. In this chapter, I have in contrast emphasized how 
repeated historical experience builds up a set of common expectations that allows companies to 
anticipate how regulators will react to new information.  
Are there points of tangency between these two accounts? As I mentioned above, the legal 
and institutional relationships found in the German and Danish chemical control regimes are 
roughly comparable and thus cannot – with the exception of UBA – be the source of the 
variation we observe. State bureaucrats are in both countries empowered to determine what 
chemicals to regulate, in what order, by what means, and how stringently. Scrutiny by national 
parliaments or the courts rarely infringes on bureaucratic autonomy. As in Britain, concentration 
of regulatory powers and the limited prospect of political or judicial interference in short dictate a 
strategic orientation towards the bureaucracy. But how does the Anglo-American nanotech 
experience look in the German-Danish mirror? What role if any has institutionalized policy 
deliberations had for corporate risk-benefit calculations in Britain and the United States? 
Deliberative institutions as it were are an important – and so far neglected – element of the UK 
nanotech story; in the U.S., their impact on business responses has in contrast been negligible. 
Advisory bodies abound in the UK chemicals sector – some of which are familiar from 
chapter three. Some two dozen expert committees and stakeholder fora advice HM Government 
on questions related to chemical safety and regulation. Governmental departments and agencies 
have routinely relied on these advisory bodies for guidance and inputs on their nanotech related 
initiatives and policies. Since industry is represented on many, if not most, of these advisory 
panels, the UK policy process has created ample opportunities for corporate representatives to 
engage decision-makers in regular discussion of governmental agendas, priorities and preferences. 
We saw for example how, in an effort to promote knowledge exchange and consensus on the 
direction of UK research policies, membership of the various taskforces under the inter-
ministerial Nanotechnology Research Coordination Group was expanded to include 
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representatives from industry; and how deliberations among governmental scientist, academic 
researchers and industry experts helped guide decisions on research initiatives and priorities as 
well as facilitate agreement on the major challenges facing reliable hazard and risk identification 
(Defra 2007). The NRCG has thus provided a venue, where members could develop a common 
diagnosis of nanotech and gather information about the consequences of different decisions. 
Membership of the taskforces in turn created opportunities for industry representatives to learn 
how governmental decision-makers understood the available body of knowledge.  
We also noticed how the Health and Safety Executive funneled discussions with corporate 
representative and industry experts through its network of advisory committees, boards and 
industry councils. Organized and operating according to similar principles as comparable German 
expert bodies, HSE relies on its advisory committees to engage industrial stakeholders in regular 
deliberations of industry drivers, workplace hazards and exposures. The Working Group on 
Action to Control Chemicals (WATCH) illustrates: following the conclusion of the October 2004 
stakeholder symposium (HSL 2004), HSE asked WATCH members to review current knowledge 
about safety issues and advice the agency on the adequacy of existing exposure control strategies. 
WATCH members since engaged in detailed analyses of occupational health aspects of 
nanotechnologies with positions on toxicological hazard, occupational exposure, risk assessment 
and management approaches agreed among members (WATCH 2005; 2006; 2008).  
WATCH and its sister committees have thus encouraged regular communications among 
HSE officials and industry representatives on sources of workplace harms as well as strategies for 
prevention, management and control. HSE’s advisory committees serve as permanent fora, 
where officials can meet with experts from industry and other stakeholders to discuss the main 
health and safety issues facing particular industries and to consider methodologies relevant to 
best practice solutions. HSE further relies on its committees to translate and disseminate agency 
agendas and priorities to their constituent industries. And as we saw in chapter three, feedback 
from policy discussions often act as a stimulus for identifying industrial health and safety research 
needs. Because industry experts are placed in permanent and close contact with their academic 
and governmental peers, companies are in short better able to understand how the agency views 
and interprets scientific evidence of occupational harm as well as the need for new control 
measures. 
Defra has likewise relied on its Advisory Committee on Hazardous Substances (ACHS) for 
advice in support of the ministry’s nanotech related initiatives, investments and programs. Defra 
for example asked members to review information submitted under the VRS. Submissions were 
discussed and evaluated behind closed doors to accommodate the interests of data owners. 
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Members ultimately concluded that the information did not present cause for concern and were 
thus instrumental in persuading Defra that no urgent measures were needed to curb human and 
environmental risks.25 Because the ACHS procedure preserves discretion and protects the privacy 
of communications, regular interactions among Defra officials and industrial members as 
illustrated by the VRS facilitates frank discussions about potential hazards and exposure; and the 
ACHS has since 2005 constituted a major source of advice on domestic and international 
developments related to nanotechnologies.  
The ACHS further acts in support of the UK Chemicals Stakeholder Forum. Establish under 
the 1999 UK Chemicals Strategy (DETR 1999) to build trust among government, industry and 
other stakeholders, the forum was created to allow industry expertise and views to flow into the 
formulation of policy and priorities. The forum advises HM Government on how industry can 
reduce possible risks from hazardous chemicals, and reflects a measure to promote and 
institutionalize regular discussion among officials and industry representatives. As I observed in 
chapter four, the Chemicals Strategy cements past commitments to cooperation and dialogue 
with industry. Collaboration among UK companies and state authorities thus builds on and 
reflects a broader pattern of institutionalized policy deliberations in the UK chemical safety area. 
While HM Government has turned to established advisory bodies and familiar contacts within 
the industrial community to garner advice and inputs, the fledgling nature of the nanotech 
industry also created its own set of problems. One official explained,  
“the main problem has been identifying who ‘they’ are in fact. Because of course they are the ones who 
make the nanocovers and the nanoparticles and they are quite obviously nanomanufacturers, but what 
about the people, who makes the paints with the nano-titanium dioxide, what about the people who do 
micro and nano-electronics? A lot of these people don’t see themselves as nanomanufacturers and it is 
difficult to talk to the entire industrial community.”26  
In 2005, Defra therefore set up a Nanotechnologies Stakeholder Forum (NSF). The NSF 
brings together stakeholders from industry, academia and civil society organizations to ensure 
that wider concerns and perspectives are built into early policy deliberations (NSF 2005). Never 
intended as a mechanism to secure general consensus, the forum was instead meant to capture a 
wide breadth of opinions.27 Initial meetings in the NSF were structured around the desire to 
discern the need for immediate action, while laying out governmental strategies and priorities. 
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prior to their launch. The NSF has allowed HM Government to float ideas to stakeholders and in 
return receive feedback on the design, formulation and implementation of regulatory measures 
and research initiatives. As “a valuable means of information exchange on developments in 
nanotechnologies” (HM Government 2009: 8), the NSF has thus underpinned regular policy 
deliberations among government and stakeholders. As one Defra official concluded, “the forum 
has been a very useful group up until now. It has helped shape policy, has helped us understand 
better what public perceptions are in the world of nanotechnologies.”28  
For UK companies, the NSF helped address uncertainties about the future directions of 
governmental policies and strategies. Informal discussions with officials served as a valuable 
source of information on their current statutory responsibilities. The forum has further helped 
UK companies keep abreast of how the rapidly evolving international nanotech debate might 
influence regulatory agendas and priorities. As a forum, where members could develop common 
understandings of complex technical issues, gather and share information about the 
consequences of different decisions and build mutual expectations, the NSF was thus 
instrumental to dispel possible concerns about the intentions of state bureaucrats. The reliance 
on informal consultation of UK companies and regular discussion with their representatives 
funneled through the NSF and similar deliberative bodies in short facilitated their ability to 
anticipate how state authorities might react to new information. Knowledge about the agendas of 
state bureaucrats in turn helped persuade companies that their views and interests would be 
considered as new issues emerge; and strengthen their beliefs in the credibility of bureaucratic 
commitments. 
Business responses in the United States were in contrast colored by misgivings about agency 
intentions and agendas. Despite generous opportunities for American companies to participate in 
regulatory proceedings, there are few occasions for their representatives and federal officials to 
develop mutual understandings, craft common solutions, or reach agreed conclusions. While 
federal entities such as the NNI or EPA have placed great emphasis on getting all relevant parties 
to the table to ensure full public participation in the development of U.S. nanotech policies 
(Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott 2007), they have nonetheless been reluctant to draw in external 
views during the formative stages of decision-making. A stakeholder forum comparable to the 
NSF was for example never established in the United States; nor was industry representatives 
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of deliberative institutions are thus few and far between, and representatives of organized 
interests have been kept at arm’s length. Where deliberative institutions do exist – federal 
advisory committees – they have not created the basis for regular discussions among officials and 
industry representatives; and their impact on corporate risk-benefit calculations has been 
negligible.  
Federal decision-makers have expressed interest in improving communication with companies 
and industry groups. Since the initiative’s inception, the NNI has for example experimented with 
various mechanisms to tap the research needs of industry: between 2003 and 2005, NNI 
sponsored the creation of liaison groups with the electronics, forest products, chemicals, and 
industry research management communities. Described as mechanisms to encourage ongoing 
dialogue with industrial stakeholders,29 these Consultative Boards for Advancing Nanotechnology 
(CBAN) brought public and private sector experts together in an effort to facilitate debate of 
NNI research programs and priorities. But while the CBANs did help structure dialogues among 
industrial stakeholders and federal officials (Maynard 2006: 37), their activities had ceased by 
2007. The NNI instead came to rely on a more ad hoc format with discussions organized around a 
series of workshops and formal consultations. While an argument certainly can be made in favor 
of public workshops, they cannot substitute for ongoing discussion of complex technical issues. 
In their review of the NEHI research strategy, the National Research Council (2009: 8) for 
example found that while the  
“NNI reports have undergone public comment […] public comment is not the same as engaging 
stakeholders in the process. Without adequate input from external stakeholders, it is not possible for 
government agencies to develop an effective research strategy to underpin the emergence of safe 
nanotechnologies.” 
In chapter four, I explained how rigorous procedural and judicial controls of administrative 
discretion undercut bureaucratic autonomy. The NNI’s now all but forgotten experiment with 
the CBANs illustrates how such controls also limits the ability of federal decision-makers to 
institutionalize deliberations with their industrial constituents – and therefore undermine the 
credibility of their commitments. Explains a NNI official:  
“we have some restrictions by the Federal Government for seeking advice from external stakeholders on 
a regular basis. We can’t set up a regular series of advisors without going through a lot of rules […] at that 
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our laws are interpreted change over time [and] the CBANs really are not legal under the current 
interpretation of the law – they violate FACA!”30 
Passed during the ‘Good Government’ era of the 1970s, FACA or the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act is designed to formalize and routinize the use of advisory bodies, in part out of 
concern that some interests had come to enjoy unchecked and perhaps illicit access to federal 
decision-makers (Croley and Funk 1997: 453). The act stipulates that membership of advisory 
committees and their functions must be balanced and representative. FACA therefore precludes 
the creation of single stakeholder committees – like the CBANs. Establishing advisory bodies 
under FACA is a cumbersome task and U.S. regulators often look to arrange interactions with 
stakeholders in ways that avoid its requirements, e.g. through open workshops or ad hoc meetings. 
Although federal decision-makers thus have sought the advice of external experts to interpret the 
evidence of harm and access international experiences, they were also reluctant to create a 
platform – to ‘go through the rules’ – to structure discussions with stakeholders. With no 
permanent venues to organize and promote discussions of how the evidence for nanotech should 
be interpreted, there has been no clearing of mutual expectations over the direction of federal 
nanotech policy.  
While the NNI has been mired in a search for appropriate dialogue mechanisms, the executive 
agencies have meanwhile turned to existing advisory bodies for inputs on matters pertaining to 
their statutory mandates. EPA for example called upon its National Pollution Prevention and 
Toxics Advisory Committee (NPPTAC) to advise the agency on an overall risk management 
approach to nanotechnologies. Federal advisory committees are constituted to bring needed 
expertise to the decision-making process; and – in theory – they are expected to provide a forum 
for technical experts to reach consensus on difficult-to-resolve scientific or technological issues 
(Ashford 1984). Reality on the ground is however often more complicated. While discussions 
among NPPTAC members for example did provide initial inputs for the NMSP (NPPTAC 
2005a; 2005b), EPA’s attempts to maintain a constructive dialogue with stakeholders quickly 
foundered. In response to agency policies on nanomaterials, the National Resources Defense 
Council and several other members decided to resign in protest, and in August 2007 EPA 
announced that the NPPTAC had completed its charged and that further activities in the 
committee would cease.  
EPA’s experience with the NPPTAC illustrates one of the major drawbacks of the federal 
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major views are represented, advisory committees often prove incapable of reaching agreed 
positions. As I explained in chapter four, the adversarial format of regulatory proceedings 
demands that private interests present their views as strongly as possible. But the combative 
relations among competing interests and their belligerent stance against public officials rarely lend 
themselves to a search for compromise solutions. A federal official observed: “In Europe, people 
tend to see this more as a cooperative problem. We need to sit down at the table and argue about 
this and come out with the best solution. Over here, it’s like we are sitting across the table, 
throwing darts at each other.”31 
Although advisory committees do help regulators access information essential to buttress 
agency decisions and hence minimizing risks of external political and judicial interference 
(McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987: 257f.; Moffitt 2010: 891), the articulation of partisan 
interests is not conducive to a reciprocal search for prevention strategies. Cooperation with 
regulatory authorities remains a precarious gambit, since it can be construed as tacit admission of 
the validity of opposing views and in many cases will make regulation more likely. Balanced 
representation allows regulators to ‘shop’ among different sources of expertise and support for 
their regulatory proposals, and the unstable and unpredictable coalition patterns inhibit candor in 
discussion. But even if companies did believe in the ‘benign’ intentions of their regulatory 
adversaries, the participation of competing interests, who might seize on and exploit sensitive 
information, cautions against frank exchanges.  
The procedural transparency associated with advisory proceedings further hampers incentives 
to share information. FACA requires committees to keep detailed minutes of each meeting, 
including records of participants and accurate descriptions of their discussions (Croley and Funk 
1997: 464f.). Any information disclosed, gathered or disseminated in the course of committee 
deliberations becomes a matter of public record. Since communications among participants are in 
the public domain, companies face overwhelming incentives to withhold rather than share 
information. The most valuable discussions among committee members thus often take place in 
the hallways before or after the formal meetings (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 2004: 327). 
Ultimately, attempts to channel deliberations with American companies through existing advisory 
bodies have proven insufficient to conquer the cause of their discomfort in sharing sensitive 
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Would deliberations under a less formalized and less transparent procedure have induced 
American companies to share information with federal bureaucrats? Absolutely! Informal 
discussion among state authorities and industry representatives facilitates information 
transmission, just as it facilitates gossip in everyday life. Would it have addressed corporate 
discomfort in disclosing sensitive information and convinced American companies to engage in 
candid discussions with federal officials? Perhaps – but probably not. The complexities of the 
American decision-making environment ultimately create few incentives for companies to seek 
collaborative settlements with the agencies responsible for regulating their conduct. Although 
deliberative institutions thus might have helped dispel misgivings about agency intentions and 
designs, they would not have addressed the fundamental roots of corporate discomfort in sharing 
sensitive information. Because administrative decisions and policies in the United States can be 
challenged, revised or overturned at other stages of the regulatory process, companies have little 
reason to believe that bureaucrats will be able to uphold their end of a cooperative arrangement. 
Advisory bodies did little to change this evaluation, and their impact on business responses 
remains negligible.  
The U.S. nanotech story instead reflects how fragmentation of regulatory powers affords 
companies generous opportunities to influence regulatory outcomes through indirect means. The 
UK story of nanotech regulation is in contrast one of the incentives created by powerful state 
bureaucrats; but it is also one of regular contacts and dialogue among representatives from 
industry and state authorities channeled through institutions that encourage participants to gather 
and share information about joint problems, craft agreed solutions and settle disagreements 
through discussion and negotiation. Because they improve corporate understandings of agency 
agendas and designs, the extensive reliance on expert bodies and stakeholder fora in the 
development of UK chemical safety policy thus helps explain why companies entrust information 
to state bureaucrats with the power to make – and break – cooperative arrangements.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The notification of nanomaterials has been at the heart of international nanotech debates for the 
past few years. With the advent of nanotech on the regulatory agenda, authorities in America and 
Europe initially pinned their hopes on voluntary reporting. Over time and based on scant 
industry participation, the initial interest in Denmark, the United States and to some extent 
Germany has been exchanged for a new focus on statutory instruments. Although mandatory 
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Table 5.1  Drivers of German and Danish Business Responses  
 GERMANY DENMARK 
   
Regulatory 
Strategy 
Encourage cooperation Encourage cooperation 
   
Nature of Advisory 
Proceedings 
Comprehensive industry  
participation and representation 
Limited industry participation  
and representation 
   
  Federal authorities funnel nanotech 
debate through advisory committees 
and stakeholder fora 
 Nanotech debate structured around 
infrequent and issue-specific 
workshops and conferences 
  Regular policy deliberations 
encourage participants to develop a 
common diagnosis of the challenges 
created by nanotech, debate the 
consequences of different decisions, 
and reach agreed recommendations 
 State officials, companies and their 
representatives do not meet on a 
regular basis to debate scientific 
developments, analyze the roots of 
joint problems and craft agreed 
solutions  
  Through regular discussion, 
companies learn how federal 
decision-makers understand the 
evidence for nanotech and how they 
evaluate the need for new controls 
 Companies unable to predict how 
state authorities might react to new 
information – and whether such a 
response might consider their views 
and interests 
  Confidence in the designs of federal 
authorities creates compelling 
incentives for companies to 
volunteer information  
 Uncertainty about the designs of state 
authorities inhibits incentives to 




Business Response Disclosure Nondisclosure 
Outcome  Joint Decisions Unilateral Regulations 
Nature of  
Industry Influence 
Direct Negligible 




Best practice guidelines 
Stakeholder confidence 
New administrative burdens  
Market uncertainty  
Risks of backlash 
   
 
reporting obligations have been considered in all four countries, only Danish companies now 
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obligations for manufacturers and users of nanomaterials and authorities in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Italy, 
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affected by the registration obligation – whether or not they import and use nanomaterials 
(Fischer et al. 2012). The outcome of the Danish policy process thus illustrates that acquiescence 
can prove a costly luxury for an industry. Since however decisions on the direction of Danish 
nanotech policy were informed by discussions among a closed group of governmental and 
academic experts, industry representatives were left without a reliable basis to predict how state 
authorities might react to new information. A cautious stance was in consequence a sensible 
response to the policy process; and reluctance to volunteer sensitive information to state 
authorities a strategy to minimize the economic and administrative impacts of decisions over 
which companies had little influence. Rather than resign to await state initiative, institutionalized 
deliberations among German companies, their representatives and federal decision-makers have 
in contrast created ample opportunities to guide the direction of federal nanotech policy. 
Confident that federal authorities would consider their views – and where possible respect their 
interests – companies therefore faced compelling incentives to volunteer, rather than withhold 
information. Variations in the institutions that structure communications among state 
bureaucrats and industry thus in short account for the diverse responses of German and Danish 
companies. Table 5.1 summarizes. 
The varied responses of Danish and German companies to the regulatory process and its 
diverging outcome in the two countries meanwhile capture important elements of the 
conclusions emerging from my account of nanotech regulation in America and Europe. I have 
made two claims with respect to the regulatory behavior and interests of business: that fear of 
state intervention need not be the dominant concern or driver of business behavior; and that 
industries are willing to share information about their operations – even in the absence of 
structural constraints on state capacities to intervene. Looking to the arguments fielded against a 
nanoproduct register by industry representatives in Denmark illustrates the first of these claims. 
Above we noted how the decision was criticized as futile and unreasonably burdensome for 
industry. Such objections are to be expected: after all, industries are as a rule held to resist 
decisions and obligations that might translate into increased operating cost, barriers to market 
entry, and so. To reiterate the observation made by a U.S. industry insider in chapter four: “there 
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But concerns for their competitiveness were not the only or indeed most forceful objections 
voiced by Danish companies. Industry representatives likewise and urgently warned that a 
separate reporting requirement for nanomaterials might feed into consumer perceptions of 
unexplained or general risks inherent to all nanoproducts. By bringing to public notice the 
possible existence of a risk, even proposed regulations can significantly shake confidence in an 
industry or the technology underlying its products, processes and operations (Greenwood 1984; 
Paddock 2010: 183). Public opinion in Denmark is as we will see in the next chapter still 
favorable to nanotechnologies. But this could quickly change. Mounting public hostility to 
nanotech could significantly impair the economic prospects of the Danish nanobusiness 
community, and industry representatives in short feared that the signal value of new ‘nano’ 
regulations could contribute to stigmatize the technology in the public eye (Boteju 2012; Telcs 
2012; Zeuthen 2012). While the decision to establish a nanoregister ultimately sparked little 
attention – and has not notably contributed to public awareness of nanotechnologies in Denmark 
– industry insiders have complained that past adverse and unbalanced media coverage has left a 
‘residue’ in the public mind; and that this residue has served to significantly erode the market 
potential of nanotechnologies in Denmark.34  
Above all however industry representatives balked at the market uncertainties created by the 
decision to establish a nanoregister. Since the register entails a retrospective reporting 
requirement, manufacturers and importers of nanomaterials would place products on the market 
not knowing the number and type of products subject to registration, the frequency of 
registrations, the scope and extent of information required for registrations, the rules governing 
data access and the protection of confidential business information. Until specific rules are 
promulgated, companies will in short be unable to predict and plan for their eventual obligations 
and compliance costs. These objections draw our attention to the value corporate decision-
makers attach to a stable business environment. In chapter four, we thus saw how the main 
benefits secured by American and British companies can be described in terms of the confidence 
created by a predictable regulatory response to nanomaterials. Similar corporate concerns and 
preferences permeate my narrative of the German and Danish regulatory processes. German 
companies for example readily joined the NanoCare project, exactly because it allowed them 
learn ‘what the federal agencies need or what they want to know’35 – with participation in joint 
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mold the knowledge and understandings of federal bureaucrats. While Danish companies were 
unable to fend off the decision to introduce new statutory obligations, their objections echo the 
arguments advanced by the VCI in the German debate over a nanoregister (VCI 2011).  
The German nanotech story however also illustrates that companies may actively seek and 
promote regulatory outcomes that translate into greater business predictability – even if they 
result in new controls. Consider the AGS. Beyond advising the Minister of Employment, the 
AGS also formulates technical rules for hazardous substances (TRGS). While not statutory 
regulations, these technical rules constitute statutory guidance documents, often inspired or 
supported by practical guidelines published by Länder authorities or the social partners. 
Application of a TRGS ensures and assumes that an employer meets the requirements of the 
Hazardous Substance Ordinance. Failure to observe the guidance laid down in such rules can in 
contrast lead either to regulatory penalties or to legal action against an employer. Employers in 
short as a BAuA official emphasized tend to view them as if they were legally binding.36 At its 
meeting in November 2010, the AGS decided to initiate a rule-making procedure for activities 
involving nanomaterials – based on the guidelines developed by VCI following the joint BAuA-
VCI survey (AGS 2011). Initial policy discussions among BAuA and VCI representatives in 2005, 
supported by the legal mandate of the AGS, are in other words slowly finding their way through 
the regulatory process.  
While thus rejecting mandatory reporting obligations, German companies have not been 
opposed to any and all regulatory obligations. Rather they have assiduously sought to encourage 
– and shape – decisions that could ensure a predictable regulatory environment for the 
development and commercialization of nanomaterials. A federal official observed:  
“[It] is not true that they don’t want to have regulation. Especially in a field where you have a lot of 
uncertainty, companies want to have regulation. [Not that] they want to have strict regulations that forbid 
them everything. That is not the point. But they want to have rules that can [tell them] what do the 
agencies want, what expectations do they have, and so on, and so they can align with this, so they won’t 
have problems with their applications and products later on. […] That is the point: We do not want to 
have products banned afterwards, because we did not know the rules or the agencies did not know what 
they really wanted.”37 
Regulations may thus increase costs – but they also serve as guidance to expected behavior. In 
areas of high scientific and legal uncertainty, such as nanotechnologies, industries therefore 
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business environment. While regulations may come at a price to flexibility, a stable regulatory 
environment also promises significant benefits in terms of business predictability and public 
acceptance of nanotechnologies, which cannot easily be ignored. Again in the words of the U.S. 
insider, “[Less regulation] is cheaper, but ultimately it is just not very good for the technology.”38 
The coincidence of industry responses in Britain and Germany meanwhile serve to illustrate 
my second claim. This chapter opened by noting the conundrum created by this coincidence: 
operating as they do in markedly different political contexts and under distinct economic 
circumstances, we should have expected companies in the two countries to react differently. The 
answer to this puzzle is rooted in the existence of a comparable set of institutions governing the 
formulation and implementation of chemical control policy. As Wyn Grant and colleagues have 
observed (1988: 307), “in the chemical industry the differences are not as great as a reading of the 
literature on government-industry relations in [Britain and Germany] might lead one to suppose. 
In particular, there is a danger of confusing differences of style with differences of substance.” 
While the organizing logic of the British and German political economies differs, the strategic 
environment for chemical control policy in the two countries is also broadly similar. 
Manufacturers and users of chemicals are thus presented with a set of distinct, but comparable 
risks and opportunities: companies in both countries confront powerful state bureaucrats. 
Whereas safeguarding their interests requires American companies to keep the executive agencies 
guessing about the nature of their products and operations, leverage over regulatory decisions in 
Britain and Germany is in contrast purchased by volunteering such information and making 
industrial expertise available to the authorities responsible for regulating their conduct. The 
reliance on expert bodies and stakeholder fora in the development of chemical safety policy on 
the other hand also helps explain why companies entrust information about their operations to 
state bureaucrats with the power to make – and break – cooperative arrangements. Membership 
of such deliberative institutions bolsters corporate confidence that their views and interests will 
be considered as new issues emerge; and advisory bodies thus buttress the credibility of 
bureaucratic commitments. British and German companies are in short willing to share 
information about their operations – even in the absence of significant constraints on state 
capacities to intervene – because disclosing such information can succeed in convincing state 
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Industry can live very well with laws, because then they know exactly what they should be doing. […] But the public would 
like to have believes or values, for example ‘I swear that I won’t harm the environment.’ That is for us a little bit difficult, 
because that is nothing we can put in to operations. It is easier to say: ‘to not harm the environment you make these five tests 
on these safety features.’ At the moment, we have more of an emotional society than it was 30 years ago, so you need to [not 
only] comply with something technical or rational, but you have to show your believes and values. […] Products get approved 
by an authority or not, whatever the values of a company, because you must hand in the data and they look at it and say: ‘is 
it safe or not?’ [However] with a value driven environment, that is not really fitting [and] consumers expect something else 




In November 2006, a group of UK companies came together to explore the technical, social and 
commercial uncertainties of nanotechnologies. Deliberations on good practice and responsible 
governance concluded in late 2008 with the launch of the Responsible NanoCode. 2008 likewise 
saw German companies embrace the NanoKommission’s ‘Five Principles for Responsible Use of 
Nanomaterials’. While UK and German companies thus have signalled a voluntary commitment 
to responsible governance, similar talks of self-regulation among industry leaders in the United 
States and Denmark never surfaced and no comparable initiatives have been undertaken. In this 
chapter, I investigate the conditions that led UK and German companies, but not their U.S. and 
Danish competitors, to pursue a course of self-regulation.2 I contend that the roots of these 




1  Interview, Frankfurt, October 11, 2012. 
2  My interest in industry self-regulation is here confined to collective business initiatives and the circumstances 
that convince companies to band together with the aim of formulating a common code of responsible conduct. 
Following Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees (1997: 364f.), I therefore define industry self-regulation as “a 
regulatory process whereby an industry level (as opposed to a governmental or firm-level) organization sets 
rules and standards (codes of conduct) relating to the conduct of firms in the industry.” 
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regulation of nanotech. This chapter in turn departs from much of the conventional political 
science wisdom about the motives for and instrumental value of industry self-regulation. 
Traditional answers to the question, why do industries self-regulate, emphasize either the desire 
to capture the benefits from collective action or the need to deflect and minimize costs imposed 
by external stakeholders. While these are usually reasonable explanations for business interests in 
self-governance, they nonetheless fall short for nanotechnologies. In this chapter, I show how 
neither the organization of business interests, market developments nor the prospect of new 
legislative controls can account for the cross-national variation in industry self-regulation.  
Instead we must look to the varied industry responses to the regulatory process and the 
demands placed on corporate decision-makers by the realities of national chemical control 
regimes. Regulatory policies decided through mutual agreement and joint collaborations imply 
that state bureaucrats and companies both have a stake in the final outcome; and inevitably that 
they must share the political risks and responsibilities for such decisions. This is however 
treacherous terrain for industry: because consumers and other stakeholders do not or cannot 
distinguish among members of the ‘nano’ industry, companies will tend to assume a collective 
identity in the public eye. Adverse information about the products or activities of one company 
will consequently color perceptions about the entire industry and the technology as a whole. If 
left undisputed however regulatory and scientific developments could trigger visceral market 
reactions as happened for the European agri-biotech industry. The predicament facing industry is 
therefore one of managing stakeholder perceptions of nanotechnology risks and benefits; and 
codes of responsible conduct can be understood as instruments to reassure stakeholders that 
regulatory decisions do not reflect the inherent harmful properties of nanotechnologies. Industry 
self-regulation in short does not intend to preempt, but complement state intervention.  
In pursuing this explanation for self-regulation, the chapter falls in five parts. Sections one 
through three consider some plausible alternative reasons why companies might have embraced 
self-governing responsibilities. I show how self-regulation in Britain and Germany owe little to 
variations in the legislative control strategies of governments on either side of the Atlantic, 
differences in the risk perceptions and thresholds of Europeans and Americans or the strength of 
business organization in these four countries. Section four proceeds to offer a (re)interpretation 
of the instrumental value of codes of responsible conduct. I suggest that industry self-regulation 
can be understood as an instrument to garner public acceptance of nanotechnologies and market 
confidence in industry. I further argue that the impetus for companies to self-regulate arises from 
cooperation with state authorities. Section five demonstrates how the UK and German codes of 
conduct intends to shelter companies from future nanoscares resulting from ‘irrefutable’ or 
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‘uncontestable’ information about their products and activities – and how self-regulation was a 
business response that grew from the incentives and constraints embedded in the British and 
German chemical control regimes.  
SHADOW OF THE STATE 
Business interest in self-governance often arises from disputes over the necessity and the terms 
of authoritative state intervention (Streeck and Schmitter 1985: 130f.). The fervor of the 
nanotech debate over the past decade, combined with the intense attention of elected politicians, 
suggests that self-regulation was a business responses crafted to fend off new legislative controls. 
Analyses emphasizing the shadow of hierarchy see incentives for self-governance emerging from 
the threat – explicit or implicit – of state intervention. State actors may threaten to enact adverse 
legislation unless companies alter their behavior (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008: 2; Halfteck 2006). 
Since they command greater expertise and technical knowledge about their economic and 
technological circumstances, self-governance allows companies to formulate less intrusive and 
more flexible rules (Ogus 1995: 97f.). To the extent that companies value the flexibility and 
influence associated with formulating industry specific rules and controls higher than presumably 
more rigorous and intrusive public regulations, a threat of legislation creates strong incentives to 
self-regulate (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997: 202f.). According to this story, the 
diverging self-governing responses of companies were dictated by differences in the control 
strategies of governments in America and Europe. Unlike their American and Danish 
competitors, UK and German companies were in short willing to self-govern, because their 
incentives to do so were more desperate.  
If this is indeed the reason why UK and German companies self-regulated, they must have felt 
convinced that new legislative measures were in the works; and that such measure could be 
starved off by endorsing a code of responsible conduct. We therefore need to know what might 
have alerted companies to a looming threat of state intervention; that is, we must investigate the 
legislative plans, designs and ambitions of the British and German governments. Elected 
politicians communicate their intentions to businesses explicitly through their statements and 
implicitly through their actions. Short of public commitments to restrict undesired behavior, 
publication of draft bills (introducing new or reinforcing existing legislation), discussions in 
parliament about planned legislation or activities necessary to enact legislation (e.g. announcing 
regulatory reviews, data gathering, and convening working groups with a mandate to consider 
statutory options) certainly should raise red flags (Halfteck 2006: 35-42; Héritier and Eckert 
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2008: 119). A flurry of such activities and commitments from elected politicians in Britain and 
Germany could have persuaded companies that state intervention was imminent.  
Elected politicians for their part must pay attention to voter opinion. Whether seeking to 
capitalize on public sentiments or simply concerned for their electoral prospects, mobilization of 
public opinion can galvanize politicians to push for state intervention. Media coverage or NGO 
campaigns are common mechanisms, which can mobilize public sentiment and make large 
numbers of voters aware of the implications of an issue (Culpepper 2011: 6ff.; Porter and Ronit 
2006: 48f.). Sustained efforts to mobilize anti-nano sentiments might therefore have created 
equally compelling reasons for companies to preempt a political response. If we can show that 
new legislation was indeed on the table or that the media and NGOs vigorously heralded anti-
nano messages to UK and German consumers, we would in short have found a plausible answer 
to why companies in these companies embraced self-regulation.  
Does the evidence support the shadow of hierarchy as a plausible explanation for the self-
governing response of UK and German companies? In a word – No! Although the frantic pace 
of the nanotech debate in Britain for instance at first blush might suggest that momentum for an 
adverse intervention indeed was building, a closer look reveals that governmental decision-
makers never harbored designs for new legislation. We encountered the reluctance to impose 
mandatory reporting requirements on industry in chapter three; and for HM Government, 
‘getting it right’ evidently meant “do not overburden industry with regulation.” (HM Government 
2005: 1) Since 2004, all recommendations, which would entail new obligations for industry, have 
been met with quiet indifference or rejection. Treating nanomaterials as ‘new’ chemicals, as 
recommended by the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering, was for example 
quickly dismissed in favor of a case-by-case assessment of the need for additional testing (HM 
Government 2005: 14f.; BIS 2010: 44). Conclusions made by an independent review on the need 
for a long-term integrated regulatory approach (Frater et al. 2006: 32), failed to generated an 
official response.  
HM Government instead time and again committed to address potential ‘grey zones’ through 
incremental adaptation and adjustment of existing frameworks (HM Government 2005; 2008; 
2009). A separate regulator or a new framework for nanotechnologies were briefly discussed 
within government circles – and swiftly discarded. One Defra official remarked:  
“It has been considered – but never seriously. When we first started working properly at nanotechnology 
and regulation, we very quickly understood that nanotechnologies can appear in any one of a number of 
different regulatory framings. There are particular product sectors, where they can appear and there are 
potential hazards there, so you need to focus your regulatory efforts in those areas, and that is far better 
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achieved by individual regulatory frameworks rather than having something overarching, which then runs 
the risk of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.”3  
With no political appetite for new legislation, HM Government has consistently maintained that 
existing legislation offer sufficient protection, while enabling prompt action should risks be 
identified. Absent conclusive evidence of human or environmental hazards, industry was in short 
given little reason to expect much less fear state intervention.  
Scrutiny of governmental plans, publications and statements in the Federal Republic similarly 
reveals that neither elected politicians nor regulatory decision-makers nurtured designs for new 
legislative measures. In none of its statements, strategy documents, or appearances before the 
Bundestag has the Federal Government expressed an interest in new legislation. Written 
statements instead overflow with confidence that minor adjustments to existing frameworks 
would suffice to guarantee human health and environmental integrity. Parliamentary motions 
sponsored by opposition parties to ban or restrict use of nanomaterials have summarily been 
dismissed with references to a lack of evidence in support of new controls.4 What doubts 
corporate decision-makers might have harbored concerning the Federal Government’s legislative 
ambitions for nanotech were swiftly put to rest in 2004 with the BMBF declaring that “no one 
sees any need to introduce regulations or additional laws covering nanotechnology.” (BMBF 
2004: 44) The Federal Government has since repeatedly reaffirmed this conclusion (Beyerlein 
2006: 545; BMBF 2007; 2011a; Bundesregierung 2007; 2012). An official review – commissioned 
to assess the adequacy of existing frameworks and consider the need for new controls – for 
example concluded that the “idea that the state by means of a strict ‘command and control’ 
approach can comprehensively intervene in private research and development departments 
appears – in both a practical and a legal sense – to offer little promise.” (Führ et al. 2006: 57).  
The Federal Government instead committed to pursue harmonized measures through the 
European Union, emphasizing that possible decisions must be made in concert with European 
partners. With REACH time and again identified as the appropriate vehicle to regulate 
nanomaterials (BMBF 2011a: 37; Bundesregierung 2007; 2012), observers have meanwhile 
described this commitment as a comfortable disguise for the Federal Government’s own inability 
to reach an agreed position on nanotech.5 With no clear recommendations on new legislation 
emerging from the NanoKommission, federal decision-makers moreover were not presented 
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legislative measures or amendments be put off as scientific understandings and evidence mature, 
federal decision-makers have thus given industry representatives little cause for alarm.  
Nor has attempts to mobilize voter awareness or anti-nano sentiments in Britain and Germany 
presented much cause for concern. Demands for mandatory regulations or even a moratorium 
have been voiced by some within the NGO community. But in contrast to GMOs, neither 
Germany nor Britain have witnessed sustained anti-nano campaigning. German NGOs 
participated with other stakeholders in the NanoKommission. Citing a lack of resources, they 
were however slow to join the federal NanoDialogue and several major groups such as German 
Greenpeace never did.6 Representatives from the NGO community have since expressed 
disappointment in the outcome and impact of the dialogue process;7 and some skepticism of 
federal commitments and policies have been voiced. Ultimately, however, neither German nor 
UK-based NGOs have pursued strategies which could set them apart internationally (Miller and 
Scrinis 2010: 420-27) – nor have they embraced messages or tactics that resulted in greater social 
pressures on governmental decision-makers.  
Neither has media coverage created urgent concerns for corporate decision-makers. While the 
UK media was swift to lash on to the nightmarish ‘grey goo’ scenario heralded by Prince Charles 
in April 2003, media attention turned sporadic after May. Coverage was largely confined to a few 
‘elite’ papers, such as Financial Times and the Independent, whose outreach are – relatively 
speaking – limited (Anderson et al. 2005). Despite the interest triggered by the 2006 MagicNano 
incident, it likewise did not significantly alter the tone or scale of media coverage in Germany 
(Zimmer, Hertel and Böl 2010b: 103); nor did the incident have a lasting impact on consumer or 
public perceptions of nanotechnologies. Recalls a federal official: 
“We had 80 intoxications during 2 days – which is quite a lot – but it didn’t become a scandal. The public 
wasn’t really interested and it’s just like another product: something went wrong, okay, and then they fixed 
the problem, and it is okay. And it was a product which was not really new […] and I think some people 
thought: ‘okay that can happen, but it is a product we know, it is nothing really new. So it was a mistake, 
an accident, okay.’ And that was it. It had nothing to do with nanotechnology and it didn’t spread to the 
nanotechnology debate.”8 
German and UK companies were in short given few reasons to expect that new legislative 
measures or controls were on the table; nor were they presented with strong signs to indicate a 
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former participants in the Responsible NanoCode Initiative gave no indication of working under 
pressure from an impending state intervention. And, while disagreeing about the appropriate 
governmental response to nanotechnologies, they unanimously agreed that HM Government in 
their view never considered measures with a similar scope to the NanoCode – a view confirmed 
by government officials.9 Participants instead emphasized a desire to target areas that are ‘not laid 
down in regulation’ or that ‘regulations can never get into.’10 There is thus ultimately little 
evidence to suggest that the NanoCode dovetails into a contingent legislative plan. A similar 
conclusion applies with respect to the NanoKommission’s ‘Five Principles’: interviews with the 
code’s framers unearthed no evidence to suggests that it was motivated by a desire to preempt 
legislation. From the very beginning of the German nanotech debate, federal decision-makers 
instead went to great lengths to allay potential corporate concerns, insisting that possible 
legislative measures or amendments would have to await international efforts to build the 
necessary evidence and risk management methodologies. What incentives UK and German 
companies had for self-governance, they in short did not originate with the legislative ambitions 
of governmental decision-makers. 
Looking across the Atlantic corroborates this conclusion: pressures to reform American 
chemical management laws mounted steadily during the final years of the Bush administration. 
With the Democratic Party assuming control of both Houses of Congress in 2008, the election of 
Barack Obama appeared to consolidate the momentum for reform. Within its first year in office, 
the new administration had secured significant funding increases for the executive agencies and 
made several high-profile appointments, leading to talks of a ‘revival of the fourth branch.’ (Judis 
2010) The walls might thus appear to have been closing in on the chemical industry. Bush 
officials had vehemently rejected that new statutes were required to regulate nanotechnologies 
(Marchant, Sylvester and Abbott 2007: 192), confirming that “[t]he Federal government’s current 
understanding is that existing statutory authorities are adequate to address oversight of 
nanotechnology and its application.” (Marburger and Connaughton 2007: 2) A federal official 
reflected: “We didn’t change the framework for biotechnology. In other words, we shoehorned 
living organisms into existing frameworks, and it doesn’t fit exactly right. But I think 
nanotechnology is even easier [since] they are still chemical substances, so I don’t see us changing 
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The Obama administration nonetheless entered office with a plan to push TSCA reform 
through Congress. Early in her tenure, new EPA administrator Lisa Jackson rolled out innovative 
and aggressive goals for legislative reform of TSCA, arguing  
“[W]e need to review all chemicals against safety standards that are based solely on considerations of risk 
– not economics or other factors – and we must set these standards at levels that are protective of human 
health and the environment. […] Manufacturers must develop and submit the hazard, use, and exposure 
data demonstrating that new and existing chemicals are safe. If industry doesn’t provide the information, 
EPA should have the tools to quickly and efficiently require testing, without the delays and procedural 
obstacles currently in place.” (Jackson 2009) 
Jackson concluded by calling on leaders in Congress to accelerate efforts to update and 
strengthen TSCA. On April 15, 2010, Democratic Senator Frank F. Lautenberg introduced a 
reform bill, intended to modernize TSCA, which would require manufacturers to demonstrate 
the safety of their substances. While the bill did not explicitly address nanomaterials, it would 
empower EPA to consider ‘special substance characteristics’, including size, shape and surface 
structure, reactivity, and any other properties that may significantly affect risks. Powers, which 
would undeniably and adversely have impacted on nanomaterial manufacturers and users.  
If fear of state intervention indeed were driving companies to endorse codes of responsible 
conduct, then the United States after 2008 should have been a more likely candidate than either 
Britain or Germany. The Obama administration had the political resolve, if not capacity, to push 
chemical reform through Congress. Ultimately, while broad consensus on the need for TSCA 
reform has coalesced, prospects dimmed as industry set to work on convincing Congress against 
reform. In response to strong pushback from the chemical industry, Lautenberg amended his 
reform bill to improve its chances of passage – to no avail. House hearings and stakeholder 
discussions were undertaken throughout 2011 – again to no effect. In the closing months of 
2011, Lautenberg expressed intentions to bring the bill up for a committee vote in ‘the near 
future.’ That was the last word in 2011. Although Lautenberg reintroduced an amended bill in 
2012, the buzz on TSCA reform had gone (Bergeson 2012a; 2012b).  
An EPA official observed: “The President came in, wanted to do TSCA reform, found out 
that this Congress doesn’t want to work with [him] – and they have had troubles getting some 
very basic stuff through Congress, much less TSCA reform – so that’s where it is: there is not 
enough support one way or the other.”12 Talk of TSCA reform is almost as old as the statute 
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elections, chances of TSCA reform are now as remote as ever. Two observers noted: “We have a 
stalemate essentially between the Republican and the Democratic Party, which prevents anything 
from being done in the Congress.”13 “The problem is the really hard right-wing ideologues that 
aren’t gonna do anything that lets Congress look like it is doing something, because they don’t 
want the President to win. […] Our Congress isn’t moving anything. You could have bill that just 
said: ‘this paper should go through Congress’ and that bill wouldn’t move.”14  
Increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of reform, state legislatures have instead begun 
enacting chemical-specific or product-specific measures in record numbers. 28 states considered 
toxic substance legislation in 2012 – many with explicit provisions for nanomaterials (Bergeson 
2012b); yet, like the Lautenberg reform bill, this has not been preceded by designs for self-
regulation. During interviews neither industry insiders nor observers could recall any talk of, let 
alone need for industry to assume greater self-governing responsibilities. Fear of state 
intervention may in hindsight never have been at the forefront of industry concerns. But if self-
regulation intends to preempt statutory regulations, either TSCA reform or state initiatives should 
at least have sparked some interest in or talk of self-governance – they did not. Where the 
capacity to enact new controls did exist, Britain and Germany, the political will to legislate was in 
contrast entirely absent. Unlike the Obama administration, HM Government had no plans for an 
overhaul of existing legislative frameworks; let alone designs for business to assume greater self-
governing responsibilities. A similar observation can be made for the German government.  
The 2006 enactment of REACH of course directs our attention to Brussels; but here too we 
find that the new European chemicals regime has not been preceded by talk of self-regulation. 
Where finally new specific powers to regulate nanomaterials have been enacted – notably the 
recast 2009 EU Cosmetics Regulation, the U.S. Food Safety Modernization Act, which 
‘miraculously’ passed Congress in 201115 as well as various mandatory reporting schemes in 
Canada, France and of course Denmark – they have not been anticipated by calls for self-
regulation. Again if fear of state intervention were driving companies to endorse codes of 
responsible conduct, Denmark would have been a more likely candidate for self-regulation. But 
despite objections from industrial stakeholders, the decision to introduce a Danish nanoregister 
was not preceded by designs for self-regulations, let alone suggestions for industry to assume 
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companies had to self-regulate, fear of state intervention has not figured prominently among 
them. 
SHADOWS OF THE PAST 
Political imperatives need not be the only source of industry self-regulation. Signals emanating 
from the marketplace are important drivers of business behavior and voluntary governance 
mechanisms. Demand-side pressures, channeled through threats of consumer boycotts, ‘naming 
and shaming’ campaigns orchestrated by non-commercial third-party, or obligations to business 
partners, can create equally compelling reasons for companies to embrace self-governing 
responsibilities (Haufler 2001; Bernstein and Cashore 2007; Vogel 2008). Signs of eroding market 
confidence in an industry may thus induce companies to band together to formulate codes of 
conduct with the aim of preempting consumer rejection – or technology stigma. The European 
GMO experience provides an excellent, if extreme illustration of the implications for industries 
which disregards such signs: preceding the enactment of new EU labeling requirements in 2003 
was a decade fraught with intense policy disputes, vocal opposition from the NGO community, 
consumer boycotts, and negative media coverage, resulting in deteriorating public acceptance of 
GMOs in food, suspicion of industry and declining trust in the regulatory authorities charged 
with overseeing food safety. A perfect storm of anti-GM sentiments, abandonment by business 
partners, and stringent regulations, culminating in public backlash and technology stigma, 
significantly impaired the commercial prospects of the European agri-biotech industry.  
As another technology with revolutionary promise, nanotech entails all the ingredients for 
visceral public reactions and market rejection. Self-regulation could therefore be explained as an 
attempt by industries in Britain and Germany – in the face of mounting opposition – to 
demonstrate responsible engagement, create public trust and ameliorate corporate reputations, 
ultimately with the aim of circumventing public fears and ‘nanophobia’. Bracketing for the 
moment the different responses of German and Danish companies, one reading of the 
Responsible NanoCode might therefore see self-regulation in Britain and its absence in the 
United States as a result of the diverging fortunes of the American and European agro-biotech 
industries. Confronted with signs of rapidly deteriorating public acceptance of nanotechnologies, 
UK companies in this view embraced the NanoCode to forestall escalation of consumer 
rejection, mistrust of industry and long-term market erosion.  
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This account of the NanoCode presumes two things: first that public opinion in Britain was 
hostile to nanotechnologies. For obvious reasons, favorable or neutral public opinion would not 
have swayed corporate decision-makers in favor of self-regulation. Second, hostile public opinion 
must have been sufficiently pervasive or strident to spark corporate attention and concern. We 
therefore need to know how public perceptions have developed since polls on attitudes to 
nanotechnologies began to appear around 2003. Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of respondents 
in Britain and the United States that reacted pessimistically to nanotechnologies in the period 
2003-2012. If fear of consumer reactions explains self-regulation in Britain and its absence in the 
United States, public confidence in Britain must either have shown signs of rapid decline, been 
notably more hostile than in America, or both. As we can see from figure 6.1, this is not the case. 
Although opposition to nanotechnologies is pronounced in neither country, perceptions in the 
United States have been equally or more negative than in Britain. Survey results released in July 
2006 (Gaskell et al. 2006) – four month prior to the launch of the Responsible NanoCode 
Initiative – moreover showed a decline in pessimistic responses and a seven point increase in 

















United States United Kingdom Germany Denmark EU 25/27 
Figure 6.1 Perceptions of Nanotechnology Risks in Europe and the United States  
 
Percentages of respondents answering ‘nanotechnology will make things worse’ (2003); ‘risks 
[of nanotechnology] will exceed benefits’ (2005); ‘nanotechnology will deteriorate our way of life’ (2006); 
‘risks [of nanotechnology] will outweigh benefits’ (2007; 2008; 2012) and ‘nanotechnology will have a 
negative effect on our way of life in the next 20 years’ (2010). 
SOURCE:  Gaskell, Allum and Stares (2003); Gaskell et al. (2006); TNS Opinion & Social (2010); 
Macoubrie (2005); Hart Research Associates (2007; 2008); Harris Interactive (2012). 
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NanoCode’s founding partners (Insight Investment, Royal Society and NIA 2006: 2). Based on 
these figures, U.S. not UK companies should have assumed self-governing responsibilities.  
But perhaps this comparison misses the point entirely. Public interest in, awareness of, and 
opposition to GMOs in the United States has been episodic, rather than sustained. While 
consumer attitudes toward GMOs did become more negative after the monarch butterfly and 
StarLink controversies, Americans are not, and never have been, as hostile toward GMOs as their 
European counterparts (Sylvester, Abbott and Marchant 2009: 168; Vogel 2012). And, unlike 
European governments, the Federal Government did not take strong regulatory action. Because 
public opinion in the United States never hardened against GMOs, American companies had 
little reason to expect or fear a public backlash against nanotechnologies; and they therefore saw 
no reason to preemptively shore up public confidence by engaging in self-regulation. In Europe, 
the starkness of the GM debacle painted a very different picture for corporate decision-makers: 
here public debate about GM foods began just as the BSE food crisis struck – a coincidence, 
which helped link the two issues before the public. As the epicenter of the BSE crisis, consumer 
reactions to GMOs in the United Kingdom were especially visceral. The BSE scandal created a 
‘crisis of confidence’ in both science and government and left Britain with a legacy of public 
suspicion and mistrust in industry and fear of new technologies (Moore 2001: 176).  
We could therefore contend that the combined experience of BSE and GMOs has left UK 
companies more risk adverse – or at the very least more alert – than their U.S. competitors. 
Although early surveys reported largely positive attitudes, awareness of nanotechnologies also 
jumped from 29 percent in 2004 to 44 percent in 2006, with 57 percent of respondents unable or 
unwilling to take a position (BMRB Social Research 2004; Gaskell et al. 2006). UK companies 
may in these figures have found a powerful stimulus for preemptive action. Because so little is 
still known of the technology’s risks and benefits, public perceptions remain volatile. The 
founding partners thus reasoned that  
“public perception of risks is dynamic and while currently people are broadly well disposed towards 
nanotechnologies this cannot be counted on indefinitely. […] These perceptual risks depend on the ability 
of companies and governments to minimise unintended consequences, develop beneficial technologies 
and adequately govern the exploitation of the technologies (Insight Investment, Royal Society and 
NIA 2006: 3). 
The misfortunes of the European agri-biotech industry in short serve as a cautionary tale and 
may explain why UK companies – anxious to avoid past mistakes – embraced the NanoCode. To 
settle this claim, we must look beyond Britain and the United States. Figure 6.1 therefore also 
includes results from Germany and Denmark, countries equally haunted by public hostility to 
GMOs. If past experiences explain self-regulation, public perceptions of nanotechnologies 
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should be similar in Britain and Germany and more negative than in Denmark, where industry 
did not self-regulate. The latter is indeed the case for Germany, where opposition to 
nanotechnologies reached close to 13 percent in 2010. But it cannot explain self-regulation in 
Britain: based on figure 6.1 we would again have expected Danish, not British companies to 
endorse a code of responsible conduct. Of the countries included in figure 6.1, public opinion in 
Britain is consistently least pessimistic about nanotechnologies – well below the European 
average – and hostility is not evidently on the rise. 
No clear pattern which could explain self-regulation has emerged from the surveys of public 
attitudes undertaken to date: perceptions of nanotechnologies are both most and least negative in 
the two countries, Germany and Britain, where industries have engaged in self-regulation, with 
opinion in the United States and Denmark nestling in between. It is therefore in short difficult to 
attribute self-regulation to variations in public perceptions of nanotechnology risks. Although 
public awareness moreover is growing, studies have tended to demonstrate a positive association 
between awareness of nanotechnology and the belief that the technology’s benefits will outweigh 
its risks (Cobb and Macoubrie 2004; Gaskell, Allum and Stares 2003; Gaskell et al. 2006; TNS 
Opinion & Social 2010; Macoubrie 2005; Hart Research Associates 2007; 2008; Harris Interactive 
2012). The situation is dynamic, of course. A major NGO campaign, feeding on lack of trust and 
past experience, could push public opinion from its current positive position to one which is 
fearful and risk averse. But while the founding partners may correctly have anticipated that 
goodwill cannot be counted on indefinitely, an undeniable ‘triggering event’ has yet to occur. 
Awareness of nanotechnologies in these four countries is at best episodic, rather than continuous 
(Anderson et al. 2005; Laing 2006; Kjærgaard 2010; Zimmer, Hertel and Böl 2010b). Above we 
noted the absence of NGO campaigning or sustained media coverage in Britain and Germany; 
neither have financial stakeholders and business partners in these countries taken actions 
suggesting that market pressures for voluntary governance were more acutely felt by UK and 
German companies than their U.S. and Danish competitors – there is for example no European 
equivalent to the CNT exclusion policy announced by U.S. Continental Western Group in 2008.  
THE STRENGTH OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION  
Demand-side pressures thus cannot account for self-regulation in Britain and Germany; but 
perhaps drivers on the supply-side can. Business interests in self-regulation often result from a 
desire to improve market coordination and economic efficiency. Market imperfections can create 
compelling economic incentives to implement common standards that allow companies to 
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coordinate their behavior, reduce transaction costs and address barriers to innovation and trade 
(Büthe and Mattli 2010: 444ff.). Common standards and guidance documents for example serve 
to establish procedures for workplace safety or facilitate effective communications among 
manufacturers and their customers on quality and safety issues. Voluntary guidelines can further 
help clarify regulatory obligations and aspects of good product stewardship and they are thus 
used to complement formal statutory regulations.  
Powerful business organizations are often instrumental in formulating and disseminating 
common technical standards and guidelines on recommended behavior among members of an 
industry (Hall and Soskice 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Throughout chapters three and five, 
I have alluded to the central role of the powerful association of the German chemical industry – 
the VCI. In chapter three, we for example saw how collaboration among VCI and BAuA resulted 
in the publication of guidance for workplace handling and use of nanomaterials (BAuA and VCI 
2007); and the VCI has since issued various other guidance documents and recommendation 
papers to establish best practices for the responsible production and use of nanomaterials. 
Examples include guidance to implement Responsible Care for nanomaterials, assist members 
with regulatory compliance, enable effective communication among member companies and their 
customers in the value chain, and the management of health, safety and environmental aspects of 
nanomaterials throughout their life cycle (VCI 2008). The NanoKommission’s Five Principles 
likewise intend to provide guidance for companies on responsible governance and best practice, 
and perhaps they are therefore best understood as an expression of VCI’s commitment to 
support the operations of its members. In this view, the reason German companies embraced 
self-governing responsibilities was to resolve coordination problems resulting from a mix of 
scientific, technical and regulatory uncertainties. With their powerful association acting as catalyst 
of agreement, German companies were in other words able to implement common standards of 
best practice intended to foster market efficiency, reduce transaction costs and address barriers to 
innovation.  
If the strength of their association did indeed enable German companies to self-regulate, we 
can expect that the association of UK companies, the Nanotechnology Industries Association, 
displays features or characteristics comparable to those of the VCI. If powerful business 
organizations in other words explain why some industries embrace self-governing responsibilities, 
while others do not, then the NIA together with the VCI must belong to the group of powerful 
associations. What do we mean when we speak of powerful business organizations? What makes 
VCI powerful? There are many answers to this question. We might for example refer to the 
political influence which flow from the economic weight of the German chemical industry. Or 
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we might refer to the VCI’s capacity to coordinate the strategies and activities of its members. 
We might also refer to its control over organizational resources and its autonomy to select 
associational goals and the strategies it believes necessary to achieve those objectives (Schmitter 
and Streeck 1999). Or we might refer to all of those things. If the Five Principles are indeed an 
instrument to guide and coordinate the operations of members, we must examine what enables 
the VCI to formulate and disseminate such common standards. A representative described the 
process like this:  
“What is normally done in VCI, and maybe in all associations, it’s typically the big companies who write 
guidance for the small ones. The big ones can also better analyze the law, what it means, and so on, and 
then it is shared. […] In a lot of cases, the best practice is always starting in big companies, because they 
always have the lowest level of workplace accidents – in any field. This means they do something right. 
[…] Normally, the best practice in health and safety is established in big companies and then through 
associations transferred to the small companies.”16 
Exchange of information is the most obvious and basic function of any business association. 
Members benefit from information exchanged through their association as it for example reduces 
individual costs of gathering information on markets, competitors or best practices. Information 
shared through their association can in turn induce members to adjust their business strategies 
and activities. Information circulated among members and between members and their 
association can in other words result in coordination of behavior (Culpepper 2003: 99; Schaede 
2000: 43). The more extensive, accurate and regular information members receive from their 
association, the more it will impact on their behavior. Associations which can routinely draw, 
process, and diffuse information from and to a wide member base are thus better able to 
coordinate the behavior of members.  
Herein lies perhaps the most basic source of strength for the VCI. VCI represents the 
interests of more than 90 percent of the enterprises operating in the German chemical industry. 
With a near monopoly on representation, there is no significant branch or sector association 
organized outside the VCI (Grote and Schneider 2006: 129). The encompassing membership 
implies that the VCI is able to obtain information on and from companies operating in all areas 
of the German chemical sector; and in turn diffuse information back down to companies situated 
across the entire supply chain. A representative remarked: “If you are under one roof [of course] 
you talk better.”17 By providing information on how their competitors organize and manage their 
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companies. Knowledge and information about their rivals shared through the VCI help members 
adjust their business strategies; and information collected and disseminated by the VCI on how 
their competitors are reacting to associational guidelines in turn creates further incentives for 
members to adopt and converge around common standards. The capacity to collect, process and 
circulate information on and to members operating across the entire chemical sector in short 
induces and enables companies to coordinate their behavior. In this very fundamental sense, 
then, the strength of their association is based on the degree of organization among German 
companies.  
By this metric, it is immediately clear however that the VCI is an altogether different 
associational ‘beast’ than the NIA. The NIA represents the interests of a mere 23 members 
hailing from a wide range of application areas and product sectors. While the small membership 
do facilitate information exchange among members and between members and their association 
(Schaede 2000: 30f.),18 it also restricts the extent and completeness of information the association 
can circulate to members. The NIA in other words has only limited capabilities to coordinate the 
behavior of its members. There are three reasons for this: First, the NIA represent some of the 
most prominent nano companies, such as e.g. BASF and L’Oreal. These ‘industry champions’ 
might of course help establish and supply norms and standards that could be share through the 
association. Since the NIA organizes few small or medium sized enterprises relative to the 
number of large companies, there is however little immediate demand for such best practice 
guidelines. Other multinationals can establish their own guidelines and thus have limited need for 
the association to formulate and circulate best practice documents; and they might instead prefer 
that the association direct attention towards objectives that better serve their interests. Unable to 
sway associational policies and priorities, smaller members are in effect forced to look for 
guidance beyond their association. 
Second, the heterogeneity of its membership further limits demands for the association to 
identify and formulate common guidelines. Best practice developed by a company specializing in 
say material science need not be directly applicable to those targeting medical applications; and 
there is thus little need to share such information and experiences through the association. 
Common standards and guidance documents are finally in important ways comparable to 
language groups: the benefits from learning a given language are proportional to the number of 
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similarly related to the number of companies that adopt them. While standards and 
recommendations formulated by the NIA might serve to guide the operations of its 23 members, 
their impact on competitors would likely be limited. Given its small membership, the NIA is 
unable to promote the adoption of associational guidelines across the industrial supply chain; nor 
is the association able to routinely obtain and provide accurate information on how nonmembers 
are reacting to associational guidelines. Members therefore have little reason to expect that 
industry norms will converge on standards formulated by their association. Since the NIA plays 
no prominent role in establishing common industry standards, members have few incentives to 
use the association to coordinate their commercial and risk management practices. The NIA 
instead remains first and foremost a vehicle to voice the political views and demands of its 
members; and beyond the Responsible NanoCode, the association has published no documents 
intended to establish guidance or standards for companies commercializing nanotechnologies. 
While the NIA and the VCI both exist to serve the interests of the members, as business 
organizations go, the two associations are about as different as they come.  
The strength of organization is thus not a good predictor for codes of responsible conduct. 
Degree of organization is of course not the only source of power for business associations. 
Regardless of how we might think of powerful business organizations, there can however be no 
question that the American Chemistry Council, the UK Chemical Industries Association or the 
Confederation of Danish Industry are leagues apart from the NIA. Yet, none of these 
associations have endorsed codes of responsible conduct. If it was indeed the strength of their 
association that enables companies to self-regulate through agreed standards and guidelines, we 
are in the curious situation that both the most and the least powerful association in my sample 
succeeded in doing so. It is thus unlikely that the story of nanotechnologies and industry self-
regulation reflect attempts by powerful business associations to implement common standards of 
best practice intended to improve coordination among their members. It is as I explain next 
instead the story of the incentives and constraints created by the institutions that underpin 
relations among state bureaucrats and industry. 
MANAGING PERCEPTIONS OF NANOTECH RISKS AND BENEFITS  
To understand why companies in UK and Germany self-regulated, we must first consider the 
risks of market rejection, public backlash and technology stigma. And how codes of responsible 
conduct reflect a business response intended to mitigate such risks. Debate on nanotech 
commenced in the immediate wake of the GM Controversy, and the misfortune – and mistakes – 
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of the European agri-biotech industry as I observed above quickly came to constitute a 
cautionary tale for the nanobusiness community. To survive and prosper, industries need to 
ensure stakeholder confidence in the activities of their members and acceptance of the 
technologies underlying their products and processes. Failure to heed signs of declining trust or 
backlash can result in significant economic or reputational costs for industries in ways that could 
threaten their commercial prospects and long-term legitimacy. If the public turns against an 
industry, financial stakeholders, business partners and politicians are sure to follow. Should 
adverse information for example spark public hostility against an industry, politicians may feel 
compelled to entrench ‘irrational’ or ‘uninformed’ sentiment into official policy, cut public 
funding or erect costly test barriers (Sylvester, Abbott and Marchant 2009: 169). This would 
indeed be one reading of the GM Controversy – a looming fate that industry leaders clearly have 
no desire to share. If nanotech is to avoid the fate of GM, stakeholders – business partners, 
investors, insurers, employees, the media, and especially customers and the public – need to be 
reassured that companies commercializing nanotechnologies are proactively and effectively 
mitigating any risks related to them. The commercial viability of the nanobusiness community in 
short hinges upon the ability to garner public acceptance of the technology as well as market 
confidence in industry. 
The ‘nano’ industry, of course, is a fiction. While we can identify a (small) core population of 
companies, where the nanotech aspect is dominant, the vast majority of research and 
development is undertaken within established and very different industries and market sectors. 
The sheer number of facilities, combined with the heterogeneity of research and production 
processes, denies all but a small number of specialists a clear understanding of the industry. 
Given this complexity, stakeholders not least the public naturally struggle to distinguish among 
members of the industry. Assessing the performance and characteristics of individual companies 
requires massive amounts of information; a daunting and elusive task even for more resourceful 
stakeholders, such as regulators or financial analysts. Consider, for example, the implications of a 
safety study linking a specific company’s nanomaterial, say multi-walled carbon nanotubes, to 
cancer. Markets and regulators will certainly take steps to penalize the ‘culpable’ company, e.g. 
through restrictions on use or depreciating share prices. But what of the implications for other 
companies involved with similar materials or even nanotechnology in general? Few consumers 
will probably pause to contemplate the differences between single-, double- or multi-walled 
carbon nanotubes and less so their various toxicological properties. Rather, consumers may 
quickly jump to the straightforward, but incorrect conclusion that all nanoproducts cause cancer. 
Even more sophisticated observers, like regulators, insurers or financial traders, may however be 
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susceptible to grouping carbon nanotube producers and users together. Public, commercial and 
regulatory reactions might thus reverberate throughout the wider nanobusiness community. 
Although the study in question was undertaken for a single company’s specific nanomaterial, the 
evaluation of the results will, albeit to varying degrees, color judgments about the entire industry. 
Because stakeholders do not or cannot relate information to each individual member of the 
industry, ‘nano’ companies – whether they hail from the chemical or other industries – tend to 
share a common stakeholder assessment of their character and relative performance. As 
information about the activities of one company or group of companies become available, it will 
to some degree affect the evaluation of the entire industry (Nash 2002: 239). An error attributable 
to a single company – whether this consists of an accidental release of toxic nanomaterials, a 
product recall or a negative toxicity finding – might in other words cause very real harms for its 
competitors. Research in financial economics has quantified the implications of such spillover 
harms: Gregg Jarrell and Sam Peltzman (1985) for example found that a drug recall by one 
pharmaceutical company caused the stock portfolio of 50 rival companies to drop by one 
percent. Even stronger effects were demonstrated for other industries, such as the automobile 
industry. Information asymmetries among companies and their stakeholders in other words 
intertwine the fates of members of an industry.  
Since ‘nano’ companies assume a collective identity in the public’s mind, members of the 
industry share a pooled risk of stakeholder sanctions (Barnett and King 2008: 1150).19 The now 
infamous MagicNano debacle, which propelled nanotech into the world’s media spotlight, gave 
nano companies a first taste of “the palpable exposure of an entire industry being [mis]judged on 
this single misunderstanding.” (Bowman and Hodge 2008: 481) While public opinion still is 
favorable to nanotechnologies, stakeholder perceptions are – because so little is still known of the 
technology’s risks and benefits – volatile and subject to rapid change. The pervasive uncertainties 
about the technology’s future trajectory, its unknown risks and the (slowly) evolving regulatory 
environment imply that even seemingly innocent information can have major impacts on 
stakeholder perceptions. As they learn about the technology and the industry, stakeholders adjust 
and update their perceptions about the safety and commercial prospect of nanotechnologies. 
With every industrial accident, product incident and negative toxicity finding, companies 




19  Such interdependencies can of course have positive effects. The high-tech ‘nanolabel’ may constitute an 
intangible asset that helps companies attract private and public funding, develop competitive advantages, and 
ultimately drive long-term profitability. Interdependencies can thus be favorable if, for example, one 
company’s success helps to legitimize the emerging industry and so eases all companies’ access to resources. 
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accumulates, it could precipitate a tipping point, triggering widespread backlash, stigma or even 
nanophobia. Even a single event – possible evidence of harm, a product recall or restrictions on 
use – could do irreparable damages to consumer confidence, causing long-term erosion of the 
market potential of nanotechnologies. Regrettably, for industry however, news of accidents, 
incidents and safety concerns will continue to surface, if not for other reasons then simply 
because of the sheer number of companies involved, the projected future pervasiveness of 
nanotechnologies and because some nanomaterials, like their bulk forms, are (very) toxic. A 
nanoscare is therefore not an implausible future outcome – it is in fact bound to occur. This is 
where codes of responsible conduct enter the frame.  
If ‘bad news’ engender backlash, anticipating such information will also be an essential 
element of the solution (King, Lenox and Barnett 2002: 403). Turn to the blunders of the biotech 
industry: proponents mistakenly assumed that rational arguments could effectively influence the 
response to biotechnology. While markets and consumers did indeed recognize the benefits of 
biotechnology, fear of potential abuses and accidents ultimately captivated public imaginations. 
Proponents of biotechnology continued to raise rational arguments in defense of the technology, 
largely dismissing the risks as exaggerated. Unfortunately, for proponents, to no avail (Matsuura 
2004: 492). As Paul Slovic (1987) explains, risk perceptions are systematically linked to the 
characteristics of the risk: an accident that claims many lives may produce relatively little 
disturbance, if it occurs under familiar and well-understood circumstances – train-wrecks provide 
an oft cited example. Even a minor accident “in an unfamiliar system (or one poorly understood) 
may [however] have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of further and 
possibly catastrophic mishaps.” (Slovic 1987: 284) Stakeholder reactions will be stronger, where 
the risk in question is perceived to be involuntary, uncontrollable or invisible, has a delayed or 
irreversible effect, is memorable, very uncertain, poorly understood, unfamiliar, and unfairly 
distributed – all elements which characterize nanotechnologies. Because the risks of 
nanotechnologies are (perceived as) unknown and potentially catastrophic, accidents will be 
highly publicized and may produce large ripple effects. Even relatively unremarkable incidents 
could therefore conjure up images of “a sinister technology run amok.” (Economist 2006)  
The predicament facing industry is in short one of managing stakeholder perceptions of 
nanotechnology risks and benefits; and codes of responsible conduct can be understood as 
instruments to familiarize stakeholders with important attributes and characteristics of the 
industry and the technology. Michael Barnett and Andrew King (2008: 1155) explain:  
“From the perspective of information economics, if a stakeholder already understands the propensity for 
an error, the occurrence of an error should provide no new information. From a psychological 
perspective, information provided in advance of an error may also influence how the error is interpreted 
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by reducing the degree to which stakeholders view any observed error as informative about unobserved 
dangers, thus resulting in a soothing effect.”  
A code of conduct may reduce the harmful effects of interdependencies by communicating 
information about members of the industry and the technology itself, such that future bad news 
is viewed to reveal little or no new information of relevance and so have limited impacts on 
perceptions of the safety and commercial prospect of nanotechnologies. Michael Barnett (2007) 
for example reports how voluntary codes can influence stakeholder evaluations of an entire 
industry. John Peloza (2006) similarly argue that voluntary governance measures can mitigate 
risks arising from negative events that would otherwise harm corporate financial performance: 
being trusted by stakeholders reduces financial risks arising from safety issues, potential boycotts 
and loss of corporate reputation. In codes of responsible conduct, companies may thus see 
instruments to reassure their stakeholders that they understand the technology and are 
proactively and effectively mitigating any potential risks. Self-regulation may in other words serve 
to shelter the industry from criticism and hysteria in the wake of a future nanoscare: to the extent 
that incidents or accidents can be written off as caused by a few ‘bad apples’ or a series of 
unfortunate, but otherwise manageable circumstances, companies can garner public and market 
confidence that industry at large is taking a responsible approach to development. 
But insofar backlash is a shared risk of all companies, it has yet to precipitate a universal drive 
to self-regulate among national industries; and none of the above tell us why UK and German 
companies self-regulated, while their American and Danish competitors did not. The answer I 
argue lie with how regulation can impact on stakeholder perceptions and the varied roles 
companies have assumed in the regulation of nanotech. There never was any solid scientific 
evidence that GMOs pose serious dangers to health or safety (Sylvester, Abbott and Marchant 
2009: 169); but the absence of scientific evidence did not prevent a statutory response. Initial 
regulatory decisions, negotiated by EU governments in the 1980s, came quickly to represent 
more than merely the statutory basis for evaluation of specific GM products. As Matthew Kernes 
and colleagues (2006: 294f.) note: “[Directive 1990/20] acted to constitute a normative framing 
that structured how the nature of GM artifacts was understood by the policy community and the 
way that possible impacts (‘to human health or the environment’) were conceptualized and 
analysed in wider media and NGO discussion.” (Emphasis in original) Much of the subsequent 
anti-GM sentiments thus originated with initial decisions governing the technology and its 
products (Bernauer and Meins 2003).  
Regulation as I have observed not only increase operational costs and punish wrongdoing. 
They also help build – or break – confidence in an industry. The absence of a clear regulatory 
response to nanotechnologies readily feeds into perceptions of government inaction in the face 
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of unknown hazards and thus risks enabling a perception of the Wild West, with companies 
playing fast and loose with human health and environmental safety (Seear, Petersen and Bowman 
2009: 75). This is unmistakably treacherous terrain for industry. More dangerous still is however 
the signal value inherent in any new ‘nano’ legislation or ‘nano’ regulations. A German official 
observed:  
“A nanotechnology law would be perceived as a problem: you only regulate something which is a 
problem. Regulations are always an answer to a problem. That would have been something where the 
public would have said: ‘We have a nuclear power law and GMO law. Why do we need a ‘nano’ 
regulation?’”20 
By bringing to public notice the possible existence of a risk, even proposed regulations can 
significantly shake confidence in an industry (Greenwood 1984: 87). Consider the experience of 
agrichemical giant, Monsanto. In 1984, U.S. EPA was moving aggressively against one of 
Monsanto’s top pesticides, alachlor. When a trade newsletter reported that EPA was considering 
an emergency ban, followed by cancellation of all alachlor registrations, a Wall Street analyst 
down-graded his rating of Monsanto’s stock. In short order, the company’s share price fell so 
rapidly that the New York Stock Exchange briefly suspended trading of Monsanto stock. EPA, 
under pressure from Congress, never promulgated a ban of alachlor (Fagin, Lavelle and the 
Center for Public Integrity 1996: 83ff.). But the incident does illustrate the vulnerability of even 
corporate heavyweights like Monsanto to rumors of regulation. For most multinationals, 
nanomaterials of course still constitute a minor part of their business. But as they tie their futures 
to nanomaterials, large chemical manufacturers might increasingly find their exposure to 
information emerging from the regulatory process alarming. For SMEs and start-ups, however, 
whose business model is entirely focused on nanotech, reports of ‘nano’ regulations could prove 
disastrous.  
Short of a major accident, unequivocally unmasking the sinister side of nanotechnologies, the 
primary source of bad news for industry is in short the evolving regulatory process. Given the 
volatility of stakeholder perceptions, even unremarkable events, ambiguous safety results or 
routine regulatory decisions, could impact significantly on the perceived risks of 
nanotechnologies. Uncertainty about how to extrapolate evidence that a substance causes cancer 
in laboratory animals to humans is for example unlikely to substantially diminish the adverse 
publicity associated with the discovery of its harmful effects (Wagner 2004: 1634ff.). To avoid 




20  Interview, Berlin, June 22, 2012. 
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other words need tactics to deflect and anticipate adverse information. Yet the options and tools 
available to companies that cooperate with state authorities are very different from those available 
to companies that do not. 
Cooperation and agreement among state bureaucrats and companies imply that both parties 
have a stake in the final outcome; and inevitably that they must share the political risks and 
responsibilities for such decisions. Where influence however is purchased through access to state 
authorities, companies must also be cautious of strategies that could be viewed as disruptive to 
ongoing relationships – and this would include avoiding tactics intended to weaken the legitimacy 
of regulatory decisions. Under these circumstances, industry is ‘locked’ into the joint scientific 
and regulatory outcomes of cooperation. But herein lies the danger for industry: if left undisputed 
regulatory and scientific developments could trigger strong market reactions against individual 
companies or the entire industry. Yet, if companies must support – or at least refrain from 
challenging – regulatory decisions to maintain their access and influence with regulators, they 
need an alternative instrument to manage stakeholder perceptions. And this is what creates the 
impetus for codes of responsible conduct. Bound by the contingencies of cooperation, codes of 
responsible conduct may shelter industries from future nanoscares by reassuring stakeholders 
that scientific results and regulatory decisions do not reflect the inherent harmful properties of 
nanotechnologies. Companies reluctant to cooperate with state bureaucrats in contrast have no 
responsibility for regulatory decisions or government-sponsored safety studies; and they can 
therefore say what they please about them. Companies resolved to denounce their regulatory 
adversaries usually find ways to contest scientific conclusions and dispute regulatory actions – 
and such tactics could certainly also be employed in the court of public opinion to communicate 
safety results and frame regulatory developments – and they will consequently have little need for 
self-regulation as an instrument to manage stakeholder perceptions. 
RESPONSIBLE NANOTECH: INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 
The NanoKommission concluded its first phase by endorsing ‘Five Principles for Responsible 
Use of Nanomaterials’ (Catenhusen and Grobe 2008). Drawn up and inspired by deliberations 
among members of Working Group 3, the Five Principles reflect a multi-stakeholder consensus 
on principles and guidelines for responsible governance within the chemical industry. With an 
explicit ambition of complementing existing regulatory mechanisms, the principles are intended 
to assist companies in the interim period as legislative frameworks are being evaluated and 
updated (Catenhusen and Grobe 2008: 52; NanoKommission 2008a). While participants were 
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unable to agree measures to monitor implementation or clarify the extend of binding 
commitments – questions deferred to the NanoKommission’s second phase – the principles 
summarize those issues on which representatives from federal authorities, industry and other 
stakeholder groups could reach consensus on recommendations for practical guidance.21  
In Britain, the launch of the Responsible NanoCode in late 2008 signaled a comparable 
commitment to responsible governance of nanotechnologies. Developed by a process of multi-
stakeholder engagement, the NanoCode aims to establish consensus on good practice, while 
promoting “transparency and accountability and so help build confidence in the technology to 
ensure its potential is also fulfilled.” (Insight Investment et al. 2008: 5) Born of a corporate desire 
to avoid ‘another GM’,22 interviews with former participants confirmed the need for companies 
to understand and respond to the concerns of their stakeholders. One participant recalled: “the 
businesses asked for help on communication. They felt the problem was: ‘we don’t know how to 
effectively communicate with our stakeholders.’”23 A NIA representative noted: “We felt that it 
would be appropriate both of informing our members where responsible development needed to 
be set and where it needed to be agreed on as a guidance to members, but also to provide to the 
outside a transparent display of how responsible the nanotechnology industries were.”24  
A similar observation can be made for the Five Principles. Explains an observer:  
“[The companies] were afraid of the GMO debate and they are still afraid of the it! […] So they did 
everything to avoid regulation and that was also why they were involved in the NanoDialogue and why 
they had these [Principles] developed, because the idea behind this was to have criteria industry would 
apply to and to have something where you could say: if you don’t stick to these criteria then you will have 
a nanotechnology law.”25 
A federal official elaborated:  
“There was no fear of nano, but they wanted to prevent fear. [The rationale was] we don’t know how 
dangerous nanomaterials are – this is often the problem when you have new technologies – but we are 
sure that we can deal with it – that German industry is responsible enough to do it and that German 
industry has the technology to deal with it. And they said: ‘how can we bring this to the people? How can 
we make sure it works?’ And then there was this idea to put out these principles, so companies can say 
that they will comply with these principles as a voluntary statement, which is better than to have nothing. 
It was too early for regulation […] The idea was to have no regulation, but to have this voluntary standard 




21  Interview, Berlin, June 22, 2012. 
22  Interview, London, June 8, 2011. 
23  Phone interview, March 1, 2011. 
24  Interview, Brussels, March 2, 2011. 
25  Interview, Berlin, June 22, 2012. 
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idea of the [principles]: to put this process in a way that everyone says: ‘OK, even if I personally – like 
most of the people here in Germany – are not familiar with these problems, I have trust in that everyone 
who is dealing with it does his best and takes efforts and looks for our safety.’”26 
In both countries, business interests in self-regulation grew from the need to garner public 
acceptance of nanotechnologies and market confidence in industry. Endorsing a code of 
responsible conduct thus assists companies reassure their stakeholders that they are proactively 
and effectively mitigating possible risks related to their activities.  
We here arrive at a second point of tangency between the Five Principles and the Responsible 
NanoCode: their lack of binding commitments. Neither the British nor the German code confer 
obligations on participating companies. The codes are instead meant only to provide companies 
with guidance on responsible governance and suggestions of good practices during the 
transitional period in which regulatory frameworks are developed. The NanoCode for example 
merely intends to “assist with the evolution of such legislation by clarifying the principles which 
may underpin more detailed, verifiable, standards.” (Insight Investment et al. 2007: 1) A UK 
official remarked:  
“The [NanoCode] doesn’t have any regulatory significance. It doesn’t confer anything. But it does indicate 
a company takes seriously the need to make sure their products are safe and make sure their processes 
don’t present hazards to human health and the environment. So, yeah, I think it goes hand in hand really. 
It’s not a part of regulation [but] it’s certainly something we are happy to stand behind, happy to see a 
code developed.”27  
Much to the disappointment and frustration of some participants (Grobe 2011; 
NanoKommission 2010b),28 a similar conclusion applies to the German code of conduct. The 
Five Principles represent a direct result of discussions among industry and governmental 
representatives. But while the principles thus are intrinsically linked to the regulatory process – 
they are not themselves binding. An industry participant offered this view: 
“Most of the Principles can be found in the first article of the laws governing us […] For example, we 
protect the workers – which is one Principle – it is in Article One of the Worker Safety Law in Germany. 
[…] The chemical industry is so heavily regulated that the only principle which goes beyond the legal 
requirements is the Principle of communicating with the community. Everything else you can find nearly 
word by word in the very first article of the law.”29 
By communicating information about members of the industry and the technology, the 




26  Interview, Dortmund, October 11, 2012. 
27  Interview, London, March 3, 2011. 
28  Phone interview, October 30, 2012. 
29  Interview, Frankfurt, October 11, 2012. 
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of nanotechnologies, and the two codes can thus help companies anticipate adverse information 
about their products and activities: should the codes in other words succeed in familiarizing 
stakeholders with the industry and the technology, future ‘bad’ news may be viewed to reveal 
little or no new information of relevance and hence have limited impacts on perceptions of 
nanotechnologies. British and German companies in short embraced self-governing 
responsibilities as a strategy to shelter their operations from future nanoscares. 
Self-regulation was in turn a business response that grew from the incentives and constraints 
embedded in the British and German chemical control regimes. While the desire to avoid market 
rejection obviously applies to all nanobusinesses, cooperation among state authorities and 
industry in Britain and Germany entailed its own dangers of backlash; and conditioned a search 
for tools to deflect and anticipate adverse information resulting from joint safety studies and 
agreed regulatory outcomes. We can gain an intuitive grasp of how the strategic environment for 
chemical control policy commands the choice of tactics intended to communicate safety results 
and frame regulatory decisions by contrasting corporate risk-benefit calculations in the United 
States and Britain. 
Because they have been reluctant to cooperate with federal decision-makers, American 
companies have no direct stake in regulatory decisions: since they do not participate directly in 
drafting regulatory proposals, they have no direct influence or responsibility for their content; 
and they can therefore say what they please about them. While new ‘nano’ regulations of course 
do risk inciting consumer fears, driving financial stakeholders away, adversarial sound and fury is 
also well-suited to paint persuasive pictures of bureaucratic excess, caprice or incompetence 
(Badaracco 1985: 143f.). The very same tactics used to contest, refuse and obstruct regulatory 
action can be employed in the court of public opinion to communicate scientific results and 
frame regulatory developments. By retaining their independence and formal distance from 
regulators, American companies are thus not only able to exercise significant, but indirect 
influence on the direction of U.S. nanotech policies; they will – in the short to medium term at 
least – in their delay tactics also find the instrument to shape stakeholder perceptions of 
nanotechnologies. 
UK companies in contrast find themselves in a more precarious situation. Since influence in 
the British regulatory system hinges upon access to the executive, companies must be cautious of 
strategies which could jeopardize that access – and this would include avoiding tactics intended to 
weaken the legitimacy of joint safety studies and agreed decisions (Grant 2001: 343). Business in 
Britain of course does not shy away from criticizing governmental policies it finds objectionable 
– chemical control policy is no exception. The situation is different, however, where regulatory 
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policies are the outcome of mutual agreement or joint collaborations among industry and 
regulators. Cooperation and agreement among state bureaucrats and companies imply that both 
parties have a stake in the final outcome; and inevitably that they must share the political risks of 
such decisions. Since moreover British regulators are largely free to structure and manage access 
to administrative proceedings, companies must be wary of strategies which could be viewed as 
disruptive to ongoing relationship, as failure to observe tacit accords ultimately risks exclusion 
(Grant 2004: 408f.). The realities of the British regulatory system in short ‘locks’ industry into the 
joint scientific and regulatory outcomes of cooperation.  
But herein lies the danger for UK companies: if left undisputed regulatory and scientific 
developments could trigger visceral market reactions against individual companies or the entire 
industry. Confronted with adverse findings from a joint safety study on say nanotubes, corporate 
sponsors will inspire little confidence in their products by admitting: ‘Yes, nanotubes may cause 
cancer, but not our kind of nanotubes.’ Given the volatility of stakeholder perceptions, failure to 
dispute safety findings and regulatory developments could do irreparable damages to consumer 
confidence, causing long-term erosion of the market potential of nanotechnologies in Britain – as 
happened with GMOs in the wake of the BSE scandal. Yet, if companies must support – or at 
least refrain from challenging – the results of collaboration to maintain their influence with 
regulators, they need an alternative instrument to manage stakeholder perceptions – to reassure 
stakeholders that regulatory decisions do not reflect the inherent harmful properties of 
nanotechnologies – and that instrument was the Responsible NanoCode.  
In Germany, self-regulation likewise reflects the need for companies to divert the harmful 
effects of future nanoscares resulting from ‘irrefutable’ or ‘uncontestable’ news about their 
products and activities. Unlike Britain, regular cooperation with named interest groups is a 
requirement of many areas of German toxic substance legislation – and the de facto discretion of 
federal authorities to manage and structure access is limited. Although the bounds of cooperation 
in consequence are less pronounced for German companies, they too confront compelling 
reasons to endorse agreed outcomes. While German toxic substance legislation guarantees access 
for industry views and hence locks regulators and companies in an ongoing relationship, it need 
not necessarily be maintained on congenial terms. Cooperation is as I have observed a desirable, 
but not inevitable feature of chemical control policy – conflicts, suspicion or even antagonism 
among companies and regulators are not uncommon. For companies, the mere existence of a 
relationship is thus trivial. What matters is the terms and results of that relationship (Scharpf 
1990; 1994: 43f.). Bureaucracies develop institutional memories over time and companies willing 
to jeopardize the terms of their relations with state bureaucrats by publicly denouncing agreed 
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decisions must anticipate a frosty welcome in future dealings (Wilson 1989; Badaracco 1985). 
Although federal authorities are unable to exclude belligerent industry representatives, they 
certainly have ways to make life more difficult for them. Simply failing to return a phone call or 
to invite industry representatives to important meetings are common and cheap ways through 
which regulators can punish uncooperative regulatees (Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 
2004: 330).  
Because the German chemical control regime places a premium on cooperation, corporate 
interests are better served by maintaining relations on congenial terms. German companies no 
less than their UK competitors therefore observe the accords of cooperation; and this entails 
assuming responsibility for regulatory policies decided through mutual agreement and joint 
collaborations. We can elaborate this conclusion by briefly looking to the tactics adopted by 
Danish companies in response to the decision to establish a nanoproduct register. In chapter five, 
we observed how industry representatives urgently warned that a separate reporting requirement 
for nanomaterials might feed into consumer perceptions of unexplained or general risks inherent 
to all nanoproducts and thus contribute to stigmatize nanotech in the public eye (Boteju 2012; 
Telcs 2012; Zeuthen 2012). Rather than wager that the decision might fail to impact on public 
perceptions of nanotechnologies, industry representatives instead used the media to criticize the 
basis for MST’s decision and denounce a nanoregister as futile, counterproductive and ultimately 
harmful to the Danish economy (see e.g. Zeuthen 2013). Since Danish companies had no say in 
the decision to establish a nanoregister, they were not bound by it, and they consequently had 
little need for self-regulation as a tool to manage its impacts on public perceptions of 
nanotechnologies. While German companies in the debate over a nanoregister have voiced 
similar arguments, their capacity to dissuade federal decision-makers against reporting obligations 
also eliminated the need for the VCI and its members to pursue a more aggressive message. 
The varied self-regulatory responses across the four countries are in short rooted in the 
realities of their chemical control regimes and the different roles companies have assumed in the 
regulation of nanotech. Since influence in the British and German regulatory systems is 
purchased through cooperation with state authorities, companies must also assume responsibility 
for its outcome. The extensive involvement of companies and their associations in the decision-
making process in other words encourages them to behave ‘responsibly’ – and this would include 
avoiding tactics intended to weaken the legitimacy of joint policies. Industry self-regulation in 
Britain and Germany thus intends to complement, not preempt, state policies governing the 
human health and environmental risks of nanotechnologies. In the United States and Denmark, 
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Table 6.1  Explanations for Industry Self-Regulation in Britain and Germany 
 BRITAIN UNITED STATES  GERMANY DENMARK 
     
Self-Regulation Yes No Yes No 
     
State-Industry 
Cooperation 
Yes No Yes No 
     
Plans for Legislation No Yes No Yes 
     
Public Opinion Favorable Favorable Favorable Favorable 
     
NGO Campaigns No No No No 
     
Media Coverage Episodic Episodic Episodic Episodic 
     
Market Pressures* Low Low Low Low 
     
Strength of 
Organization 
Low Low Very High High 
     
     
* Demands for voluntary risk management mechanisms from insurers, investors or business partners.  
 
where companies remain free to contest scientific conclusions and dispute regulatory actions, the 
need to self-regulate has yet to present itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional political science answers to the question, why do industries self-regulate, emphasize 
either a desire to capture the benefits of collective action or the need to deflect costs imposed by 
external stakeholders. Whether we insist on economic rewards or negative inducements, we 
usually find reasonable explanations for business interests in self-governance. But not for 
nanotechnologies. As we have seen in this chapter, the diverging self-governing strategies of 
industries in Britain, Denmark, Germany and the United States is neither an account of the 
different control strategies of governments on either side of the Atlantic; nor is it one of the 
different risk perceptions and thresholds of Europeans and Americans or the organization of 
business interests in these four countries. It is instead the story of the need to garner stakeholder 
confidence in nanotechnologies; and how the incentives and constraints embedded in the 
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institutions of the British and German chemical control regimes have created compelling reasons 
for companies to self-regulate. Table 6.1 summarizes the empirical record for the different 
accounts of self-regulation. 
Bound by the contingencies of cooperation, UK and German companies embraced self-
regulation as an instrument to shelter their operations from future nanoscares, resulting from 
‘irrefutable’ news about nanotech. Because American and Danish companies in contrast have 
been reluctant to cooperate with governmental decision-makers, they have faced few compelling 
reasons to self-regulate. This argument presumes that cooperation with state authorities translates 
into a need for companies to self-regulate. The UK and German nanotech experiences have 
given us no reason to doubt this link. In view of collective action theory, this is nonetheless a 
heroic assumption. Free-rider problems, distributional conflicts and inertia usually act as 
significant barriers to collective action among companies that are ultimately rivals; and such 
dynamics must of course also infringe on the decision to band together to develop a common code 
of responsible conduct. In essence: would Danish companies have embraced self-governing 
responsibilities had they cooperated with MST and other state agencies? Perhaps – but it is far 
from certain. Self-governance presupposes that most if not all members of a group share a 
common judgment about the harm that might result from their behavior and agreement on the 
rules intended to correct and avert such harm – neither of which constitute a trivial problem 
(Ostrom 1990); but none of which has figured in my account of self-governance. Let us consider 
each in turn.  
First, companies will not self-regulate unless they recognize the potential for spillover harms. 
How do members of an industry arrive at such a diagnosis? One straightforward way companies 
might become aware of their interdependencies is to talk about them. In Britain, self-regulation 
was thus the result of discussions among a group of companies that came together to explore 
aspects of responsible governance and good practice for nanotechnologies. In Germany too, the 
NanoKommission’s ‘Five Principles for Responsible Use of Nanomaterials’ were the result of 
deliberations among members of Working Group 3. And, just as the NanoKommission has 
facilitated cooperation among federal officials and industry representative, it has also promoted 
discussion about joint problems and their possible solutions within industry. Deliberative 
institutions in other words not only underpin cooperation among state bureaucrats and industry; 
they may likewise encourage collective action among companies. A closer look at the different 
organizational basis for dialogue among German and Danish companies further probes the roots 
of their diverging self-governing strategies.  
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In 2003, VCI with the German Society for Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology, 
DECHEMA, established a joint working group on the ‘Responsible Production and Use of 
Nanomaterials’. As an interdisciplinary forum for academic and industrial experts, the group aims 
to share scientific findings and best practices on safety aspects of nanomaterials. Discussions 
center on identifying and prioritizing risk research and measures to promote the economic and 
technological opportunities of nanotechnologies. The group has since published extensively on 
research needs and priorities, including roadmaps for safety research and papers on the current 
status of risk assessment (DECHEMA and VCI 2007a; 2007b; 2011). Like the 
NanoKommission, the working group creates opportunities for participants to gather and 
exchange information, develop common understandings and craft agreed solutions. Unlike the 
advisory committees and stakeholder panels we encountered in chapter five, the DECHEMA-
VCI group is however exclusively a private forum.30 The working group in short provides a 
venue, where corporate representatives can meet to debate the opportunities, challenges and 
safety aspects of nanotechnology, including the need to garner stakeholder confidence. 
In Denmark, by contrast, no such private organization exists; and the absence of 
institutionalized policy deliberations among industry and state authorities is paralleled by 
infrequent contacts among corporate representatives. The diminutive size of industry of course 
implies that the Danish nanobusiness community is relatively small. But while members might 
know one another, they do not routinely meet to debate scientific and regulatory developments 
or discuss their problems and options.31 DI and other business associations have on occasion 
convened meetings to inform members of national and international developments. But there has 
been no sustained effort to promote regular discussion through the creation of working groups 
or professional networks.32 Absent a venue to organize and encourage ongoing dialogue among 
representatives of the Danish nanobusiness community, there has been little basis for the 
development of common understandings of mutual problems and their possible solutions.33 And 
it is therefore ultimately doubtful whether Danish companies – had they cooperated with MST 
and other state authorities – would have embraced self-governing responsibilities. Reflecting on 
the basis for organizing Danish nano companies, an industry representative thus demanded: 




30  Representatives from the federal agencies are on occasion invited to participate, but strictly as observers. 
31  Interview, Copenhagen, June 1, 2011. 
32  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011.  
33  Interview, Copenhagen, June 1, 2011. 
34  Interview, Copenhagen, March 9, 2011. 
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The different organization of exchanges among companies in Germany and Denmark is on 
the other hand not alone sufficient to account for their diverging self-governing strategies. 
Although the NIA for instance was established with the express ambition of facilitating 
information circulation and discussion among UK companies,35 groups and fora comparable to 
those found in Britain and Germany also exist in the United States. The ACC Nanotechnology 
Panel was for example convened to promote dialogue and contacts among ACC members with 
an interest in nanotech;36 and the panel serves much the same basic purpose as the NIA for UK 
companies.37 While the basis for discussion among American companies thus is not 
distinguishable from the situation in Britain, talks of self-governance never surfaced and no 
initiative comparable to the Responsible NanoCode have been undertaken. Rather, to understand 
why industry leaders in the two countries perceived the need to self-govern differently, we must 
instead look to the different roles companies have assumed in the regulatory process. Private 
deliberative fora are in contrast best understood as a prerequisite for companies to recognize 
their interdependencies; and therefore for the decision to act upon them (Culpepper 2003). 
Whether cooperation with state authorities will also result in self-governance depends in short on 
the capacity to organize and promote dialogue about joint problems and their possible solutions. 
Second, this of course leaves the question of how companies were able to agree to rules 
intended to govern their behavior. It is after all one thing to reach common understandings of 
joint problems; quite another to devise agreed solutions and still another to ensure that everyone 
adheres to them. At the heart of the collective action dilemma is the free-rider problem – and 
such problems should be especially pronounced for members of the nano industry given the vast 
number of companies involved (Olson 1971). Yet, despite the risk of free-riding, companies in 
both Britain and Germany readily came together to implement a common code of conduct. The 
interpretation of self-regulation advanced in this chapter can help us understand how companies 
were able to solve the collective action problem and how this ‘solution’ in turn had implications 
for the design of the British and German codes of responsible conduct. Recall that fear of 
widespread backlash and hence the threat to the commercial viability and long-term legitimacy of 
nanotechnologies motives the interest in self-governance. But members of the industry do not 




35  Interview, London, March 3, 2011. 
36  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 18, 2012. 
37  Interview, Brussels, March 2, 2011. 
An Uncertain Business 
196 
confidence will in fact spell very different consequences for the fortunes of large and small 
companies. 
For small startups, whose business model is entirely focused on nanotech, backlash or worse 
nanophobia will of course prove disastrous. But the long-term commercial prospects of 
nanotechnologies need not be among their immediate concerns: by the time backlash sets in, they 
may long have ceased operations – or have been acquired by other companies. For large 
manufacturers in contrast, signs of market erosion will be alarming. Because they will remain in 
the market long after the initial hype has died out, large companies must demonstrate a particular 
concern for the commercial viability of nanotechnologies. Large companies with conspicuous 
brands will likewise be more vulnerable to visceral consumer and market reactions than their 
small competitors, which pursue narrow business-to-business applications. Stakeholders often 
possess better information about large companies – or consumers may simply associate them 
with nanotech – and they are in consequence at greater risk of being singled out as the target of 
boycotts, even though their performance might not be below the industry average (King, Lenox 
and Barnett 2002: 395f.).  
Large manufacturers will in other words suffer exposure to the fallout from adverse 
information related to their competitors, even if such information does not directly pertain to 
them or their products. Although unilateral commitments might reduce such exposure, they 
cannot eliminate it entirely either. Since the costs of spillover harms – and the benefits from 
measures intended to mitigate them – thus are asymmetrically distributed among large and small 
companies, the nano industry is reminiscent of a privileged group (Olson 1971): large companies 
have the resources, expertise and incentives required to initiate instruments intended to ensure 
market confidence in industry and public acceptance of nanotechnologies (Barnett 2013: 220; 
Prakash and Potoski 2007: 783); and self-regulation was in both Britain and Germany driven by 
the demands of large companies able and willing to assume the cost of developing codes of 
responsible conduct. Herein lies perhaps also the key to understand the design of the two self-
governance instruments.  
An oft heard criticism of self-regulatory regimes is that they neglect to establish mechanisms 
to monitor and police compliance and hence have limited impact on business behavior. This 
critique certainly could be – and has been – levied against the British and German codes of 
conduct: companies in both countries were reluctant to include rigorous enforcement and control 
measures (RNCI 2008; NanoKommission 2010b), and neither the British nor the German code 
of conduct confer obligations on participants. But if large companies had the incentives to initiate 
the development of codes of conduct, why were they then reluctant to make binding 
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commitments? A tentative answer might run along these lines: Because ‘bad news’ might 
engender backlash, anticipating such information will also be an essential element of the solution. 
Companies could conceivably have done so in one of two ways: manage the perceptions of 
stakeholders by communicating information about members of the industry and the technology 
or improve their collective performance relative to criteria of concern to stakeholders. These 
responses to the problem of information asymmetries among companies and their stakeholders 
however place very different demands on the capacity to curb free-rider dynamics.  
A self-regulatory regime can reduce the risk of spillover harm by helping stakeholders 
distinguish members from nonmembers. If participation in such an industry ‘club’ conveys 
information about the desirable but otherwise unobserved characteristics of members, it might 
act to shelter members from criticism and hysteria in the wake of a future nanoscare (Barnett and 
King 2008: 1156). By making a commitment to proactively and effectively mitigating any risks 
related to nanotechnologies, self-regulation might in other words allow members to distance 
themselves from potential culprits. To be credible in the eyes of stakeholders, such an elite 
subgroup must however make binding commitments. Failure to correct the behavior of concern to 
stakeholders would dilute the credibility of their commitment to do so, and members must 
therefore be ready to establish mechanisms to police and compel participants to adhere to 
program obligations; and there must be a mechanism to expel or exclude those unable or 
reluctant to meet their obligations (Prakash and Potoski 2007).  
But to the extent that a binding self-commitment to responsible governance succeeds in 
averting backlash, garners public acceptance and strengthens market confidence, all members of 
the nano industry – whether they subscribe to this commitment or not – will benefit. Incentives 
to free-ride will in consequence dominate. Membership of such an elite club would likely remain 
small, with industry at large left with little incentive to join. What positive impact information 
about participants might have on stakeholder perceptions would likely be outweighed by 
information about their competitors, who do not participate. No more than spillover harms can 
be eliminate through unilateral commitments, so binding commitments among a small group of 
(large) companies would be sufficient to shore up stakeholder confidence, if the large majority of 
(small) companies continue to engage in actions that erode favorable perceptions of 
nanotechnologies. Unless participants could find a way to convince their competitors to join, 
implementation of binding commitments would occur at their expense and to the collective 
benefit of members and nonmembers alike.  
Given the persistence of free-rider dynamics, coupled with the significant hurdles of finding 
common ground among companies scattered across various and diverse market sectors, it is 
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hardly surprising that companies were reluctant to commit to binding standards. While large 
companies do have disproportionate stakes in the long-term market potential of 
nanotechnologies, the benefits of rigorous enforcement and control measures would not have 
outweighed their costs. German and UK companies in consequence opted for a less demanding 
solution to the problem of spillover harms: rather than agree to establish mechanisms to monitor 
and police behavior, their codes of conduct instead intends to familiarize stakeholders with the 
industry and the technology, such that future bad news is viewed to reveal little or no new 
information of relevance and so have limited impacts on stakeholder perceptions. Since their 
codes of conduct may reduce the harmful effects of interdependencies to the collective benefit of 
the nanobusiness community, German and UK companies would in short appear to have 
provided a ‘public good’ to the industry as a whole – albeit at limited cost for participating 
companies. This chapter then again emphasizes that fear of state intervention need not be the 
dominant driver of business behavior. Rather, the chapter speaks to the need for members of an 
industry to garner stakeholder confidence, and demonstrates how the desire to mitigate spill-over 









Chapter one opened with the observation of a de facto industry moratorium on the use of nano-
remedial techniques in Britain. Since 2004, UK-based and international practitioners have 
observed this moratorium as a result of an official request by HM Government that industry 
avoid the deliberate release of nanoparticles into the environment until their effects and possible 
risks have been assessed. A decade of safety research has not unearthed conclusive evidence that 
nanoscale particles present significant, unreasonable or unmanageable risks to human health or 
the environment. But it has not managed to acquit them of suspicion either. The pervasive 
uncertainties about risks, benefits, properties and future directions of nanotechnologies persist – 
and are likely to do so, given the intricate scientific, technical, commercial and regulatory 
complexities associated with nanoscale materials. 2014 will thus mark the decennial of industry’s 
voluntary moratorium on nano-remedial techniques; and still there are no signs that it will come 
to an end in the foreseeable future. While remedial projects using nanoscale particles now are 
under way in other countries, neither UK-based nor international operators appear to have 
imminent plans to use such tools in Britain (Bardos et al. 2011). So why do companies abide by a 
voluntary moratorium in the United Kingdom? Chapter one observed that neither the scale of 
environmental contamination in Britain nor technical, financial or administrative impediments 
can account for the discrepancies between the UK plans of practitioners and their international 
business strategies. But the nature of bureaucratic commitments in Britain can. 
In chapter four, we saw how centralization of power in Whitehall dictates a strategic 
orientation towards the executive bureaucracy. Confronted with the uncertain promises and risks 
of nano-remedial techniques, regulators at Defra and the UK Environment Agency responded 
cautiously, recommending that industry refrain from deliberate releases of nanoparticles. Beyond 
this request, however, HM Government has yet to decide whether and how the use of nano-
remedial tools will be authorized. Nothing thus prevents companies from submitting nano-
remedial projects for administrative approval. Nonetheless, no such application has been received 
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to date. Not because the licensing procedure is exceedingly burdensome by international 
standards, however; but because the procedure commits the details of authorization to the 
discretion of state bureaucrats. Hence, until regulators at Defra and the UK Environment Agency 
are convinced that nanoscale materials do not represent unreasonable risks to human health or 
the environment, companies stand to gain little from attempts to force a decision by submitting 
project applications. Rather patience appears prudent as evidence in support of a decision to 
authorize nano-remedial techniques is gathered, developed and interpreted. But this of course 
does not imply that companies must resign to await state initiative.  
As we have seen, UK policies for bridging the knowledge gaps exhibit a penchant for drawing 
in industrial expertise to inform decisions on the proper course of action. Chapter five thus 
demonstrated how the extensive reliance on expert bodies and stakeholder fora in the 
development of UK chemical safety policy afford industry representatives opportunities to mold 
the knowledge of state bureaucrats and hence influence their understandings of the need for and 
design of new regulations. Companies inclined to volunteer information, share their expertise or 
assist regulators in the acquisition of new knowledge may in turn exercise significant influence on 
regulatory priorities and policies. Applying for administrative approval of nano-remedial projects 
might of course succeed in persuading state bureaucrats of the virtues of the techniques; but it 
could also fail. Pushing for state authorities to decide whether the use of nano-remedial tools will 
be authorized or not – by submitting projects for approval – in other words represents too blunt 
an instrument to guarantee a decision that favors corporate interests. UK companies must instead 
rely on their access to administrative deliberations to advocate the merits of nano-remedial 
techniques, pressing on decision-makers their concerns about scientific developments, technical 
feasibility and economic impacts.  
At the same time, regular contacts and dialogue among representatives from industry and state 
authorities help bolster corporate confidence that their views will be considered as new issues 
emerge. UK companies can thus countenance a gradual and precautionary approach to nano-
remediation, confident that an eventual decision to authorize the use of nanoscale materials and 
the rules governing authorization will consider their inputs and – where possible – accommodate 
their interests. A voluntary moratorium on the use of nano-remedial techniques was therefore an 
industry response that grew from the demands placed on corporate decision-makers by the 
realities of the British regulatory system. While governmental decision-makers in the United 
States and other European countries meanwhile share the cautiously optimistic view of nano-
remedial techniques expressed by their UK peers, their regulatory institutions and processes also 
structure the opportunities for national and international operators differently. Gaining and 
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maintaining influence over regulatory outcomes in these countries confront businesses with a 
distinct set of incentives and strategic demands – and thus hints at the reasons for the 
discrepancies between the UK plans of practitioners and their international business strategies. 
Whether our interest is narrowly confined to the politics of environmental remediation or to 
the more general process of nanotech regulation, the findings of this thesis point to the same 
conclusion. In all four countries, business responses to governmental appeals for voluntary data 
disclosure, joint safety research and cooperation to inform the formulation and implementation 
of national nanotech policy reflect tailored attempts to navigate the strategic environment for 
chemical control policy. The varied responses of industries in America and Europe is thus not an 
account of variations in governmental control strategies for nanotechnologies, the organizing 
logic of political economies, or differences in stakeholder perceptions of nanotech on either side 
of the Atlantic. It is instead a story of the incentives created by the institutions that underpin 
relations among state bureaucrats and industry; and how variations in the institutions and 
processes of domestic chemical control regimes have shaped business responses to the evolving 
regulatory process. This final chapter revisits my theoretical arguments in light of the empirical 
cases as well as how they might apply to other countries, industries and technologies. I also 
consider implications for our understanding of the regulatory behavior and interests of business, 
including the instrumental value industries attach to self-regulation. I conclude with some 
reflections on the ability of governments to assess and control chemical hazards. 
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THE POLITICAL PROBLEM OF COMMITMENTS 
I have traced the roots of the varied industry responses in America and Europe through two case 
studies that examined how the institutions and processes of national chemical control regimes 
link to the strategic risk-benefit calculations of companies. In chapter four, I demonstrated how 
the autonomy of administrative authorities to decide regulatory outcomes, insulated from 
pressures originating from other branches of government, explains the reactions of companies in 
the Britain and the United States. Chapter five next explained how the different responses of 
German and Danish companies are rooted in the institutions that structure communications 
among state actors and industry representatives. And I further demonstrated how the strategic 
environment for chemical safety policy in Britain and Germany is comparable; and how the 
coincidence of business responses in these two countries is explained by the capacity of state 
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Table 7.1 summarizes the drivers of business responses to the regulatory process and its 
results across the four countries (classified according to the ‘outcomes’ sketched in chapter two). 
While American, British, Danish and German companies have pursued widely different 
strategies, they have also met with comparably satisfying results in terms of moderating 
production costs, reducing barriers to market entry, protecting the potential for innovation and 
assuring confidentiality. Regardless of their varied interests and styles, companies have been 
motivated by what we can describe as a quest for certainty: although their responses and 
behaviors may differ, companies have in each country sought clarity regarding their statutory 
obligations, market confidence in their products, public acceptance of the technology and 
technical command of its scientific principles. And, over the decade since 2003, state intervention 
has translated into a more stable and hence predictable regulatory environment, so to recall the 
words of a U.S. industry insider “it is not nearly as intimidating as it used to be.”1  
Regulators for their part have on one hand sought to balance the need to identify and control 
possible risks with the desire to encourage the technology’s economic and societal benefits on the 
other; and, in the main, national nanotech policies have succeeded in striking a delicate balance 
between these dual goals. An official summed up the rationale governing UK control strategies:  
“It as an evidence-based approach. We are monitoring the science and responding to clear evidence of 
harm. And also we want to capture the benefits [so] securing the benefits and managing the risks. […] It is 
possible to be overly precautionary and stifle innovation and we are not in the business of doing that. […] 
There are some great ideas coming out of this country, which we are rightly proud of and we don’t want 
to stifle that. We don’t want those ideas to go overseas, when we can capitalize them at home.”
 2
  
The absence of conclusive evidence that nanotech presents unreasonable risks has at the same 
time spared governmental risk managers from the dilemma that often arises when protection of 
health and safety comes at the expense of industry’s potential to innovate and compete. With the 
exception of Denmark, regulators have favored a case-by-case approach that has imposed few 
new costs or compliance hurdles on industry. In Denmark, administrative deliberations and 
interpretations, coupled with the absence of major producer interests, ultimately led decision-
makers to accept increased business costs in exchange for measures to improve the evidence-base 
on nanomaterials. Yet, while some regulators, notably U.S. EPA and UBA, now likewise advocate 
the need for mandatory instruments, others do not. Nanotech has yet to bring governments in a 




1  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012. 
2  Interview, London, March 3, 2011. 
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freedom to operate; and it therefore remains to be seen how they will trade off one goal for the 
other, when their policies cannot accomplish both simultaneously. 
In each country – save perhaps in Denmark – the regulatory process thus brought greater 
business confidence and predictability, while the formulation of statutory guidance documents 
and joint risk management methods in Britain and Germany over the longer term might facilitate 
what the U.S. insider also called for: “widespread stakeholder buy-in on the safety front.”3 
Despite the different political contexts and the varied outcomes of the regulatory process, 
companies have at the same time ensured that disclosed information was not used to the 
detriment of their interests – an observation that lends prima facie credence to the claim that the 
nature of bureaucratic commitments weighs heavily on corporate decisions to disclose, bias or 
withhold information from the authorities responsible for regulating their conduct. 
How confident can we be that the capacity of state bureaucrats to make credible 
commitments is indeed responsible for the observed patterns of industry behavior across these 
four countries? Relationships among regulatory authorities and business actors constitute one 
dimension, albeit an important one, of a nation’s public policy process. But other circumstances 
and contingencies also impinge on the political behavior of business – and the varied political 
contexts for nanotech regulation suggest that other variables might perhaps better explain the 
different industry responses. I have relied on a twofold approach to eliminate possible 
ambiguities concerning the causal drivers of the varied business strategies and behaviors. First, I 
have sought to explicitly consider the most important alternative explanations that might be 
relevant to the observed outcomes, including the impact of EU competences on regulatory 
decision-making in the UK chemicals sector, mobilization of public opinion or the legislative 
control strategies of governments in America and Europe. To reiterate, neither of these rival 
accounts offer a satisfactory explanation of the different business responses.  
Second, I have approached the question of control for confounding variables according to the 
logic of a most similar systems design. Hence, beyond variations in their institutions and processes 
of chemical control policy, the country studies juxtapose broadly similar cases. We can as I 
observed in chapter one therefore safely assume that the varied business responses do not reflect 
calculated attempts to counter distinct bureaucratic or legal traditions. For the same reason, we 
can feel equally confident that the organization of their political economies and their traditions of 





  Interview, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2012. 
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variations in the relative size, economic weight and political strength of the national chemical 
industry bring the conclusions drawn from the case studies into question. In chapter five, I 
explained that while the diminutive size of the Danish chemical industry undeniably influenced its 
response to the regulatory process, it did not determine that response. The economic and 
political weakness of the chemical industry in Denmark is rather a precondition for 
understanding the roots of the acquiescent response of Danish companies – just as the reactions 
of their German competitors can be understood in relation to the chemical industry’s privileged 
political position that resulted from its postwar economic success in Germany. The particular 
history, organization, and economic strength of the domestic chemical industry do of course have 
implications for its political options and behavior – but this does not translate into predetermined 
strategies for meeting regulatory challenges.  
We can further bolster our confidence in this conclusion by looking to the behavior of 
multinationals. International firms have in each country readily adopted the strategies and 
positions of their domestic competitors. Consider the record of joint safety research. In chapter 
three, we saw how public-private partnerships constitute a cornerstone of British nanotech 
policy, as exemplified by the PROSPEcT project – a consortium that brings together government 
agencies and research institutions, university laboratories and industry as joint sponsors. 
Corporate sponsors include Oxonica, a small spin-off from the University of Oxford, several 
other UK-based companies, U.S. multinational Johnson & Johnson and German chemical giant, 
BASF. At home, BASF has likewise been among the core sponsors of the German NanoCare 
cluster projects. Despite the high stakes riding on company test data, concerns for confidentiality 
or regulatory liabilities have not served to deter the company from collaborating with state 
authorities. In the United States, however, BASF has undertaken such commitments to joint 
safety ventures on a much more modest scale. BASF do participate with U.S. manufacturers in 
the NanoRelease project. Unlike the PROSPEcT or NanoCare projects, which aim to provide a 
full characterization of the analyzed nanomaterials, NanoRelease is however meticulously crafted 
to minimize access to the raw data needed to lift the burden of demonstrating unreasonable risk. 
Whereas BASF thus has expressed no reservations in cooperating closely with regulators in 
Britain and Germany, the company also mimics its American competitors in their manifest 
discomfort in disclosing sensitive information to the federal agencies. The participation of 
Johnson & Johnson in the PROSPEcT project on the other hand provides an illustration of how 
U.S. multinationals embrace the strategies of the European competitors. American no less than 
European multinationals, then, appear to recognize that influence in regulatory politics is 
maximized by exploiting existing national processes to their full advantage.  
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The case studies do of course contrast countries with very different political systems. 
Constitutional and political variables undeniably impact on regulatory politics, and they likewise 
influence the political options and strategies of business. Might not the federal American system 
for example create different opportunities for businesses than the unitary British system – 
opportunities, which could have a different bearing on the strategic risk-benefit calculations of 
companies in the United States than in Britain? Or perhaps variations in the kind and intensity of 
contacts companies cultivate with political parties influenced their responses to the regulatory 
process? The German chemical industry for example entertains close ties with the FDP and the 
CDU. Danish trade associations in contrast tend to pursue less clear-cut partisan strategies. With 
parties traditionally viewed as unequivocal allies of industry at the helm of government, might 
German companies therefore not have been presented with more generous opportunities to 
influence policy outcomes than their Danish competitors? Because the country studies thus 
consider regulatory processes that unfold within very different constitutional and political 
contexts, they may fail to convince the skeptical reader that other variables and circumstances are 
not relevant to – or at least impact on – the observed patterns of industry behavior. Juxtaposing 
evidence from all four countries can allow us to settle possible ambiguities concerning the proper 
interpretation of the varied industry responses.  
In chapter five, I observed that despite their distinct constitutional traditions, the nature of 
legal and institutional relationships found in the German and Danish chemical control regimes 
are comparable. The different business responses I argued therefore cannot reflect variations in 
the prospect of political or judicial interference in regulatory proceedings. This assessment is 
nonetheless somewhat inaccurate and the decentralized nature of the Federal Republic does have 
implications for the strategic options available to business groups in Germany. In the past, the 
VCI has thus proven admirably adroit at enlisting the support of Länder governments to 
influence outcomes at the federal level (Paterson 1991: 238). The unitary Danish political system 
in contrast precludes companies from seeking influence through such a subnational route. Did 
their leverage with regional governments have a bearing on the responses of German companies? 
The evidence I have considered suggests not. While representatives from the Länder participated 
in the policy process, there are no evident signs that German companies have sought to enroll 
their support – or that the prospect of doing so have figured prominently in corporate risk-
benefit calculations. Looking to the other federal system in my sample – the United States – help 
eliminate doubts that variations in the distribution of powers among national and regional entities 
account for or otherwise distort the interpretation of the case studies.  
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Similar to the German Länder, the U.S. states retain important powers with respect to 
chemical safety policy. Under TSCA, however, the control of toxic substances is a clearly defined 
federal competence; and attempts to exploit their leverage in state capitals to browbeat EPA and 
other executive agencies into submitting to industry demands hold limited promise for American 
companies. Quite the opposite in fact. In chapter six, we saw how the slow pace of TSCA reform 
has induced state legislatures to initiate chemical or product-specific measures in record numbers 
– many with explicit provisions for nanomaterials (Bergeson 2012b). Rather than turn to state 
capitals for support, reform initiatives in California and other U.S. states have instead meant that 
U.S. companies had to divert their attention across multiple jurisdictions. But this has not 
evidently affected how corporate decision-makers viewed or responded to policy developments 
in Washington. The constitutional structure of political systems does of course influence how 
private interests orient their attention and allocate their resources. Responsibility for nanotech 
has nonetheless in all four countries fallen squarely within the statutory ambit of national 
authorities. While the potential to enlist regional governments against federal bureaucrats exists 
for companies in Germany and – in principle – the United States, there is ultimately little 
evidence to suggest that corporate decision-makers in either country have looked to this option 
to influence the direction of federal nanotech policies. 
Neither do the cases lend weight to an interpretation that parliamentary dynamics have shaped 
the responses of industry. The four countries do differ in the nature and character of their 
partisan politics; and might further be distinguished by the kind of ties and relations businesses 
seek to cultivate with party organizations. But variations in their partisan strategies have not 
impacted on how companies responded to the evolving regulatory process. As we have seen in 
chapters four through six, nanotech has drawn little partisan attention and has not sparked 
competitive dynamics among political parties. This is hardly surprising: unlike economic or health 
care policy, questions of chemical safety, by virtue of their technical obscurity, rarely invite 
partisan contestation. Elected politicians – with the exception of U.S. law-makers – routinely 
relinquish their prerogative to decide and interfere in the formulation and implementation of 
chemical safety policy. But while the NNI agencies have been the target of congressional 
scrutiny, federal nanotech policies have not emerged as a contentious issue in either House or 
Senate. Where nanotechnologies did become an issue for parliamentary debate – Denmark – 
industry was unable to count on the sympathy of the liberal-conservative opposition to prevent 
the passage of a narrow political agreement on a nanoregister. Contacts and influence within 
political parties may well afford industries opportunities to place a break on meddling 
bureaucrats. But there are nonetheless few convincing signs that companies have looked to 
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political parties for sympathy in dealing with their regulatory adversaries; or that variations in the 
support they might draw from such contacts should have influenced their responses to the 
regulatory process.  
The cases are not monolithic, however. In all countries, we find instances of collaboration 
with or dissociation from governmental officials, disagreement and compromise, disclosure as 
well as nondisclosure. Even in the United States – a country renowned for its ‘longstanding 
culture of antagonism between the industry and the government on these kinds of issues’4 – we 
observe examples of cooperation among regulators and companies; as do we find instances of 
suspicion in Germany, despite the ‘long history of cooperation between the federal agencies and 
industry.’5 While interactions among state bureaucrats and industry representative in each country 
fall in relatively clear patterns, nanotech cannot be taken as testament to enduring national styles 
of regulation or deep-seated traditions of government-business relations. Rather the varied 
business responses across and within the four countries align with the incentives created by the 
specific institutional configuration of their respective chemical control regimes. U.S. companies 
for example readily volunteered information to NIOSH, exactly because the agency’s research 
mandate guaranteed that participants would not incur regulatory liabilities. German companies 
for their part were in contrast reluctant to cooperate with UBA, since the absence of 
institutionalized policy deliberations left them without a reliable basis to predict how disclosed 
information might be put to use by the agency. Expectations about the probable behavior of state 
authorities in short informed the strategies of companies in each country; and shaped their 
reactions to the specific opportunities offered by participation in the regulatory process.  
Looking beyond these four countries, there is thus little immediate reason to believe that the 
regulation of nanotechnologies in other political contexts should yield dissimilar results. Certainly, 
the dynamics of chemical control policy outlined in chapter two also apply in Australia, Canada, 
France and other advanced industrial economies. To the extent that governmental decision-
makers in these countries have embraced comparable policies and priorities for nanotech, an 
investigation of their regulatory processes can therefore be expected to unearth similar results 
with respect to the drivers of business responses. Whether Australian, Canadian or French 
authorities can persuade companies to volunteer information necessary to assess the risks of 
specific nanomaterials or decide on effective control policies hinge on their capacity to convince 
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these countries organize and manage their institutions and processes of chemical control – in 
particular the distribution of regulatory powers and the reliance on deliberative institutions in the 
formulation and implementation of national chemical safety policies.  
Whether companies will decide to disclose, bias or conceal information in short depends on 
the expected behavior of their regulatory adversaries and the credibility of their commitments. 
But this is not a conclusion unique to nanomaterials. To succeed in regulation of complex social 
and economic processes, states require vast amounts of information on the possible and actual 
consequences of their policies. From environmental policy over worker protection to the 
regulation of competition, state authorities in almost all contexts need more information than 
they have. And more often than not the information needed to make regulatory decisions can be 
supplied only by the very companies and industries, state authorities are looking to control. For 
all their novel properties, nanomaterials are from a regulatory perspective thus familiar in at least 
this one respect. The delicate issues raised by the regulation of nanotechnologies with respect to 
whether or not companies should trust state bureaucrats with sensitive information are in other 
words an expression of the more fundamental problem of commitments in politics. 
At the root of the commitment problem is the state’s discretionary powers (North and 
Weingast 1989; Shepsle 1991). State policies often depend on the behavior and cooperation of 
private actors to meet their objectives. Policy preferences however also change over time, and 
while policy-makers may wish to encourage cooperation with social and economic actors to 
achieve their goals, their incentives after the fact are not always compatible with maintaining a 
cooperative agreement. Unless governments can devise a method to disable their discretionary 
powers, individuals, groups and industries must doubt their commitments to pursue a set of 
stable and predictable policies. Yet, when governments cannot rely on coercion to implement 
their policies, a lack of credibility becomes problematic: if future policy changes can be 
anticipated, social and economic actors may fail to react and adapt as intended, thus preventing 
the policy from attaining its objectives (Majone 1996; Gilardi 2002). And the capacity of state 
actors to make credible commitments is therefore as relevant for the control of chemicals as it 
for macro-economic policy-making, labor-market policy and all other governmental policies, 
where intervention aims to influence the behavior of individuals, groups and industries.  
For many areas of state intervention – from the licensing of new substances for environmental 
remediation to the approval of new drugs – elected politicians are content to leave effective 
decision-making powers firmly in the hands of executive departments and agencies. In these 
areas too, we can therefore expect that the nature of bureaucratic commitments will exercise a 
major influence on the political behavior and strategies of businesses. Although different 
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institutional arrangements may well buttress the capacity of state bureaucrats to commit in other 
areas and for other issues than industrial chemicals, expectations about the probable future 
behavior of the agencies responsible for regulating their conduct should nonetheless weigh 
heavily on corporate risk-benefit calculations. Unless state bureaucrats can credibly commit to 
regulatory policies, companies must be cautious of sharing information about their operations. 
But the framework I have elaborated to dissect the determinants of business strategies is not 
applicable to all areas of state intervention, of course. Although executive bureaucracies are 
prominent representatives of the state, other governmental or political actors are often more 
important for deciding the course of a nations policy process. In areas and policy sectors 
dominated by partisan contestation or political dynamics other than administrative law-making, 
the nature of bureaucratic commitments need not be relevant to the strategic risk-benefit 
calculations of businesses. Where for example elected politicians reserve their prerogative to 
routinely decide and interfere in the formulation and implementation of state policies, it will be 
more relevant to investigate the institutions and processes that hamper their temptation to alter 
policies that run counter to their short-term electoral interests. Labor-market policy or macro-
economic policy-making thus comes to mind as instances, where constitutional and political 
constraints on the policy-making powers of governments are much more important determinants 
of their capacity to commit to a set of stable and predictable policies. While concentration of 
regulatory authority and deliberative institutions facilitate the capacity of regulators to commit in 
the industrial chemicals sector – and perhaps in other areas of state intervention as well – other 
institutions and process also contribute to the capacity of state actors to make credible 
commitments. An analysis of the political problem of commitments in policy sectors beyond 
industrial chemicals must in short begin by locating the locus of the state’s discretionary powers 
and then proceed to consider the institutional arrangements that allow state actors to convince 
their constituents that they can be trusted to honor them. 
As a broader theme to my inquiry, I have finally emphasized that fear of state intervention 
need not be the dominant driver of business behavior. Although industries are commonly held to 
resist statutory regulations, business also has preferences for and stakes in the outcomes of 
regulatory politics that extends beyond the desire to minimize state interference. Because a mix of 
scientific and legal uncertainty can combine to significantly impair the economic prospects of an 
industry, its members usually have reasons to welcome regulatory outcomes that can help them 
navigate an uncertain business environment. I base this claim on observations of the chemical 
industry. As explained in chapter one, I have devoted particular theoretical and empirical 
attention to chemical companies, because – to paraphrase a German official – this is the industry 
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‘where they really use nanotech, not where it is only an idea to use it.’6 As the primary targets of 
regulation, the views and interests of representatives from the chemical industry have necessarily 
taken center stage in my account of international efforts to assess and control the human and 
environmental risks of nanotechnologies. 
The chemical industry is no friend to state intervention as the record of its members’ 
resistance to TSCA and REACH can surely attest to (See e.g. Collins 2010; Selin 2007). 
Nonetheless, the inconclusive status of nanomaterials under existing statutes and regulations has 
also presented companies with other opportunities and predicaments than a mere desire to 
reduce state interference. The main benefits secured by American and British companies can thus 
be described in terms of the confidence created by a predictable regulatory response to 
nanomaterials; and similar corporate preferences permeate my narrative of the German and 
Danish regulatory processes. The roots of these preferences are simple, if multifaceted. Because 
the science is continuously evolving, the harmful properties of nanomaterials may not become 
apparent until years or even decades after they have been placed on the market. Absent official 
guidance, however, companies – as well as investors and insurers – are left guessing about their 
eventual degree of liability exposure (Fink 2007; Dana 2010). Unless measures are undertaken to 
address such uncertainties, the funding stream for nanotech might rapidly dry up. Without clear 
regulatory guidelines, companies likewise struggle to effectively demonstrate the safety of their 
production processes and products; and this may eventually scare off consumers and deter 
business partners, reluctant to invest in products with unknown effects or uncertain risks.  
While companies thus for obvious reasons may wish to reduce regulatory burdens, a stable 
regulatory environment also promises significant benefits in terms of business predictability and 
public acceptance of nanotechnologies, which cannot easily be ignored. The response of Danish 
and U.S. companies to new statutory obligations illustrates: in what might appear a strange 
reversal of industry roles and reactions, the decision to introduce registration requirements in 
Denmark was met with widespread protests, while the responses of U.S. companies to the 
promulgation of significant new use rules regulating a nanomaterials entry into the market can 
best be characterized as acquiescent. Rather than any inherent resistance to state intervention, the 
different reactions of Danish and American companies however owe more to their desire to 
balance regulatory costs against a predictable business environment. Hence, whereas the Danish 
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nanomaterials and creates uncertainty concerning their eventual obligations and compliance 
costs, SNURs in contrast ensure a predictable regulatory response at negligible cost to industry. 
The chemical industry is nonetheless an industry like no other. Chemicals are indispensable 
for industrial production, and with both direct and indirect links to almost all industrial sectors, 
the industrial chemicals sector is one of the most central industries of the modern economy. The 
economic circumstances and technological contingencies of an industry undeniably affect the 
(regulatory) interests of its members and the drivers of their behavior (Hollingsworth, Schmitter 
and Streeck 1994). We should in other words exercise caution before we let conclusions inferred 
from observations of the chemical industry color our understanding of the interests and 
behaviors of other industries.  
Chemical manufacturers have a long history of resisting statutory obligations that might 
increase costs, erect barriers to market entry or result in lower or changing patterns of innovation 
– the lifeblood of the industry. But exactly because it is so highly capital intensive, the industry 
also places a premium on regulatory certainty in order to ensure adequate investment levels. 
While testing obligations for example raise the costs of bringing new products to market, 
manufacturers also demand a predictable regulatory environment to avoid undertaking expensive 
and long-term R&D for applications that may later be banned. The manufacture and sale of 
chemicals is further highly internationalized. Rather than cope with a multitude of different 
requirements, industry leaders has in consequence long expressed interest in harmonization of 
divergent national policies to ensure coordination of testing protocols and marketing obligations. 
Fear that REACH could act as a significant barrier to market entry was thus a major concern for 
U.S. manufacturers, just as TSCA was for their European competitors three decades earlier 
(Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985: 224f.; DiGangi 2003). Although the chemical industry time 
and again has fought hard against state interference, the industry’s economic circumstances and 
technological contingencies also imply that certain regulations and statutory outcomes are indeed 
desirable for its members.  
But while these features help distinguish the chemical industry, they certainly do not render it 
unique. Chemicals is not the only product sector, where success is defined by the ability to 
innovate and continuously bring new products to market; neither is the industry’s international 
character distinct; nor is chemicals the only economic activity, where investments and business 
planning require companies to operate with extended time horizons. Many if not all of these 
contingencies in fact characterize industries as diverse as automotive, pharmaceuticals, energy and 
semiconductors to name but a few. And no less than the chemical industry, members of these 
industries routinely seek and promote state decisions that translate into greater regulatory 
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certainty, harmonization of national policies and hence a more predictable business environment. 
We should in conclusion be cautious of the view that industries will automatically and necessarily 
resist any and all regulatory restrictions. We must instead consider how specific state decisions 
and policies might advance – or harm – the interests of regulated industries; and how this in turn 
shapes the strategies and tactics their members deploy.  
INFORMATION, INTERDEPENDENCIES AND INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION 
Chapter six unpacked the narrative of nanotechnologies and industry self-regulation. I 
demonstrated how the roots of the varied self-governing responses of industries in Britain, 
Denmark, Germany and the United States lie with the different roles companies have assumed in 
the regulation of nanotech. And how the UK and German codes of responsible conduct intend 
to shelter companies from future nanoscares, resulting from ‘irrefutable’ information about their 
products and activities. Because so little is still known of the technology’s risks and benefits, 
stakeholder perceptions are volatile and subject to rapid change; and the predicament facing 
industry is thus one of managing perceptions of nanotech risks and benefits. But this 
predicament looks very different for companies that cooperate with state authorities and those 
that do not. Since influence in the British and German regulatory systems is purchased through 
cooperation with state authorities, companies must also assume responsibility for its outcome – 
and avoid tactics intended to weaken the validity of joint safety studies or the legitimacy of agreed 
regulatory solutions. UK and German companies in consequence embraced self-regulation as an 
instrument to reassure their stakeholders that scientific developments and regulatory outcomes 
do not reflect the inherent harmful properties of nanotechnologies. Because American and 
Danish companies in contrast have been reluctant to cooperate with governmental decision-
makers, they have no responsibility for regulatory decisions or government-sponsored safety 
studies; and they can therefore say what they please about them. Free to contest scientific 
conclusions and dispute regulatory policies, American and Danish companies have faced few 
compelling reasons to self-regulate.  
This reading of the UK and German codes of responsible conduct views self-regulation as a 
strategy crafted to manage and mitigate the harmful effects of interdependencies among members 
of the ‘nano’ industry. Companies commercializing nanotechnologies scatter across the entire 
industrial economy and stakeholders, not least the public, naturally struggle to distinguish one 
company from its competitors. Assessing the performance and characteristics of individual 
companies requires massive amounts of information; a daunting and elusive task even for more 
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resourceful stakeholders, such as regulators or financial analysts. Because their stakeholders do 
not or cannot relate information to each individual member of the industry, ‘nano’ companies 
share a common stakeholder assessment of their character and relative performance. Adverse 
information about one company will consequently color perceptions about the entire industry 
and the technology as a whole – and might therefore cause real harm for its competitors. 
Information asymmetries among companies and their stakeholders is thus the crucial problem 
facing industry. If stakeholders possessed ample information on the relative performance of each 
individual company, then no interdependencies would exist and no spillover harm would occur. 
The practices and products of companies could be individually, directly and accurately assessed, 
and stakeholders could reward or punish each company accordingly. Each company would 
possess a unique stakeholder evaluation and could take unilateral measures to shape that 
assessment. Though managing the perceptions of their stakeholders would remain a concern for 
companies, it would not be a common problem for industry (King, Lenox and Barnett 2002; 
Barnett and King 2008). Information asymmetries and interdependencies are not problems 
exclusive to nano companies, however. Consider the difficulties stakeholders may face in 
determining the relative contribution of members of the energy industry to air pollution rates. 
Energy companies usually generate electricity from numerous power stations. Some of these 
facilities contribute to air pollution and some do not (e.g. wind turbines). Those that do, vary 
greatly in the air pollutants they emit. How, when, and where pollutants are released further 
determines their impact on air quality. To assess the relative contribution of each individual 
company, stakeholders would in other words require information about its power stations, their 
production technologies and reduction techniques, the nature of their emissions, and the state of 
the environment in which pollutants are released. But such comprehensive information is rarely 
available; and members of the energy industry will therefore likewise tend to share a common 
stakeholder evaluation of their character and relative performance.  
Just as the complex and heterogeneous nature of the nano industry intertwines the fates of its 
members, so information asymmetries among companies and their stakeholders is a reality in 
most industries. Because information about the activities of one company or group of companies 
to some degree color judgments about the entire industry, interdependencies and the potential 
for spillover harms are in other words not unique concerns for nano companies. This 
observation, then, suggests that the lessons gleaned in chapter six can be employed to understand 
the predicaments of companies and the drivers of self-governance beyond nanotech. Codes of 
conduct have in fact often emerged in industries that the public and government perceive lack 
self-discipline, cannot be trusted, or are inherently unsafe (Nash 2002: 237). In 1979, at a time 
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when skepticism towards the chemical industry was rivaled only by the tobacco industry, the VCI 
for example established the Initiative Geschützter Leben – since 1986 supplemented with a set of 
guidelines that commit members to the safe production and use of chemicals – as an instrument 
to influence public opinion (Grant, Paterson and Whitston 1988: 258f.; Paterson 1991: 235f.). 
1979 likewise saw the Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association publish a Statement of Policy on 
Responsible Care motivated by the industry’s eroding credibility not just with the public, but also 
with government decision-makers (Belanger et al. 2009). Other examples of industries that have 
embraced voluntary codes in response to mounting public enmity include e.g. textiles, paper and 
pulp, petroleum, mining and forestry. But while interdependencies thus characterize most 
industries, it does not follow that recognition of the potential for spillover harms will compel 
companies to self-regulate or that codes of conduct will always represent instruments to manage 
stakeholder perceptions. It is for example unclear whether the desire to garner stakeholder 
confidence would induce the energy industry to launch a code of responsible conduct.  
The British and German codes of conduct as I have argued intend to mitigate spillover harms 
by communicating information about members of the industry and the technology itself. Because 
the risks of nanotechnologies are (perceived as) unknown and potentially catastrophic, accidents 
will be highly publicized and may hence produce large ripple effects. Even relatively 
unremarkable incidents, routine regulatory decisions or otherwise innocent scientific result could 
conjure up images of a sinister technology run amok. Self-regulation was in other words a result 
of and a response to the particular risk perceptions of nanotechnologies. Risk perceptions are 
systematically linked to the characteristics of the risk: an accident that claims many lives may 
produce relatively little disturbance, if it occurs under familiar and well-understood 
circumstances. Stakeholder reactions will however be stronger, where the risk in question is 
perceived to be involuntary, uncontrollable or invisible, has a delayed or irreversible effect, is 
memorable, very uncertain, poorly understood, unfamiliar, unfairly distributed or seen as a 
harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps (Slovic 1987) – all elements which 
characterize nanotechnologies; but not all technologies. 
Whereas the technological promise of nanotech – ultimate human control of the very forces 
of nature – thus lends itself to doomsday scenarios in which nanoscale robots self-replicate out of 
control (‘grey goo’), the conversion of wind energy to electric power does not to a similar degree 
suggest images of turbines spun out of control as a threat to the future of humanity. Whether and 
where we will see industries embrace instruments intended to manage stakeholder perceptions 
will in other words be linked to the characteristics of the technologies underlying their products 
and processes, and the risks – real or perceived – associated with these technologies. Industries 
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that rely on more traditional and therefore familiar techniques within engineering, chemistry, 
physics or biology might find little use or need for such instruments. Here business interests in 
self-governance will likely derive from fear of state intervention, market pressures or the strength 
of business organization – although signs of rapidly deteriorating stakeholder confidence in and 
acceptance of the products and practices of an industry might change that evaluation.  
A number of new and emerging technologies – from synthetic biology over robotics to 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence – are in the meantime being heralded as defining 
technologies of the 21st century. As these technologies progress from blue skies research to 
applied science, ensuring public acceptance and market confidence will be of paramount 
importance to their commercial prospects and survival; more so, if they – as nanotechnologies – 
involve significant, but uncertain risks and unknown hazards. If these technologies are to avoid 
the fate of GMOs, stakeholders and especially the public will need to be reassured that 
companies are proactively and effectively mitigating any risks related to them. For these 
technologies and the industries which emerge to commercialize them, the catalyst for voluntary 
initiatives will likely be public skepticism about the introduction of new technologies and the 
desire to convince public and market stakeholders of the commitment to develop them in a safe 
and responsible manner. 
BUSINESS POWER AND THE CONTROL OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
Throughout this account of international efforts to assess and control the human health and 
environmental risks of nanotechnologies, I have adopted the perspective of nanobusinesses – 
their interests and beliefs, their predicaments and aspirations for the evolving regulatory process. 
I have demonstrated how the institutional arrangements, which underpin relations among state 
bureaucrats and industry, weigh on corporate decisions to disclose, bias or withhold information 
about their products and operations. But what does all this matter for us, the consumers and the 
public? Should nanotech give us cause for concern? Surely, we gladly embrace nanotech in the 
form of our smartphones, tablets and other gadgets. And as research in nanoscience and 
technology progresses, we may in the future come to depend on yet more miraculous and 
revolutionary products, processes and applications. So why should we concern ourselves with the 
pervasive uncertainties about risks, properties and future directions of nanotechnologies? Despite 
the fuss about unknown properties, nanomaterials are responsible for no work-related casualties, 
no evidence of human harm or environmental contamination. Or why should we care about 
corporate statements and commitments to develop nanotechnologies in a safe and responsible 
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manner? After all, “products get approved by an authority or not, whatever the values of a 
company, because [they] must hand in the data.”7  
We should care. While it is indeed true that little tangible evidence currently links 
nanomaterials to actual human or environmental harm that is not a guarantee that such evidence 
will not surface in the future. The record of toxic substance regulation abounds with examples of 
chemicals once deemed safe for human consumption that later proved highly hazardous, noxious 
and persistent. Asbestos, PCBs, DDT and CFCs were all considered ‘wonder’ chemicals – right 
until their insidious effects on humans and the environment were discovered. Nanomaterials are 
thus not the first new ‘miracle’ products introduced by the chemical industry with suspected, but 
unknown risks. And despite a decade of safety research, answers to important questions remain 
elusive. Little is still known about the toxicological and epidemiological effects of nanomaterials, 
their fate and transport in the environment, their exposure pathways, whether they persist and 
accumulate in food chains or how they might interact with other chemicals. Until we know more 
about how to answer these questions, caution is in other words merited before nanoscale 
materials are realized on a broad commercial scale. 
Might we then not rest assured that the responsible state authorities will protect our health 
and safety? We should. And most of the time we can. Authorities in American and Europe have 
devoted considerable resources to shore up the knowledge base. But the amalgam of scientific, 
technical, commercial and regulatory complexities continues to confront governmental control 
strategies with intractable difficulties. Given the sheer number of nanomaterials that are being 
researched, developed and manufactured as well as the range of parameters – size, shape, 
composition, reactivity, surface area and chemistry – that might influence their behavior and 
properties, there is in short no guarantee that things will not slip through the cracks. The promise 
of the technology itself – that materials at the nanoscale may exhibit novel and unpredictable 
properties – thus do raise serious concerns over the capacity of existing risk management systems 
to ensure human health and environmental integrity.  
With the ambition of ‘getting it right’, governmental decision-makers have looked to industry 
for information to guide the development of efficacious control policies. A core element of 
American and European nanotech policies thus consists of appeals for dialogue, collaboration 
and knowledge exchange among state authorities and industry. And as a consequence of this 
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regulatory response to nanotechnologies. But in attempting to take advantage of industry’s 
superior knowledge, expertise and resources, it is of course also possible for industry to take 
advantage of regulators, and by extension us, the consumers and the public. As Cary Coglianese 
(2010: 47) observes: “if regulation [of nanotech] is needed, this is because the interests of 
business are not fully aligned with the broader interests of the public. As a result, efforts to 
engage business in regulating business present inherent challenges.” Information is the lifeblood 
of regulatory politics; and the power to disclose, bias and withhold information is a significant 
source of business influence over the decisions and outcomes of toxic substance control. But the 
dependence on information produced, held and – selectively – disclosed by industry raises serious 
doubts about the ability of governments to assess and control the adverse effects of nanoscale 
materials as well as their larger macro-scale equivalents. 
No company of course wants to place a new chemical on the market that it knows to be 
inherently harmful to humans or the environment. Product liability laws and the prospect of 
consumer rejection of dangerous substances combine to deter companies from the reckless 
pursuit of profit (Belinsky 2010). But this does not mean that companies will avoid a fight to keep 
a product on the market, even if adverse effects are later discovered – and the dynamics of 
chemical control policy suggest that they are superbly well-positioned to emerge victorious from 
such a fight. The business power which flows from superior information, knowledge and 
expertise about products and processes would not be a source of concern if data withheld from 
regulators could be replicated, biased information could be independently verified and companies 
compelled to disclose the data required to formulate protective standards. But most of the time 
that is not an option for state authorities.  
Chemicals manufacturers and users have significant advantages in cumulative experience, 
technical skills, access to data, and research capacity, not to mention the fact that they own the 
production process. And it is virtually impossible for governments to conduct independent 
research to reproduce this information (Applegate 1991: 299; Wagner 2004: 1642). Nor can 
governments necessarily count on their powers to compel. Governments can and do pass laws 
that mandate product disclosure; but it is often extremely difficult to determine whether 
companies have provided complete responses or not. A failure to make any response will be 
clear, but omissions, evasions or inaccurate submissions are hard to police, if regulators cannot 
independently verify the information. Companies in consequence face overwhelming incentives 
to submit selective, biased, or even false information to satisfy disclosure requirements 
(Coglianese, Zeckhauser and Parson 2004: 306f.). It should come as no surprise then that despite 
longstanding commitments to control toxic substances, very little is known about the long-term 
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health or environmental effects of the vast majority of the more than 100,000 chemical 
substances currently in commercial use – and new chemicals enter the market daily. This dearth 
of toxicity and exposure data contributes to widespread appraisal of the failure of chemicals 
regulation to address the persistent ignorance surrounding the risks of toxic substances (Lyndon 
1989; Sachs 2009). 
The ambitious new EU chemicals regime, REACH, is in large measure a reaction to these 
failings of existing toxic substance laws. REACH privatizes information collection, provision and 
assessment: to place substances on the European market, manufacturers, importers and users of 
chemicals must demonstrate that risks are adequately controlled or that their socio-economic 
benefits outweigh the risks. Rather than assume that chemicals are safe until regulators with 
minimal authority and inadequate resources can prove otherwise, REACH reverses the burden of 
proof by requiring manufacturers to establish the safety of their chemicals. No data, no market in 
other words. REACH marks a significant sea change in European Union chemicals policy and is 
widely heralded as a potential game-changer. REACH however remains at an early stage of 
implementation; and it is therefore premature to forecast what impact the statute will have on the 
control of toxic substances. A look to the past might nonetheless offer important clues to the 
future course of chemicals regulation.  
The 1976 enactment of the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act presents instructive parallels to 
REACH. TSCA was not always the ‘toothless tiger’ it appears today (Collins 2010). As originally 
conceived, TSCA was a regulatory powerhouse of a broadly precautionary nature; and one of its 
core objectives was to place the burden of proof on industry. Four decades ago, the predicted 
effects of TSCA for the manufacture and sale of chemicals was in fact seen as no less profound 
than REACH today – on paper at least. TSCA was the first American law targeted at the 
chemical industry as a whole. The 1972 introduction of a chemicals bill caused significant stir 
within an industry that at the time was relatively naive in the ways of Washington politics 
(Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985: 242). Nonetheless, a coordinated assault against the bill 
deferred its enactment for four years. Ultimately unable to kill the bill in Congress, industry 
however succeeded in knocking out its regulatory fangs in congressional backrooms and 
subsequently during its administrative implementation (Bronstein and Wennerberg 1981; Collins 
2010). As a result, and in sharp contrast to the act’s initial intentions, elaborate statutory 
requirements, congressional oversight and judicial scrutiny today de facto places the entire burden 
of data collection and risk assessment on EPA and impedes the agency’s capacity to intervene 
against even known carcinogens, such as asbestos. 
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Although REACH differs in important respects from TSCA – in part because its framers 
could draw on the record of TSCA’s deficiencies – some of the key challenges to the statute’s 
ability to achieve its objectives have yet to be encountered. REACH endows regulators with new 
authority to mandate data production and disclosure; but determining whether companies have 
provided complete responses remains as before a challenge. Initial compliance evaluation by the 
new European chemicals regulator, ECHA, for instance indicates that a significant proportion of 
registrations have shortcomings and need to be supplemented with additional information 
(ECHA 2011). It is also yet unclear whether the design of REACH can resolve the fierce disputes 
that will ensue when a lucrative and widely used chemical is shown to cause unacceptable risk 
(Abelkop et al. 2012: 11045). Authorization and restriction under REACH mandate some 
economic balancing of risks and benefits, and REACH will ultimately require the regulator to lift 
the burden of justifying that the benefits of restrictions outweigh their costs (Applegate 2008). 
Much of the information needed to quantify costs lies however exclusively within the particular 
knowledge of industry; and companies, which stand to benefit from delay or inaction, of course 
have no incentive to provide reliable estimates. In view of the U.S. experience, this turn to cost-
benefit analysis in EU chemicals regulation thus in particular gives cause for concern. 
Manufacturers will in any event look to the risk assessment procedure and socio-economic 
analyses to defend their substances. John Applegate (2008: 746f.) observes: “the administrative 
process within the Commission […] for imposing restrictions (opinions of Risk Assessment and 
Socio-Economic Analysis committees must be solicited and responded to), and the review 
process with other organs, adopt a level of procedural complexity that in some ways rivals 
TSCA.”  
This overlap between the REACH restriction procedure and TSCA illustrates one of the 
perhaps inescapable dilemmas of toxic substance regulation. Chemicals legislation is by virtue of 
the arcane and obscure subject it seeks to regulate inherently complex. But complexity works in 
favor of those with the resources and knowledge to exploit it – that is, industry. On structure and 
process in politics, Matthew McCubbins and colleagues (1989: 469) write:  
“More elaborate procedures are generally regarded as favorable to regulated industries. Because industries 
possess much of the information relevant to regulatory decisions, elaborate processes give them more 
power by increasing the importance of that information. Another contributing factor is that industries, 
with greater economic stakes in regulatory issues, are more likely to devote the resources necessary to be 
effectively represented in expensive proceedings. In this case, established industries […] are more likely to 
be advantaged by cumbersome proceedings.” 
REACH runs close to 900 pages of dense legal text and regulations – a statutory complex which 
cannot fail but create wiggle room for enterprising corporate lawyers and legal experts. 
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Companies will at any rate and without fail scrutinize and probe every last page in search for legal 
loopholes and regulatory fissure that will allow them to keep their chemicals on the market.  
Whether the procedures and safeguards in REACH will operate as intended or whether – as 
was the case for TSCA – they will be bent and subverted to serve the interests of manufacturers 
remains to be seen. As the 2018 implementation deadline draws near important issues still needs 
to be settled – the least of which is how REACH will regulate nanomaterials to ensure a 
sufficient supply of information on their potential human health and environmental effects 
(Azoulay 2012). Industry will of course mobilize to demand that their interpretation of scientific 
developments, technical feasibility and economic impacts are considered; and as before, the 
power to disclose, bias and withhold information will remain a significant source of influence 
over the decisions and outcomes of toxic substance control. Predictions that REACH will 
profoundly and inevitably transform the dynamics of chemical control policy are in short 
premature. Across the Atlantic, the momentum to update and strengthen TSCA meanwhile 
falters. Despite mounting frustration with the act’s palpable shortcomings, pushback from the 
chemical industry and congressional gridlock combine to thwart attempts to reform U.S. 
chemicals legislation. 
Must we then resign to leave decisions on the safety of chemicals in the hands of the very 
businesses that stand to gain from keeping them on the market? Of course not! The chemical 
industry is not omnipotent and manufacturers cannot do as they please. Industry is not the only 
source of information; and it certainly does not have a monopoly on expertise. Although perhaps 
disadvantaged in terms of resources, other groups also offer advice on chemical hazards. And 
while much information might be either under-supplied or inaccessible, state agencies do have 
their own sources of information and expertise. Governments routinely assess the harmful 
properties of chemicals and dangerous substances can be – and are – taken of the market, albeit 
perhaps not at the rate we would like. We can and should in short trust state authorities to 
protect our health and safety. But if we want regulators to prevent harm, we must of course also 
give them the budgetary means, regulatory tools and authority as well as independence required 
to implement their statutory obligations. If not, companies will face little resistance and few 
obstacles to their desire to keep dangerous substances on the market. 
Manufacturers and users meanwhile do have cumulative experience from working with their 
chemicals as well as significant advantages in technical skills, access to data, and research capacity 
that cannot – and should not – simply be brushed aside. Because this information only to a 
limited degree can be secured through compulsion (Schneider 1985: 180), we must in other 
words also continue to look for methods to tap industry’s superior knowledge, expertise and 
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resources. Companies for their part will – understandably – only volunteer information if they are 
confident that it will not be used to the detriment of their interests. The experience with 
nanotech regulation documented over the pages of this thesis suggests that one such method to 
encourage disclosure consists of establishing venues, where representatives from state authorities 
and industry can meet on a regular basis to debate potential sources of harm and their possible 
solutions. If such deliberative fora succeed in convincing companies that the decisions and 
outcomes of chemical safety policy will consider their inputs and – where possible – 
accommodate their interests, they might be instrumental to persuade companies to entrust 
regulators with sensitive information. Cooperation among regulators and industry thus remains as 
before a desirable feature of chemical control policy.  
But it is not unproblematic either. Close and intimate relations among regulators and the 
industries they regulate undeniably risk the capture of state authorities. We must therefore 
demand and expect balanced participation in administrative risk management proceedings, lest 
advisory committees and stakeholder panels degenerate into vehicles of unchecked access and 
perhaps illicit influence. Bringing all relevant stakeholders to the table might facilitate mutual 
understandings of difficult-to-resolve scientific and technical problems, exchanges about the 
consequences of different decisions as well as afford participants opportunities to iron out their 
disagreements through discussion and negotiation. Regular deliberations among a closed group of 
experts might allow the parties to build trust and develop relations that facilitate candor in 
discussion – and companies may thus ultimately be more forthcoming and honest about sharing 
sensitive information. But just as likely however they will not. Our common interest in the safety 
of the chemicals we use and consume in any event demands that we find ways to convince 
companies to volunteer information about their substances. The alternative to recall the words of 
a German official is that ‘otherwise industry would do the research and we would never see the 
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APPENDIX A  




COUNTRY LOCATION DATE AFFILIATION 
Denmark Phone 23 February 2011 Industry 
Denmark Copenhagen 9 March 2011 Government 
Denmark Copenhagen 9 March 2011 Industry 
Denmark Copenhagen 31 May 2011 Academia 
Denmark Copenhagen 1 June 2011 Industry 
Denmark Phone 2 July 2013 Government 
Germany Berlin 22 June 2012 Civil Society Organization 
Germany Berlin 22 June 2012 Government 
Germany Dessau-Roßlau 8 October 2012 Government 
Germany Dortmund 11 October 2012 Government 
Germany Frankfurt 11 October 2012 Industry 
Germany Phone 30 October 2012 Civil Society Organization 
United Kingdom Phone 1 March 2011 Civil Society Organization 
United Kingdom Brussels 2 March 2011 Industry 
United Kingdom London 3 March 2011 Government 
United Kingdom London 3 March 2011 Government 
United Kingdom London 3 March 2011 Academia 
United Kingdom Durham 6 June 2011 Industry 
United Kingdom London 7 June 2011 Civil Society Organization 
United Kingdom London 8 June 2011 Industry 
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COUNTRY LOCATION DATE AFFILIATION 
United States Phone 3 April 2012 Academia 
United States Washington, D.C. 16 April 2012 Industry 
United States Washington, D.C. 17 April 2012 Civil Society Organization 
United States Washington, D.C. 18 April 2012 Industry 
United States Washington, D.C. 19 April 2012 Government 
United States Washington, D.C. 23 April 2012 Government 
United States Phone 31 May 2012 Industry 
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